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Thesis Abstract
This thesis is a critical examination of the fundamental transformations that late 
capitalist societies have undergone in the last few decades and their impact on the 
modem institution of the nation-state .With the subsumption of industrial capitalism 
by a digital and informational capitalism; with the advent of global computerised 
network systems, software packages, satellite telecommunications, the internet, the 
website, and the simultaneous decline of national industries, ‘national’ societies have 
visibly changed in the last few decades. Their borders are more salient; their 
‘national’ governments are less in charge of the dynamics of their ‘national’ 
economies; their sovereignties are threatened by ‘the euro’ and ‘the global’; their 
cultures are exposed to the uninterrupted bombardment of adverts, images, signs and 
suggestive strategies of multinational companies for a higher level of disposable 
consumption; their distinctive ‘national’ commonalties are confronted by the 
media-led hyperreal culture of global consumerism and their distinct sense of time 
and place in history is blurred. These transformations are conceptualised and 
analysed as a paradigmatic shift from Modernity to postmodemity.
Furthermore the institution of the nation-state is proposed and reasoned to be 
perceived as an institution of Modernity in which the primordial need for bonding 
and belonging is crystallised. The conjunction of the conditions of Modernity with 
the primordial need for belonging allowed the modem ideology of state nationalism 
to masterfully claim eternity for the nation-state itself This thesis argues for the 
temporality of the nation-state while preserving the notion of a primordial and 
transverse mode of collective being based on vernacular cultures and ethnicities. 
The temporality of the nation-state is empirically substantiated in this thesis in 
reference to the twin postmodern forces of ‘globalisation’ and ‘localisation’ which 
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Introduction
“(Capitalism) cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, 
and thereby the relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered 
forms was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. 
Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from 
earlier ones. All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable 
prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before 
they can ossify. AH that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned...” (Preface to 
Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels 1888).
At the turn of the third millennium, Marx’s vision of the essence of capitalism and its 
impact on human relationships still makes great sense. As capitalism enters its latest 
postmodern micro-electronic phase, and its flexible accumulation strategies and 
digital codes dictate a new spatial and temporal organisation of social and economic 
life, the modem socio-economic boundaries and epistemic paradigms are slowly 
replaced and rendered obsolete. As humanity is globally and instantaneously exposed 
to the powerful suggestions of the global capitalist marketing and advertising 
strategies, their solidities ‘melt into air’ and their distinct ties and identities are 
‘agitated’ and/or ‘profaned ‘by an ‘uninterrupted disturbance’ of the global economy 
and its consumerist culture.
The post-industrial phase of capitalism or postmodem/(y poses fundamental 
questions regarding the meaning of individual and collective identity and the 
problematic of their representation. One of the greatest platforms of representation 
of collective identity is the national-state which has powerfully controlled the 
administration of a ‘national’ identity and the delegation of ‘national’ groups such as 
armies, politicians and policy-makers since the 18th century.
However in recent years the ‘sovereignty’ and ‘homogeneity’ of the national-state has 
been agitated and threatened by global economic and cultural imperatives. The
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challenge is multidimensional. On the one hand, the need for a constantly expanding 
market for its products drives capitalism over the whole surface of the globe, 
accelerates its geographical or spatial expansion beyond the national boundaries and 
gives insight into the logic behind globalisation. It must nestle everywhere, settle 
everywhere and establish connections everywhere. The need for creating and/or 
retaining its local affiliations provides another insight into the capitalist logic of 
decentralisation and localisation. This is reflected in the postmodern sensibility of 
‘think globally, act locally’. The unity and sovereignty of the national-state is 
continuously pulled apart by this twin force, while simultaneously the structures of 
postmodern//)/ erode those of Modernity on which the nation-state rose and reached 
the peak of its power from the 18th century to the mid 20th century.
On the other hand, ‘fact and fiction’, ‘truth and falsehood’, ‘genuineness and forgery’ 
and ‘value and non-value’ become unverifiable and fuse together as virtual reality to 
characterise the fast growing postmodern world of the Internet . Once again all 
modem divisions and boundaries collapse in the new social sphere of the internet and 
the website becomes the new locus of emerging and/or forging new identities and 
relationships in a transborder fashion. The internet provides a new international 
space and a global board in which all sorts of connections and exchanges take place. 
National boundaries and identities lose their anchorage point in place and time and 
sink into the global simultaneity and anonymity of the digital sign.
Furthermore, in the new millennium the techniques of cloning and genetic 
engineering will remove the last frontier of genetic identity and a conception of 
‘blood and belonging’, which allegedly enlightened humanity of their inherent racial 
and ethnic distinctions throughout the modem period. The horizon for a genetically 
engineered and cloned identity is vast. It also is potentially highly manipulable by the 
western elite in the scientific processes of selection of the ideal physical and genetic 
type. Scientific innovations have already made it possible for humans to decide the 
physical and genetic make-up of the next generation and interfere in the natural
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process of ageing. A preferred combination of intelligence and physical type can be 
created and the ones less preferred can be genetically cleansed. In this process, the 
natural evolutionary path of genetic determination can be overcome and replaced by 
artificially engineered and cloned identities.
These developments will have serious consequences for individual and collective 
identities and their conceptualisation in the third millennium. Authorities that 
currently represent individual and collective identities such as the national-state have 
come under increasing pressure to abandon some of their sovereign power to meet the 
requirements of the global, the euro, and the ethnic, and also in order to deal with 
global issues such as the environment, poverty, over-population, AIDS, genetic 
engineering, and war-mongering.
The Argument
The nation-state has been the dominant platform for representing individual and 
collective identities throughout the modem period. In the name of ‘national identity’ 
and in the official language and ideology of ‘nationalism’, modem states have 
legitimised their policies of segregating or conglomerating and regulating diverse 
human collectivities into ‘national’ boundaries, and in delegating ‘national’ groups. 
The underlying assumption of modem ‘nationalism’ is that human collectivities are 
distinctly separable along ancestral and sometimes racial divides which if combined 
with some other shared attributes of a community such as language, religion, 
ethnicity and territory, could then naturally be crystallised in the form of a nation­
state if the collectivity so wishes. Hence according to ‘nationalism’ all distinct 
collectivities share a fundamental homogeneity and unity that can be expressed in 
the form of a ’nation’, and all ‘nations’ have the right to self-rule and sovereignty by 
creating their own territorial ‘state’. It follows from a nationalist perspective that the 
maintenance and/or building of a homogenous, united and sovereign ‘nation-state’ is
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always explicable with reference to a shared past and rooted in some primordial or 
perennial need
The ideology of nationalism offers a teleological and functionalist explanation that is 
based on a circle of assumptions that all nation-states are the result of an ethnic past; 
all those ethnic groups who have not made their own distinct nation-states have not 
really wanted it seriously enough; and all the ethnic groups that have become extinct 
could not properly utilise their shared values to create a viable nation.
Nationalism confuses the unmediated and transverse truth of ‘ethnic identity’ with a 
‘national identity’ whose embodiment in the form of the nation-state is mediated 
from above by the colonial, imperial and modem processes of nation-state building. I 
will argue that there are fundamental differences between an ethnic collectivity and 
its distinct cultural and historical attributes, and the nation-state. The main 
differences are:
- An ethnic community is bonded together at the grassroots levels by a vernacular 
culture. A nation-state, on the other hand, is a political institution and it is held 
together by the administrative power of the modem state from above.
- An ethnic community can take the form of a nation-state, but in most cases there is 
no one to one relationship between them. Most ethnic groups do not have their own 
nation-states and most existing nation-states do not represent all the ethnic groups 
that live in them equally. Many ethnic groups such as the Kurds are divided among 
several nation-states and most national-states conglomerate several ethnic groups in 
a hierarchical relationship of power. Hence a nation-state cannot be explained 
merely in terms of a shared ethnic past.
- An ethnic collectivity is temporally transverse, whereas the nation-state is a modem 
entity whose basic definitions originate from the French Revolution of 1789 and the
12
Enlightenment which mark the start of the era of Modernity.
- It follows that if the conditions of Modernity change, the conditions of the 
existence of the nation-state will change too.
Against the basic nationalistic assumptions that all ethnic groups could evolve into a 
‘nation-state’, it is argued below that the nation-state is a historically temporal and 
spatial form of representation of a collectivity, and hence can be subjected to the 
transcending and mortalising passage of time. With the postmodern processes of 
globalisation and decentralisation, there are serious impediments for the nation­
state to effectively represent the sovereignty and unity of ‘its’ people as it did 
throughout the modem period.
The substantiation of this argument constitutes the main task of this thesis. Three 
fundamental attributes of homogeneity, unity and sovereignty of the nation-state 
have been chosen through a pilot study to examine whether the nation-state has 
declined in the context of postmodemity or not. The question tackled by this thesis is 
“can the sovereignty, unity and homogeneity of the nation-state survive the structural 
transformations of late capitalism”? If this research finds no changes in the 
perceptions of ‘homogeneity’, ‘unity’ and ‘sovereignty’ of the nation-state in the 
context of postmodemity, then the primordial roots of the nation-state asserted by 
nationalism are confirmed And if the reverse is found, the temporality and hence 
mortality of the nation-state is substantiated.
This thesis, therefore, has set itself the twin task of firstly conceptualising the 
‘postmodern’ phenomena and* analysing the fundamental transformations that have 
resulted from the micro-electronic and digital revolution which characterise the 
structures of postmodernity. This is to show how Modernity can be structurally 
differentiated from postmodemity. Secondly by locating the institution of the nation­
state in the structural and epistemic framework of Modernity, this thesis intends to
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find out whether the nation-state will sustain itself as a unit of representation of 
individual and collective identity in the context of postmodemity.
It is important to add here that although this thesis proposes a linkage between 
postmodern/^ as the structural facets of late capitalism, postmodernism as the 
ideological, artistic and aesthetic expressions of late capitalism and postmodern 
theory as epistemic contemplations of late capitalism, it only concentrates on 
postmodern//)/. A full elaboration of the proposed linkage is not the intention of this 
research. The aim is to show the decline of the nation-state under the conditions of 
postmodern//)/, and the need to focus on this central discussion together with the 
pressure of time and space to expand the discussion in other directions, made me 
reflect on the linkage between digital capitalism and changes in epistemology, 
politics, ideology and culture only schematically.
There is another point I wish to make here. There is now a vast literature on the 
postmodern phenomena, and I have had to be highly selective in choosing only those 
books and articles which have a cmcial importance and relevance to this thesis. I 
have not included many interesting books and articles in this area which do not have 
an immediate bearing on my discussion. Limited time and space also constrained me 
to demonstrate the results of my research in reference to other countries and I have 
had to conduct my research in reference to a single case-study: Britain.
Organisation of the thesis
My examination of these problems is comprised of a theoretical and an empirical 
part. There are five chapters in the theoretical part and one extended chapter together 
with four appendices in the empirical part. In the theoretical part the thesis does two 
things. Firstly it locates the institution of the nation-state in the context of Modernity 
and in doing so the temporality and spatiality of the phenomenon is established. 
Secondly it shows how the structures of Modernity are being subsumed by those of
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postmodemity under the conditions of micro-electronic and digital capitalism. The 
theoretical conclusion of Part One is that as the modem contexts on which the nation­
state rose, are being transformed by the global imperatives, the institution of the 
nation-state will weaken and slowly decline as a ‘sovereign’ unit of representation of 
an allegedly ‘united’ and ‘homogenous’ collectivity.
The second part of this thesis examines empirically the above theoretical 
suppositions. This time no conceptual and abstract analysis is offered, but the aim is 
to empirically ‘observe’ what is impervious to theoretical reasoning: subjectivity. The 
focus is on the feelings and perceptions of the people of the nation-state regarding 
their ‘national identity’ expressed in the concepts of homogeneity, unity and 
sovereignty. The aim of the empirical part is to find out if what people sense about 
their identity in the context of postmodemity has any level of correspondence to our 
theoretical hypotheses.
On this basis the theoretical part moves largely on a global canvass whereas the 
empirical part concentrates on a national canvass. The linkage should be clear. In the 
conceptual framework of the theoretical part I attempt to differentiate between the 
structures of modernity and postmodemity in order to show the subsumption of the 
former by the latter, and how the modem grounds on which the ‘national’ was 
originally formed, now are agitated and disturbed by the twin forces of globalisation 
and decentralisation. In the empirical part, however, the thesis examines the extent of 
the agitation and disturbance of the solidity of ‘national identity’ in the subjective 
realm.
Part One: Theory
Chapter One is a ground clearing chapter which defines the term postmodern in its 
multiple applications. The postmodern phenomena are diverse and the term 
postmodern is used in social and cultural debates of recent years to signify almost 
anything from McDonaldisation of the world to the banality of the simulated
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televisual representation of a hyper-reality; from post-enlightenment epistemology to 
the abolition of scientism and meta-narratives; from celebration of cult religions, 
Islamic Fundamentalism, homosexual politics, intuitive power, the god within, 
science-fiction, the findings of Quantum Physics, the quark in the atom (which has 
no objectivity, but determines the behaviour of the atom), the notion of ‘difference’ 
to the abandonment of ‘fixed categories and hierarchies’, ‘certainty’, and ‘a sense of 
destination’ in artistic productions; from computerisation and flexible accumulation 
thesis to satellite telecommunication and media controlled consumerist society. The 
list is long and the range is wide.
Chapter one proposes a typology of ‘postmodern phenomena’ in order to clarify the 
researcher’s use and definition of the term ‘postmodern’ throughout this work. 
Furthermore, Chapter One paves the way for specifying how the nation-state is 
analysed in the light of a wide range of ‘postmodern phenomena’. Five different and 
mutually inclusive applications of the term ‘postmodern’ have been proposed and 
defined.
Chapter Two moves away from all the definitions that chapter one provides in order 
to establish the other important concern of this thesis, that of defining the nation­
state. These definitions then meet in chapter three and onwards to be subjected to 
theoretical interrogations in finding out what kind of a relationship exists between the 
postmodern phenomena and the nation-state.
Chapter Two argues that the nation-state is a modem phenomenon whose political 
and territorial unity is woven together and reinforced by a powerful ‘national’ 
subjectivity and imagination of distinctiveness, antiquity and unity. The nation-state 
is proposed to be perceived as a dominant container in which old and new forces that 
shape human collective identities meet to unfold in a ‘national’ form. The 
modernity of the essential parameters of the nation-state such as its territorial and 
political congruence, citizenship, the print industry, the epistemology of the
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Enlightenment combine to educate ‘people’ to the belief that ‘we’ are eternally a 
‘national we’; ‘collective distinctiveness’ is permanently a ‘national distinctiveness’ 
and ‘them’ is perpetually a ‘national them’. Hence through the processes of 
nationalisation of culture, the ‘ethnic’ and the ‘folk’ are taught to be equivalent and 
even synonymous to the ‘national \ In the same way modem concepts such as 
national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity are used by the national-states as 
ontological and indisputable attributes of any legitimate collectivity as if they are pre- 
given and timeless attributes of a people. I will argue that such misconceived 
equivalencies can only be attained through the implementation of power by the 
modem education system and the standardisation of a national identity by the 
national-state, and that the nation-state is only a spatial and temporal embodiment of 
a collectivity which uses the modem language of nationalism to claim antiquity.
I have attempted to synthesise the work of a number of significant scholars in the 
field such as Elie Kedourie, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm and 
Anthony Smith to arrive at a new definition of the nation-state, because I believe that 
if their contributions are combined, we will be able to have a more comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of the phenomenon in discussion. The rationale behind 
this synthesis is that the nation-state cannot be only an objective modem 
phenomenon, nor can it reside purely on a common past and history. Past and 
present, subjectivity and objectivity are interwoven in both the ‘performative’ and 
‘pedagogical’ discourses of nationhood.1 On this basis chapter two offers a new 
definition of the nation-state.
As soon as the nation-state is defined and asserted as a modem representative of 
collective identity and a power vehicle for separating ‘us’ and ‘them’, it can be
1 By performative nation I mean the nation that unfolds and performs itself in its daily life or the 
diachronic nation that lives itself through the passage of time and through its daily interactions. By 
pedagogical nation I mean the nation that is synchronically taught by the education system, that is the 
nation that learns itself from lectures and books. Also see Homi Bhabha’s Nation and Narration 
(1990, Ch. 16).
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subjected to postmodern scrutiny, critique and deconstruction. This is the aim of 
Chapter Three. Chapter Three provides a model of a postmodern critique of the 
nation-state by deconstructing the nationalistic narratives of the nation-state, and 
replacing them with a postmodern account in which the definitions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
are hybrid, ambivalent and mutually inclusive.
However in deciphering Homi Bhabha’s postmodern critique of the institution of the 
nation-state, the chapter also provides a critique of postmodern theory by stating that 
no postmodern theory can adequately enlighten us of the essence of any phenomenon 
unless the analysis conceptualises, includes and comes to terms with the biggest 
meta-narrative of our time, capitalism. I have argued that postmodern theory ought to 
anchor itself in the political economy of postmodemity if it does not want to be 
equated with nihilism and pure relativism. On this basis the postmodern 
abandonment of meta-narratives altogether seems to fall short of a crucial insight that 
there is still a world capitalism that seeks profit across the globe and in doing so 
constantly reshuffles and reshapes the fabrics of our social and economic lives 
everywhere. The crucial task of a postmodern theory is to show awareness of how the 
changing structures of late capitalism have rendered modem meta-narratives 
obsolete.
This is the task of Chapter Four where the thesis turns to look at the structural 
transformations of late capitalism in the light of the micro-electronic revolution and 
the way these transformations condition the ground for postmodern cultural and 
aesthetic sensibilities, ideologies and theories. In this chapter the nation-state and the 
question of sustainability of its boundaries are analysed in the context of globalisation 
and postmodemity. Chapter four conceptualises the emerging postmodern institutions 
and spaces of governance, and a notion of postmodern time, and substantiates how 
under the conditions of postmodemity a different spatial and temporal reorganisation 
of social and cultural life is being experienced. The experience of nationhood is 
compared and contrasted with these developments.
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Chapter Five continues the argument on the dynamics of ‘globalisation’ and 
‘localisation’ from a different angle. If the focal point of chapter four was the 
processes of globalisation, chapter five looks at the processes of localisation by 
concentrating on ethnic nationalism and the issue of immigration. We must 
acknowledge that despite all of what has been said in asserting a decline of the 
nation-state, ethnic awareness and nationalism have become stronger in the context 
of globalisation in the last few decades. The examples of Yugoslavia and the former 
Soviet Union suffice to show this. At first sight the claims of a decline of the nation­
state simultaneously with a rising ethnic nationalism might appear contradictory. 
However this is not the case. A distinction has to be made between ethnic 
nationalism and the civil nationalism of the national-state. The national-state is 
created from above , and through centralised power mechanisms. Ethnic groups and 
what binds them together, on the other hand, are not modem creations, only their 
position in the nation-state is modem; they are historical and cultural entities that 
existed prior to modem times. Modernity has not generated ethnicity, but it has 
generated the institution of the nation-state. Therefore the chapter concludes that the 
structures of postmodemity and the processes of globalisation are accompanied by a 
rise in ethnic awareness precisely because the national-state is in decline.
Part Two : Empirical Enquiry
Chapter Six, (together with its four appendices), is an empirical chapter devoted to 
investigating whether the theoretical suggestions made in the previous chapters about 
a decline of the nation-state are true or not. The interest of this chapter is to measure 
a sense of a decline of the national identity by people. The rationale of this chapter is 
that if the theoretical observations made in part one are realistic, then it should also 
be possible to find corresponding reflections in the way people fee l about their 
national identity in the postmodern times.
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The first step was to select a single nation-state as a testing-ground, and Britain was 
chosen as my case-study for several reasons. It represents a classic prototype2 model 
of nation/state building from above with a strong historical sense of ethnic 
consciousness that goes well beyond the modem period. It is one of the strongest 
nation-states of the world and has always presented itself as possessing a very strong 
sense of ‘national identity5 in reference to a distinct ethnic past. And it has been a 
leading socio-economic power in both the modem and postmodern times. Hence any 
indication of a historical change in a sense of national identity would be highly 
significant for our discussion.
The second step taken in Chapter Six was to establish the ‘concepts and indicators5 of 
national identity. This was conducted through a pilot study which involved the study 
of the editorials and commentaries of four British newspapers on a daily basis for one 
month. Newspapers were chosen because they are one of the most powerful media 
that reflect on the ‘national culture5. Editorials and commentaries were chosen as 
units of analysis because that is where we are most likely to find opinions, views and 
analysis of cultural issues. The cultural sphere was chosen because people's 
subjectivities are mostly expressed through the daily cultural interactions.
After a month three of the most recurrent concepts defining the nation-state were 
selected. These were national homogeneity, unity and sovereignty. Against each 
concept three of the most recurrent dimensions were chosen. The three dimensions 
that have a diminishing effect on national sovereignty were growth of 
“europeanisation55, “globalisation55 and “inability to solve own (national) problems”. 
Likewise three of the most recurrent dimensions that challenge the unity and 
homogeneity of the nation-state were found to be: “a declining sense of national 
belonging”, “ a growing sense of hybridity” and “a growing sense of ethnic
2 Also see Adrian Hastings’ argument on the British nation-state in the Construction o f Nationhood
(1997 CHs. 1 & 2)
20
consciousness”. For each dimension one, two or three indicators were chosen. The 
concepts, dimensions, and indicators are organised in the form of the following table.
Dependent Indicators 
and their codes
Al- a decline in social morality/integration
Bl - multiculturalism 
B2- pluralism
Cl- Scotland & Wales 
C2- N. Ireland
Dl-environment 
D2- defence and security 
D3- decline of national economy
El-Europe
FI- global village of consumerism/global culture 
F2- global technology 
F3- global economy
The above indicators are dependent on the independent indicator of time. The 
measurement of the above dependent indicators against the independent indicator of 
time constitutes the pivotal task of the empirical chapter.
As I wanted to obtain comparative data from different decades, I consulted the 
British Newspaper Library in Colindale to look at the newspapers’ editorials and 
commentaries since the 1920s when the British nation-state was the strongest 
imperial power in the world and its sense of national homogeneity, unity and 
sovereignty was never questioned or doubted. Four British newspapers were selected. 
Two were from the quality newspapers. These were The Guardian which represents a 
centre-to-left perspective and The Times which represents a centre-to-right approach 
to reflecting and interpreting the daily affairs of the nation. To make sure that the 
data is as representative as possible two tabloids were also selected. Those were The 
Mirror and the Daily Express. The Mirror is perceived to be a socialist paper 
supporting the Labour Party and the Daily Express a right-wing paper that has always
Dimensions
(of the concept of a ‘diminishing sense 
of National homogeneity and sovereignty')
A- a diminishing sense of national belonging
B- an increasing sense of national hybridity
C- growing regional ethnicities
D- an increasing sense of inability to solve 
own problems
E- an increasing sense of Europeanisation 
F- an increasing sense of globalisation
supported the Conservative Party. All four papers have been in print since the 1920s 
which makes the task of historical comparison possible. These four newspapers have 
been sampled over five decades from the 1920s to 1990s for the purpose of content 
analysis. The findings of the earlier decades (1920s and 1930s) are compared to the 
later decades (1970s, 1980s and 1990s).
To cross-examine my findings, I then proceeded to consult The Journal o f British 
Public Opinion and The Journal o f British Social Attitudes. There I found only two 
sets of interviews conducted by MORI Polls on the issues of ‘Europeanisation’ and 
the ‘decline of civil society’ which seemed appropriate for comparison. The results of 
both sets of interviews tended to confirm my own empirical investigation in respect 
to ‘Europeanisation’ and the ‘decline of civil society in Britain’.
This research has reached the conclusion that despite the fact that the majority of the 
British population still has a very strong sense of national identity, there is a 
verifiable historical tendency towards the decline of a sense of national identity and 
the national-state in Britain. This conclusion proves that the national-state is a 
modem and time-bound phenomenon that despite its masterful utilisation of ethnicity 






What are the postmodern phenomena?
The term postmodern has generated a large amount of literature in every academic 
discipline from architecture and art, to geography, law, politics, medicine, 
philosophy, biology, sociology and so on. The crystallisation of a postmodern 
literature, and/or literature on the postmodern, over the last few decades, and the 
impacts left on all academic and artistic fields by a seemingly rebellious postmodern 
critique of a hitherto existing conceptual framework of analysis called Modernist, is 
now so pervasive and definitions so diverse that a typology of the postmodern 
phenomena may be useful.
The task of this chapter is to suggest a model of such a typology and to arrive at 
different conceptions of the term ‘postmodern’. This chapter is only conceptually 
crucial for my work because it is within such a conceptual framework that I can do 
the grounding definitional work in order to anchor my prospective arguments on the 
relationship between the postmodern society and the institution of the nation-state.
It is also useful to add that the recognition of the term ‘postmodern’ is not meant to 
promote an adherence to the term or to discourage challenge to the postmodern 
phenomena. However either of these positions require a prior acceptance that new 
terrains of theoretical and practical discourses are created by the postmodern 
phenomena, that should be reflected upon critically.
The postmodern phenomena are multidimensional; as the latest phase of capitalist 
development, postmodern/# refers to socio-economic structures of late capitalism 
and their mode of integration and implementation. These changes have been evolved 
and incorporated into the political economy of digital capitalism as a result of the 
third industrial revolution known as the ‘micro electronic revolution’ that has new
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and distinctive technologies and machineries of articulation of power, time, space, 
and political economy and new modes of capital accumulation. The term 
postmodern/# is used synonymously with informational and digital capitalism in this 
thesis. The primary technologies of postmoderrdty are computer network systems, 
satellite telecommunications and the media. David Harvey , Lash and Urry are 
proponents of postmodemity understood in this sense.
Postmodernism, on the other hand refers to the aesthetic, artistic, cultural/political 
movements and ideologies of late capitalism. As an aesthetic ideology, 
postmodernism aims to deconstruct and decode the modernist constructions o f ‘order*, 
’hierarchy*, Inherent meaning*, and the universality of ‘the Truth*. In political and 
cultural movements, the postmodern is the rise of Modernism's Other. Postmodern 
theory is either the conceptualisation of the shift from the Modem to the postmodern 
(or some aspects of it), and/or a new mode of critical analysis of Modernity and 
Modernism as totalitarian systems. In either case the Modem conceptual framework 
that explains the world around certain basic positivistic and scientific dichotomies 
whose binary relationship is organised hierarchically, is challenged. Foucault, 
Lyotard, Jameson & Baudrillard are some of the theorists that have specifically 
worked in this direction.
Now a few words on semantics. Broadly speaking, postmodemity is the latest phase 
of the modem era, but indeed as many critiques point out, it is a futile attempt to 
make some thing appear as beyond the modem time, after the modem, or even more 
modem than the modem itself! The distinction of the modem and postmodern, in this 
sense is indeed meaningless; because both terms are used as time adjectives for what 
is happening now, with no historical reference; hence their sequence or concurrence 
appears as totally unintelligible and arbitrary.
However, I would like to suggest that the challenge of the postmodern is towards 
Modernity and Modernism (with a capital M). In this sense the Modem refers to a
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vision; an ideology; an epistemological paradigm; a mode of conceptualisation, 
institutionalisation and integration of social life, originating from the Enlightenment. 
The relationship between the modem as a period, with Modernity and Modernism as 
structures and ideologies is that the latter represents an epistemological and 
institutionalised mode of governance of the former. It is like the relationship 
between the Middle ages as a historical period, and Christianity as its dominant 
institutional and ideological mode of governance.
It is rather unfortunate that the word modem has a double meaning in the literature 
concerning us here; one referring to a specific period- the modem time; and the other 
(Modem) referring to specific institutional and ideological discourses characterising 
and governing this modem time. For this reason, I suggest using a capital M for the 
latter meaning. The postmodern, is a response to Modernity and Modernism as the 
legacy of the Enlightenment, and it also is what is happening in the latest phase of 
capitalism: in other words it is quite modem!
The legacy of the Enlightenment
What is it that the postmodern challenges? The Enlightenment thinkers of the 
eighteenth century wanted to establish a scientific understanding of the world that 
could disillusion and disenchant the world from religious and metaphysical 
explanations. Much influenced by a Newtonian revolutionary vision in natural 
sciences, they wanted a Newton of the moral and social sciences. For the new social 
scientists of the Enlightenment, the old 'truths' expounded by Christianity and the 
Pagan classics, now became problematic. The ’modems' wanted to surpass the 
'ancients' in their convictions that the use of the natural scientific method in social 
sciences was necessary for the 'advancement' of learning. They were interested to 
introduce ‘models’, similar to natural science models, to represent a complete and 
final account of social phenomea, each more accurate than the previous one As 
Voltaire emphasised in his Philosophical Letters' (1733), Newton's achievements 
truly demonstrated that science was the key to human progress. (Porter, 1990, P. 17)
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The Enlightenment thinkers demonstrated an absolute faith in a scientific 
understanding of man for the aim of advancement and progress of learning and 
knowledge and they believed that such an understanding could be acquired in the 
most factual way as if one could take photographs of the reality out there through 
rigorous scientific procedures. This faith was implicit in the work of Herder, 
Condorcet and Miller, that much of humanity had already risen from savagery to 
civilisation and a definite journey had started from myth to reason; a true scientific 
knowledge could be objectively grounded upon facts rather than upon untestable 
assumptions.
Although passionate cynics such as William Blake denounced the "dark, satanic 
mills" and condemned Bacon, Locke, Newton, and Voltaire as the evil geniuses 
behind the system, there was no reversal from this much enthused age of secular 
reason, technology and industrial capitalism, especially when the leading 
revolutionary bourgeoisie of the French Revolution delivered promises of 
preservation of liberty, freedom of trade and religion, and put an end to the monstrous 
evils of religious bigotry and feudal aristocracy.
A secular vision of the limitless human drive towards economic growth, scientific 
innovation, advancement of technology and human progress was evolved; a new form 
of reason was developed whose validity could only and autonomously be produced 
and judged by experimentation, observation and measurement. A 'value-free truth', 
objectively acquired, with a universal applicability, was passionately pursued and 
integrated into techno-scientific 'progress'. As a result of these overwhelming 
revolutionary developments of the 18th century, hermeneutic practical and intuitive 
reason which previously integrated the aesthetic, religious and moral judgements lost 
its power of judgement of truth. The new objective and scientific ‘Truth’ pompously 
divorced itself from subjective meaning and its emotional, instinctual, local and 
natural and intuitive sources. The separation was not the final step; there also
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developed a relationship of power placing the former, the great scientific Truth, in a 
superior and judgmental position. This great universal, objective and scientific Truth 
has governed Modernity and formed the Modernist epistemological paradigm since 
the 18th century. This mechanistic epistemological paradigm corresponded with the 
mechanical phase of capitalism and a Newtonian perception of the universe.
The implication of the separation between abstract scientific Reason, and 
hermeneutic/practical/intuitive reason is a division between the techno-scientific 
world of the 'experts' on the one hand, and on the other hand the life world of the 
'masses'. The separation also is an organising machinery in racial, sexual, ethnic, 
national1 and colonial discourses leading to widespread assumptions that the Truth is 
where the science and technology are. It is precisely in this respect that the critiques 
of Modernity and Enlightenment claim that Reason derived from the separation of a 
techno-scientific objectivity and a hermeneutic subjectivity is mechanical and 
totalitarian. To postmodern theorists, this Modernist conception of the world is 
inherently ideological. Techno-scientific reason is an ideology which replaces 
religion in organising the Modem power relationships.
The problem lies not so much in the theoretical principle of the Enlightenment as in 
its practice. In its desire to contest any form of animistic enchantment by nature, 
Enlightenment set out to think the natural world in an abstract form. As a result the 
material contents of the world become a merely formal conceptual set of categories. 
The Enlightenments emancipatory endeavour turns out to involve itself with a 
question of power. Knowledge, conceived as abstract and utilitarian, as mastery over 
a recalcitrant nature, becomes a medium of power, of manipulating, mastering, 
controlling, categorising and bordering the world for the enhancement of science, 
progress of technology and furthering of capitalist profitability2.
1 It may be more clear at this point why this chapter is an appropriate opening chapter for developing an argument 
on the impact of postmodemity on the phenomena of a ‘national’ nature.
2 It must also be acknowledged here that industrial capitalism and scientific knowledge have transformed the face of 
human societies for the better, and the positive impact of these developments and achievements should not be
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At the heart of the postmodern critique of Modernity and Modernism, lie the 
questions of power and totality; the dichotomies and boundaries that generate power 
relationships in totalitarian systems, and the way power is implemented against the 
hermeneutic and natural world by abstract techno-scientific Reason. The postmodern 
critique is essentially against the Modem dichotomies within which the discourses of 
power operate. Postmodern theorists, in their diverse theoretical undertakings, all 
embark on something very similar; they all want to dismantle Modernist boundaries 
and discourses within which the narratives of ‘truth’ and ‘power’ are produced.
However, I will argue below that the postmodern phenomenon can not be confined to 
and theorised as only a critique of, or a rebellion against the Modem. I would propose 
that together with a postmodern theory, a postmodern social structure is also 
emerging, that can be distinguished structurally from Modernity in terms of its 
technology and mode of economic and social integration. The question of power is 
not removed from the postmodern society, but its mode of integration and 
implementation is more horizontal than vertical, more global than national, and as a 
result of this structural change many Modem Boundaries and dichotomies vanish in 
the postmodern times to accommodate a more horizontal and global mode of 
integration across the globe.
I am therefore concluding here that the postmodern critique of Modernity and 
Modernism should be intrinsically linked to the emergence of postmodern social 
structures. An this point I can proceed and suggest a typology of postmodern 
phenomena bearing in mind that the separation of the types below is an analytical one 
only.
underestimated. Thus a critique of Modernity is not a nostalgic lamentation for the return of the past, but a 
critical reflection on the dark side of civilization and Modernity.
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A TYPOLOGY OF THE POSTMODERN PHENOMENA
I suggest five analytically different, but mutually inclusive uses of the term 
postmodern can be detected as follow:
1- Postmodernism as an aesthetic & artistic style in cultural production 
such as visual, arts, architecture, music, dance, poetry, painting etc.
2- Postmodern social and political movement, referring to the rise of the 
Other, whose colonisation, inferiorisation and subordination was an integral 
part of the making of Modem identities.
3 - Postmodern social theory poses a challenge to discourses and narratives 
of ‘truth’ & ‘power’ resulting from the epistemology of the Enlightenment.
4- Postmodemity as a social and economic reality, referring to the socio­
economic changes of late 20th century capitalism due to the micro­
electronic and digital revolution.
5- Postmodemity as a cultural condition, a term used to refer to the 
globalisation of a consumerist culture that controls the production and 
transformation of patterns of mass 'consumption' and 'life style' via the 
media.
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1- Postmodernism as an aesthetic style
This use of postmodernism is irrelevant to my thesis, and I shall not be incorporating 
or referring to any aspects of aesthetic/artistic postmodernism in my thesis. However 
for the sake of the integrity of my argument, it has been suggested that postmodern 
art appeals to different sensibilities compared to modem avantgarde art.
The task of the avantgarde Modernist art was to constantly shock its audience by the 
creation of the New and the Original and the Novel. In doing so the ‘masses’ were 
presumed as the Other who listened to the avantgarde, and its ‘progressive’ 
understanding of the next style. This is a journey at a very fast rate for progress which 
is one of the central objectives of Modernity. The question of avantgarde is therefore, 
fundamentally a question of the Enlightenment. In political terms the Enlightenment 
proposed a demarcation between the advanced and the underdeveloped, and in this 
distinction the advanced feels itself to be legitimated in its activities of mastering , 
controlling and dominating what is stigmatised as the underdeveloped.
Alterity (the constitution of the Other) is fundamental to the avantgarde art too. In 
this relationship the avantgarde is quite elitist, because the artist is the hero who has 
seen the future in advance of everyone else and risks his/her greater power on behalf 
of the ‘masses’. Baudelaire argues that aesthetic production and capturing of the 
New, the ephemeral, the contingent, the transient, the fugitive , the novel by the 
avantgarde artist becomes an aim in itself, which defines Modernity (Baudelair 1964, 
P. 13). The avantgarde artists, while trying to popularise art, simultaneously denies 
that art can be integrated into daily praxis of life.
Postmodern aesthetics abandon all claims of originality, novelty, and depth and 
sublate claims of artistic emancipation. Fredrick Jameson describes postmodern art as 
a repetition of the dead style. This repetition is either to playfully tease and mock the
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dead style (parody), or to blankly and humourlessly imitate the dead style and 
language which he calls Pastiche (Jameson, 1991).
I
The abandonment of the New, and the revival of the dead style in the name of art, 
creates a situation where the distinction between the past/present in artistic 
production vanishes, and instead a perpetual state of presentness that disguises the 
dead past, and presents it as the new style, is experienced. In such an experience 
different eras are juxtaposed, and the human subject loses its anchorage in history, an 
experience which is called ‘Schizophrenia’ by Jameson. He believes that in 
postmodernism the human subject is dead, by which he refers to a loss of his/her 
sense of purpose, creativity, originality, distinctiveness and autonomy. The 
postmodern subject has no original, distinctive core or centre in his/her identity. 
However more importantly the avantgarde loses its power relationship with the 
’audience* . The elitist artist who was responsible for the delivery of depth to an 
’audience’, is dead. The boundary is gone, and hence the question of representation is 
dissolved.
In Ihab Hassan's 'Toward a concept o f postmodernism a comparison is made between 
Modernism and postmodernism that sums up the difference: the Modernist artist 
seeks to represent a centred depth in a well boundaried and purposeful creation of 
the new in the form of a closed finished work from a position of ‘know-better’. The 
postmodernist artist, on the other hand, does not have any claims of representation; 
the art is playfully produced in a shallow, fragmentary, dispersed and de-creative 
manner, and the ’end’ result is disjunctive and open. ( Docherty, 1993, pp. 146-156).
2- Postmodemity as a social and political movement.
The deep formative influence lying behind most of the debate is the legacy of the 
Frankfurt School. According to the Frankfurt School thinkers such as Adorno, 
Horkheimer and Marcuse, the Enlightenment’s emancipatory knowledge turned out to 
evolve in a dictatorial manner, and evolved in a techno-scientific progress that aimed
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to manipulate , control, colonise, master and dominate the Other in order to furnish a 
self-legitimising aim of progress. In this process ‘reason’ evolved into Instrumental 
Reason, and separated itself from the hermeneutic, practical and intuitive reason or 
substantive reason in a Weberian. Instrumental Reason claimed universality, 
timelessness and ‘validity’ beyond the limitations of time, context, place and human 
experience. A new state of absolutism, this time a secular one, emerged.
In this path, certain binary opposites or dichotomies slowly but surely emerged to 
indicate the attributes of a techno-scientific ‘Reason’ against which the Other was 
constituted. The followings are some of the modem dichotomies that are the legacies 
of the Enlightenment:





5- techno-scientific nature/the natural
6-development/progress underdevelopment/ primitive
7- masculinity femininity
8- public world domestic world
9- white race non white races
10- the west the rest
10 -the elite the masses
11- the nation/us the foreigners/them
These dichotomies and many others have been the constitutive elements of the 
Modem theories and practices. They have created a binary framework of reference 
which in turn, when combined with the Modem narratives of ‘truth’ and ‘power’,
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become hierarchical platforms and organising vehicles of social life and human 
identities
Under a postmodern culture these binaries and platforms and what they represent are 
challenged. The society is perceived in a more plural, hybrid and heterogeneous 
cultural manner with deep impacts on the processes of representation and 
identification. In addition, in the last few decades some new types of social 
movement have emerged to challenge the modem dichotomisations. Some of these 
movements are:
The rebellion of some sect religions and religious cults; of Islamic 
Fundamentalism on the one hand, and on the other hand a growing attraction 
to more ‘holistic’ religions that do not divide between the mind and the body, 
such as Buddhism and Taoism in the West. The latter have given rise not 
only to a holistic healing method as an alternative to scientific medicine, but 
also to an alternative way of understanding and unifying with the universe.
A popular ‘New Age’ section has been added to all book shops encouraging a 
holistic vision towards the universe, the body/mind/spirit unity, meditation, 
yoga, self healing, as well as esoteric and mystical books and training courses 
with an emphasis on reliance on intuition rather than on an external truth.
The rise of feminism, and its challenge to the masculinity of Modernity and 





- public world/domestic world
- cultural/natural
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The rise and expansion of science-fiction, where the boundaries between fact 
and fiction collapse especially in the growing world of virtual reality;
The rise of the Green movement, and its antagonism to techno-scientific 
developments that treat nature as an object of planning and manipulating 
nature in violent ways to further economic growth;
The rise of gay & lesbian movements that regard heterosexuality as only one 
form of sexual organisation whose domination and institutionalisation in the 
form of the normative family denies the natural plurality of sexual 
orientations in humans;
The decline of the sovereignty and homogeneity of national-states as the
primary Modem containers o f ‘us’, and ‘them’ in the face of the practices and 
discourses of globalisation, and the rise of so many ethnic nationalisms.
In one word the Modernist's Other has inflicted damage on the world whose 
boundaries and fate was once comfortably decided and drawn by a few strong and 
modem national- states. The Other has risen to challenge its ‘position’ of Otherness 
and inferiority in all spheres of social life.
Another characteristic of a postmodern politics and movement is that class is not 
their essential organising category as it was in the Modem era. The postmodern 
movements can not immediately be defined economically in terms of common 
relationships with the means of production and/or appropriation of economic 
resources. Any definition of postmodern politics and movement is fundamentally a 
question of representation and it ought to incorporate a critique of Modernity and its 
essential epistemic categories.
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3) Postmodern Social Theory
By the 1970s, many French theorists began to attack modem theories rooted in 
Enlightenment rationalist discourses. Modernity's disciplinary institutions, practices 
and discourses began to be analysed in a completely different way; they were 
conceptualised as a machinery of legitimisation of domination and control.
Modernity in social theory is highly influenced by the intellectual legacy of the 
Enlightenment that adopts pure scientific 'Reason', and its tools for the acquisition of 
knowledge are similar to those of the natural sciences: detachment, experimentation, 
observation, measurement, test-result and generalisation; in a way it masters its 
subject matter from above and from a position of detachment and superiority in an 
empty space and time. Reason has a self generating position that does not need to 
look at itself critically. Reason offers an ontological grasp of ‘progress’ and 
‘advancement’ as self-justifying pursuits and given aspirations.
In the hands of colonialism, Modernity became a civilising mission of the Other. In 
the hands of technology Modernity provided the tools of mastery over nature and its 
subjectification to the needs of ‘progress’. Combined with rationality, Modernity 
produced bureaucratic hierarchies that categorised, codified, homogenised the diverse 
and the heterogeneous world, and classified and controlled them with the aid of 
abstraction. The public/private break reduced the ‘public’ into a place where the 
authority of pure reason was implemented, and the masculine became the carrier of 
this authority. The feminine went hand in hand with the Other; the private, emotional 
and natural. In secular education, all mystic and spiritual forms of explanation, 
exploration and experience became merely a matter of private pursuit. In the body of 
the Modem national-states, human plural and heterogeneous ethnic and local 
identities are administered and standardised by the State from above to generate a 
metanarrative of national identity and so on.
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The critique of progress and pure Reason which became available once Kant 
distinguished Pure from Practical reason made a resurgence in the 20th century, 
specifically around the idea of the postmodern. All totalising metanarratives in 
sexual, racial, national identity discourses that constituted dichotomous identities, all 
great rules with their abstractions that necessarily deny the specificity of the local, 
natural, feminine, instinctive, ethnic, etc with their power mechanisms are challenged 
by postmodern theory.
Walter Benjamin says that "there is no document of civilisation which is not at the 
same time a document of barbarism". Modernity in the hands of postmodern analysts 
is increasingly treated as an example of such a document, that has given us the 
spaceship simultaneously with gas chambers and Holocausts; advancement and 
progress through discourses of racism, sexism, colonialism etc. (Benjamin, 1973, p. 
258)
Horkheimer and Adorno in their Dialectic o f Enlightenment (1972) looked at how 
Modernity turns Reason into its opposite; into a vehicle of oppression and 
domination. The project of Modernity has turned to its own opposite and it has failed 
to put an end to totalitarianism, this time of Instrumental Reason.
For Habermas, on the other hand Modernity can still be understood as an Incomplete 
Project’, and can be saved through ’communicative action'. Habermas looks at how 
under the influence of the Enlightenment, cognitive reason is divorced from moral- 
practical and aesthetic reason. He agrees with Adorno and Horkheimer that cognitive 
reason has evolved into Instrumental, scientific and even 'terroristic' Reason and that 
it has 'terrorised' practical and expressive reasons . Although the separation of 
practical reason from instrumental reason, and the rule of the latter, does characterise 
Modernity and its cultural impoverishment for Habermas, he wants to persuade us 
that instrumental, moral/practical and expressive spheres of experience should be re­
united again through 'communicative action' (Habermas: "Modernity- An Incomplete
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Project" in Docherty 1993). Unlike the first generation of the Frankfurt school, 
Habermas does not find the abolition of scientific Reason necessary. He is more 
interested to keep it in check through the development of a good communicative 
society that confines scientific and pure reason in the sphere of ‘work’ and for the 
technical advancement of the society and does not allow it to ‘terrorise5 the 
hermeneutic/practical reason which is a more suitable type of reason for human 
interaction in moral and practical fields.
However, for postmodern theorists such as Foucault, Lyotard, Harvey, Jameson, and 
Baudrillard the Enlightenment legacy should be challenged and fully overcome. 
Lyotard and Foucault oppose the Enlightenment more philosophically while others 
such as Harvey, Lash & Urry, and Jameson are more interested to look at the 
political economy of the postmodern society. Baudrillard develops his analysis of the 
‘postmodern culture5 on the basis of the postmodern political economy of the ‘sign5. 
He is convinced that the ‘hyper real5 world created by the media is the essence of the 
postmodern culture.
Postmodern theory is important in respect to my thesis. Later in chapter three I will 
develop a ‘postmodern critique of the nation-state5 and I will argue at the same time 
that a postmodern analysis of the nation-state has to ground itself in the postmodern 
political economy in order to provide an encompassing analysis. Here it is crucial to 
concentrate further on what exactly the postmodern theory is and what it tries to 
accomplish. The work of Foucault and Lyotard as distinctive postmodern 
philosophers is looked at below.
Lyotard. Foucault & The postmodern epistemology
In The Postmodern Condition. Lyotard is interested to create a postmodern 
epistemology against the discourses of Modernity. Unlike many other postmodern 
theorists, Lyotard is not inclined to specify a postmodern socio-economic structure.
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He is rather more interested to challenge three conditions of Modem knowledge: 1) 
Metanarratives and meta-discourses such as Modem sciences, Positivism, Liberalism, 
Marxism, Philosophies of history and any other form of totalizing systems of thought;
2) Grand schemes of legitimisation, and of exclusion and inclusion, such as national 
belonging or not belonging, 3) Homogeneous epistemological and moral 
prescriptions. Lyotard’s postmodern epistemology, by contrast, fights for 
heterogeneity, plurality, locally bound micro-politics, incommensurability, 
fragmentation and difference. He writes:
"Consensus does violence to the heterogeneity of language games. And invention is 
always born of dissension. Postmodern knowledge is not simply a tool of the 
authorities; it refines our sensitivity to and reinforces our ability to tolerate the 
incommensurable'* (Lyotard, 1984, p. 75).
His reflections on dissension, difference, fragmentation and plurality on the one 
hand, and on the other hand his unconditional attack on generalities, consensus, 
common interests and macro social theory/politics make his theory fall into 
theoretical relativism and relativity of truth which is similar to that of Foucault.
Foucault also has an anti-Enlightenment position and rejects the equation of 
Enlightenment, reason, emancipation and progress, arguing that this equation has 
served to dominate the subject in various sites of domination and through various 
discourses. He identifies a few modem sites of domination such as the clinic, the 
mental institution, the prison, the school, the hospital in which the identity of the 
subject is produced through the dominant discourses of Truth and mechanisms of 
power that implement the Truth. For Foucault power is conceptualised in 
micrological terms and it is linked to the discourses of knowledge that give meaning 
and determine the functions of these sites; power is the dominant knowledge of the 
time.
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In a series of philosophical studies he attempts to develop and substantiate the 
interrelationship between power, discourse and knowledge, and locate subjective 
identity and its constitution in such a socio-historical and contingent conjuncture. 
Psychiatry, medicine, punishment and criminology, the emergence of the human 
sciences are the perspectives that Foucault examines. Through these forms of 
knowledge the definitions of ’normality1 and ’pathology' emerge and under the impact 
of modem sciences and rationality these definitions are factualised and 
institutionalised in different sites of power. Human behaviour is then 'problematized' 
and disciplined into 'normality'; subjective identities are shaped, modes of disciplines 
are formed and embodied. In such a process, power is automatically implemented 
through the very factual and scientific procedures that establish the Truth. In fact, for 
Foucault, power is not a quality of a central location, of a group, of a ruling class, but 
a mechanism, a function, a state of knowledge, an architectural design, a conceptual 
system that runs through the modem discourses and sites. The eventual and most 
intimate sites of implementation of power are human subjectivity, sexuality and body.
In his genealogical works of the 1970s, Foucault stigmatises Modem rationality, 
institutions, and forms of subjectivity as sources of domination. In 'Madness and 
Civilisation' (1971), he attempts to analyse how madness is historically constituted as 
the Reason's Other, and how through the discourses of psychiatric knowledge 
madness is excluded and confined. In 'Birth o f the Clinic' (1975) an Archaeology of 
Medical Perception is investigated in the age of scientific gaze, whereby a scientific 
discourse of the individual can emerge and human self-conception is moulded 
accordingly. In 'Order o f Things' (1984) subtitled 'An Archaeology of the Human 
Sciences', Foucault describes the emergence of human sciences.
In 'Discipline & Punish' (1979), various disciplinary matrices of power that operate 
in institutions of schools, hospitals, clinic, prisons and workshops are looked a t , and 
how they shape the historical formation of the body and its treatment, soul and the 
subject. Some of the disciplinary mechanisms and techniques involved, are
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surveillance, timetables, regulations of activities and performances, normalisation 
and standardisation of judgement, and the criteria of exclusion, etc.
Foucault is highly influenced by Nietzsche and his genealogy of morality, justice and 
punishment. Foucault wants to write the histories of the marginalised, excluded and 
’disqualified’ discourses; the mad, the patient, the criminal, the perverse. In doing so, 
he offers a powerful critique of modem sciences and rationality as forms of 
knowledge that carry power within their structures, functions, and conceptions.
He conceptualises power in an initially fascinating new way. To him power and its 
operation is to be found in the processes of dispersion, dichotomisation and 
marginalisation in individuals' bodies, sexualities and subjectivities. He rejects the 
Modernist idea of power to be anchored in macro-structures and ruling classes. The 
operation of power, according to Foucault, does not happen so much through physical 
force, but through the hegemony of norms, technologies of normalisation, the 
shaping of the body, and soul, the individual and group's subjective identity. For this 
reason, Foucault in The History o f sexuality (1980a) calls this new mode of power 
'bio-power'. 'Bio-power' links the 'technologies of domination' to the 'technologies of 
self through the dominant paradigm of knowledge and discourse. Bio-power means 
that social discourses of truth, power, knowledge enter into the very subjective 
perceptions of individuals and the behaviours of the body by self-disciplinary modes 
of social control, and not by force.
Foucault gives us a postmodern analysis of modem power as disciplinary power. In 
his conception of power the separation between subjective/objective, 
structure/agency, mind/body, theory/practice vanishes. However he is not a theorist 
of postmodemity. He has not conceptualised a new postmodern society , nor has he 
intended or claimed to have done so. His intention is to offer a new way of 
understanding the question of power in both modem and pre-modem societies.
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Both theorists have a focused philosophical interest in dismantling meta-narratives. 
Both see meta-narratives as vehicles of control and domination. They offer 
fascinating accounts on how power and domination work in the modem societies, 
but they never explain why meta-narratives have been produced, and why there are 
still macro terminals or sites of power and hegemony.
The reason for this inadequacy in postmodern theory is that it does not proceed to 
identify the structures of modernity and postmodemity, where macro terminals of 
power can be found and theorised.. Their emphasis is too heavily on agency and 
subjectivity and neither of these theorists ever mention a single word on the most 
persistent, globally pervasive meta-narrative of capitalism and its inherent incentive 
to make profit There is still a big ‘Truth’. That is, the inherent capitalist pursuit of 
maximising profit does shape and condition the parameters of social and economic 
sites of power. Neither in Foucault’s nor in Lyotard’s theories is there a location for a 
conception of macro power, or for capitalism and its global pursuit of profit. In an 
examination of their work, I have found that irrespective of their brilliant and 
fascinating contributions in the field of postmodern social theory, it is difficult to use 
their theories for organising a site of collective resistance or for explaining how 
macro discourses of power function.
It appears intrinsic to the coherence of their postmodern theories not to acknowledge 
the relationship between power and political economy. The result of this under­
conceptualisation is that there is a vacuum in the work of Foucault and Lyotard for 
explaining macro-practices such as the global consumerist culture. Postmodern 
theory seems to be inadequate in itself if it does not proceed to identify the structures 
of postmodemity, where macro terminals of power can be identified and theorised3.
3 The same argument applies to a postmodern conceptualisation of the nation-state. Such a 
conceptualisation is developed in chapter 4 where a postmodern critique of the nation-state is firmly 
anchored in postmodern political economy.
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4- Postmodemity as the Social and Economic 
transformations of the late 20th century
Broadly speaking, postmodemity refers to the whole package of social, political and 
economic transformations since the late 1960s as a result of the micro-electronic 
revolution. These transformations are creating different experiences of time, space 
and modes of governance. These changes are mentioned here, but a full examination 
of their effects on national identity will be the focus of chapter four.
The term postmodemity in a socio-economic sense, refers to the micro-electronic 
globalisation of capital and its corresponding new methods of capital accumulation 
with the corollary that this micro-electronically globalised capital both controls and 
integrates, and is controlled and integrated by the power of mass telecommunications, 
and computerised information networks. So not only is there a new mode of spatial 
and temporal integration, but also due to this, the regime of accumulation and its 
associated mode of social and political regulations have changed.
This transformation in the mode of spatial and temporal integration has provided a 
new socio-economic ground on which we need to allow for the conceptualisation of 
new frameworks of experiencing time and space, and discourses of power and 
hegemony.
Within the literature, two authors, Anthony Giddens & David Harvey have made 
significant contributions in the theorisation of globalisation and its profound impact 
on reordering experiences of time and space. Giddens looks at it under the phrase of 
"time- space distantiation" The Consequences o f Modernity (1990), and Harvey coins 
it as "time-space compression" The Condition o f Postmodemity (1989), both referring 
to the annihilation of space through faster and faster movement in time in a shrinking 
globe. They both conceptualise a global village as a communicative reality, a global
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single space that has emerged with the acceleration of the pace of movement of 
capital/information/knowledge/image and the implosion of global time and space.
Digital banking, money, production and information, satellite systems of 
communication, and computerised networks have all contributed towards an 
accentuation of velocity and acceleration of the turnover time for capital. Previous 
centres and hierarchies of capital and production such as manufacturing factories are 
slowly replaced by de-centred and more horizontal integration of capital and 
production through compluterised systems of production, facilitating faster 
movement in place and time on a global level. These changes also echo Wallersteiris 
belief in the logic of historical capitalism being essentially a global process towards 
a "world system" (Wallerstein, 1983).
The new horizontally organized micro-electronic mode of capital accumulation, 
integration and communication is slowly replacing the previous hierarchical mode, 
leading to a different perception of social relationships. A postmodern theory offers 
an explanation of the latter. However a postmodern theory will remain one-sided if 
the postmodern society is not encapsulated theoretically.
Scott Lash and John Urry also have made a significant contribution in their The End 
o f Organised Capitalism (1987). where they examine the organised capitalism and its 
structures first, and then move on to look at spatial restructuring of capitalism in 
Britain, the United States, France, Germany and Sweden. In the last chapter of The 
End o f Organised Capitalism the postmodern culture and disorganised capitalism are 
correlated. Disorganised capitalism is the structural foundation for the development 
of postmodern culture and sensibilities, politics and theory.
It is in the conjuncture of the postmodern political economy and culture that the 
question of national identity will be examined in chapter four. It will be suggested 
and explored whether under the conditions of postmodemity the cultural boundaries
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of the nation-state are subject to irreversible transformations and if they are, what the 
nature of these transformations are.
5) Postmodern Culture
One of the most striking postmodern theories that give an account of postmodern 
political economy and culture is that of Jean Baudrillard. He is recognised as the 
most influential theorist of postmodern culture. Similar to other postmodern theorists, 
Baudrillard is critical of Modernity. In Forget Foucault, he writes on Modernity as:
"A characteristic mode of civilization, which opposes itself to tradition, that is to say, 
to all other anterior or traditional cultures: confronting the geographic and 
symbolic diversity of the latter, modernity imposes itself throughout the world as a 
homogeneous unity, irradiating from the Occident.." (Baudrillard: 1987, p. 63)
As discussed above, Modernity for Foucault is a process of increasing rationalisation 
and administration of identity. For Baudrillard Modernity is a system of objects, the 
consumer society, media and information, and how these affect the commodification 
of individuals' thought, perception, behaviour and sexuality. In The System o f Objects 
(1990), Baudrillard investigates the new system of mass information and how it has 
led to mass consumption, geared with the bombardment of advertising, consumer 
goods and services in our public and private lives. This consumerist culture with its 
system of significations overwhelms the individual's identity, perception and thought, 
says Baudrillard.
To him, a new dominating social order should be conceptualised which is 
characterised with a 'new morality1, a 'new technical order1 and a 'new hyper- 
civilization' ruling our every day life. He involves himself with the development of a 
political economy of the sign, which is no longer an organisation around production, 
as Marx had suggested, but around reproduction. The relationship between 
Baudrillard’s and Marx’s therories will be examined in chapter four.
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In the new society of simulations, computerisation, information technology, media, 
cybernetics, mass communication, models and simulation codes, replace production 
as the primary organisation of society. Instead they are a system of production of 
merely signs. To Baudrillard the Modem time was organised around production by 
industrial manufacturing of real goods. However in the new postmodern era society is 
organised around the production of signs governed by models, codes and cybernetics. 
Baudrillard describes the shift as 'the passage from a metallurgic into a semiurgic 
society’ (Baudrillard, 1981, p. 185). In a semiurgic society signs take on a life of 
their own, organise a new social order, and dominate social life.
In its most proliferated state , the semiurgic society is synonymous to a Tiyper-real 
society1 where the boundary between the real and the image is blurred, and the image 
or the hyper-real appears more real than the real itself. For example the models of the 
United States in Disneyland are more real than their instantiations in the social 
world, as the USA becomes more and more like Disneyland (Baudrillard, 1983, p 25). 
Similarly the images of the ideal partner, ideal relationship, ideal beauty, ideal life 
style etc, gain more power over the real, and the real is increasingly lost in its own 
simulated imagery.
With the advent of hyper-real society , simulations therefore constitute reality itself. 
In other words there is an implosion of the real into its image, and of information into 
entertainment. Baudrillard's conception of implosion is designated to refer to a 
process of social entropy leading to the collapse of boundaries between the real and 
the unreal and hence, loss of authentic meanings into (an) apathetic silent majorities. 
To Baudrillard, this undifferentiated flux of simulacra that have no referents, defies 
any stable structure where a firm theory or politics is anchored.
If Foucault neglected the question of political economy by locating power only in the 
micro-processes of social life, Baudrillard deliberately makes it sound impossible to
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have a political economy in the state of floating signs, in a media and information 
society.
To Baudrillard ‘meaning’ has disappeared in the postmodern society because we are 
caught in sites that are far apart from any judgement of reality, the sites of fatal 
strategy of degeneration of the real. Baudrillard argues that all of western faith was 
engaged in this wager on representation; that a signifier could refer to the depth of 
meaning of a signified, but now the whole system is weightless in the postmodern 
era. Now there is nothing but a gigantic simulacrum, never again exchanging for what 
is real, but exchanging in itself, in an uninterrupted circuit without reference or 
circumference. In Baudrillard's conception of simulation, representation is dead; the 
notion of reality is impossible; there is only hyper-reality and simulation as the 
deterrence and destruction of every goal and every point or category of referentiality; 
there is no distinction between false and true, evil and good; all hierarchies and 
essential categories are shattered into pieces, and no new structure is allowed.
Although in his earlier writings, Baudrillard embarked on the development of a 
political economy of the signs, later on by the 1980s, he abandons the project. 
Perhaps as some critiques have suggested he himself became trapped with what he 
was studying, that is a loss of location and belief in meaning.
Fredrick Jameson, another influential theorist on postmodern culture attempts to 
develop a postmodern Marxism by drawing a postmodern cultural map that belongs 
to the latest stage of capitalist development (Jameson, 1991). In such an endeavour, 
Jameson remains loyal to classic Marxism in giving primacy of analysis to the socio­
economic foundations of late capitalism and developing a theory of postmodernism 
as the cultural logic of this phase.
He sees postmodern culture as the internal and superstructural expression of 
multinational capitalism in its post-industrial phase throughout the world. Hence the
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postmodern phenomena is contextualised within the development of capitalism in the 
age of micro electronics and hyperspace.
In Jameson's work, the limitations of Lyotard and Foucault's postmodern theory, in 
not locating macro-terminals for power, are overcome. On Jameson's account, 
postmodernism signals a number of cultural shifts. These include the breakdown of a 
firm distinction between the high and low culture of the elite and the masses, of the 
avantgarde art and it audience; the complete commodification of culture and the 
abolition of critical distance and radical fragmentation of subjectivity to the point of 
the 'death of the subject', and the emergence of a disorientating and dislocating 
hyper-real, hyperspace in cultural consumerism.
Jameson's theory of postmodernism draws upon Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism 
(1975) which locates the present consumerist culture in the late stage of post­
industrial capitalism. Far from a negation of Marxism, both theorists demonstrate 
that late capitalism extends commodification dynamics to virtually all realms of 
social and personal life, penetrating all spheres of knowledge, information and the 
unconscious itself.
Jameson's exposition of postmodernism regards Modernity and Modernism as the 
cultural and institutional experiences of manufacturing industrial capitalism, whereas 
postmodernism and postmodemity are the experiences of a late post-industrial 
capitalism organised around the production of signs and services.
In his work, it is possible to think of a new postmodern society that has emerged in 
the last few decades. A postmodern society can be distinguished in terms of its 
technologies, mode of economic articulation and capital accumulation as well as a 
postmodern culture. This is a society of information technology, the chip, the 
computer and the satellite communication. These new technologies have brought 
fundamental structural changes in the way the society is organised.
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Conclusion
In this opening chapter I have tried to create a postmodern conceptual framework 
that analytically separates and defines five different, but mutually inclusive, uses of 
the term postmodern and give a brief account on each.
I have argued that under the conditions of postmodemity, we are facing a new phase 
of capitalist development that is commonly called the micro-electronic and digital 
phase. Postmodemity refers to the structural transformations of late capitalism that 
can be distinguished from the previous mechanical and electronic phases in terms of 
their distinct technologies, time/space relationships, modes of governance and capital 
accumulation. Postmodernity has furnished the conditions in which a postmodern 
culture of consumerism and media simulations have been identified and theorised.
The principle concern of all postmodern theories has been to challenge the 
epistemological pillars of the Enlightenment. I have shown above that the 
postmodern social theories that do not anchor their explanations in a postmodern 
socio-economic structure, can not adequately elucidate the nature and cause of such a 
paradigmatic shift away from the Enlightenment and positivism that is occurring. 
Conversely, postmoden theorists such as Harvey and Jameson who look at cultural 
changes of the late 20th century in the context of political economy would provide us 
with a better understanding of postmodern phenomena.
These developments and changes have affected all Modem structures and boundaries 
including the nation-state. This chapter has paved the ground for asserting that under 
the conditions of postmodemity, the boundaries of the nation-state and what it 
represents together with all other Modem insitutions can be affected. In the following 
chapters my focus will shift more to the question of the nation-state. Chapter two will 
first look at different theoretical accounts of the nation and proceed to suggest a 
synthesis of all these definitions in order to arrive at a new definition of the nation-
state as a political institution of Modernity. In chapter three a model of a postmodern 
critique of the nation-state, inspired by a Foucaultian vision, is developed before the 
critique is substantiated in terms of the structural changes of the nation-state as a 
result of postmodemity in chapter four.
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Chapter Two:
The Nation-State and Modernity
The aim of this chapter is to offer a new definition of the nation-state that 
incorporates and synthesises all the major theoretical contributions that are made on 
the subject. The synthesis is important since it combines and preserves crucial and, at 
times, contradictory contributions which have been made on the question of the 
nation-state. It is also proposed in this chapter to perceive the nation-state as one of 
the institutions of Modernity whose constitutional identity has been established only 
since the French Revolution of 1789. It will be argued that the establishment of a unit 
of citizenship whose territorial, political and cultural boundaries are congruent, as 
opposed to other forms of collective identities, is a historically specific evolution 
rather than an ontological given. The chapter anchors the institution of the nation­
state in the epistemological as well as socio-political conditions of Modernity before, 
in the subsequent chapters, the impact of postmodemity on the nation-state is 
examined.
Whether "invented", "imagined", "constructed", "reconstructed", or "evolved from 
shared traditions and experiences" ; whether conditioned by the requirements of 
capitalism and its "uneven development" or formed through more subjective paths of 
a collective identification of an ethnic group with each other in terms of "shared 
language, myths, symbols, traditions" etc., the terms nation-states and national 
identity are both temporal and spatial representations of a people; they are historical 
and geographical expressions of a collectivity and its evolved ‘mode of being’; they 
gain their significance in a conjuncture where the socio-economic and cultural 
conditions of a community are dialectically linked to specific experiences of time and 
space.
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In this sense, collective identities and their unique commonalities can be expressed in 
a diversity of forms such as kinship, clan, tribal, nomadic, agrarian, dynastic, 
religious, imperial, ethnic, regional, national and even global. Each of these forms 
of collective identities has a different mode of experiencing time and space, which in 
turn has an intrinsic relationship with the socio-economic structures and 
technological capacities, that determine the temporal and spatial horizons of the 
experience. In other words time and space are two important parameters that are 
involved in the systems of symbolic representations of collectivities, and hence in the 
processes of collective identification.
To substantiate this, let me provide a comparison of Medieval and Post Renaissance 
experiences of time and space, and show how the latter is absolutely crucial for the 
formation of the imagination of nation-states and national identity after the 18th 
century. According to David Harvey in the Medieval time there was “an easy and 
hedonistic psycho-physiological approach to spatial representations” (Harvey, 1991, 
p. 241). For the Medieval artist, the place and the space of representation and of 
experience coincided, and the traditions of Medieval mapping ’’typically emphasised 
the sensuous rather than the objective and rational qualities of spatial order" (ibid see 
p.242, plate 3.3). Basically what is being said here is that the ‘space’ had not been 
subjected to rationalisation and abstract mapping in the Medieval times. It was only 
experienced in a concrete and sensuous way.
The Renaissance, however, saw a radical reconstruction of views of space and time in 
the western world. A rational, objective, totalising and homogenising ordering of 
space in the "Renaissance maps of England played an important role in affirming the 
position of individuals in relation to territory" (Harvey 1991, p. 246). This rational 
ordering of space provided for the separation of place and space and laid down one of 
the important components of the Enlightenment vision.
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Abstract maps stripped of all elements of specificity and concreteness, completely 
rational and objective, developed into functional tools for manipulating, planning, 
and engineering the phenomenon of space. The totalising and abstract vision of the 
map that presumed absolutes of homogeneous time and space allowed for spatial 
perceptions such as national and regional. This in turn paved the way for ‘national’ 
identities to be spatially conceptualised in the midst of geographical differences. In 
other words, the abstract unification of space override and contained ‘the local’ and 
the concrete and provided new containers for thought and action.
Likewise the calendar does the same thing with time; just as the map replaces the 
discontinuous patchy space of practical paths by the homogeneous, continuous space 
of geometry, so the calendar substitutes a linear, homogeneous continuous calendarial 
time for practical time. The latter was organised around nature, especially the 
position of the earth to the sun which governed the temporal cycle of production and 
consumption in all pre-industrial and agrarian societies.
The above argument shows clearly that the Enlightenment’s vision, and its abstract 
perceptual/conceptual/linguistic practices form a specific experience and government 
of time and space, that are epistemologically fundamental in the development of the 
nation-state and national identity. The evolution of the nation-state and national 
identity both materially and subjectively could not be possible had it not been for the 
development of an abstract perception of time and space. An abstract perception of 
time and space is an essential mode of experience and government of Modernity, 
including the Modem practices of nationhood and the unfolding of ‘national’ 
relationships. It is on this basis that Benedict Anderson describes the time of 
nationhood as an ‘homogeneous empty time '.
In modem times, abstract maps and calendarial time are the organising tools of 
social |ife. These tools are essential for experiencing nationhood. The nation, 
irrespective of the position of the earth to the sun and the time of sun rise or sun set,
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works at specific hours of the day and days are made sense of in the context of the 
calendar. It can therefore be suggested to place the phenomenon of the nation-state in 
the time and space of Modernity; rooted in the vision of the Enlightenment; anchored 
in the techno-scientific capacities of industrial capitalism and rationality or to be 
mofe specific, ip ppst-French Revolution time.
From this brief introduction, I propose the following assertions on the relationship 
between collective identity, space and time:
1) The formation of the nation-state and national identity, as the media of 
expressing and representing what constitutes the distinctiveness of a 
people, goes back to the post-Enlightenment and French Revolution 
period. Therefore it has to be studied in reference to the main underlying and 
time bound factors of this period, rather than to timeless factors.
2) The nation-state has to be differentiated from other forms of collective 
identity. The former is only a specific temporal and spatial coptainer of the 
latter, and its language is nationalism.
3) Collective identities can be subject to transformations if the experiences of 
time and space are transformed and re-ordered.
I will come back to the last point in the next chapters when it will be argued that
under the conditions of postmodemity the experiences of time and space are changing
and together with these changes the experience of nationhood is being transformed. A
new instantaneous compu/im^ in a global space is fast replacing the national time
and space of the nation-state. In this chapter, however, I would like to proceed to
show that my first point can be articulated by the synthesis of the brilliant
contributipns that are made in the field of nations and nationalism by Elie Kedourie,
; . ■ ( '
Ernest Gellner, Bepedipt ^Vnderson, Eric Hobsbmypi, Topi Naim, and Anthony D.
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Smith. Although the focal point of these scholars has constituted their positions in, at 
times, opposition with each other, and has created the impression that they hold
t
fundamentally antagonistic views, I wish to establish bejow that to understand the 
nation-state fully, their focal points should be combined.
The nation-state can be analysed as a modem container of collective identity, as 
Anderson, Gellner and Hobsbawm argue, but it is important to note that in such an 
analysis we should not assume a sudden break up between the past and the present, as 
Anthony Smith's work elaborates; the Modem and the New are tightly woven with a 
past or an idea of it; the idea of history lives in Modernity; the mythical and the 
subjective, which are normally the attributes of the pre-modem mind, live in the 
factuality and the objectivity of the Modem. What I am proposing here is that 
national ‘imaginations’ (Anderson) and ‘inventions’ (Hobsbawm) are always and 
invariably linked with a collective idea of an ‘ethnic’ past (Smith).
My second assertion can be elaborated by looking at the relationship between the 
nation-state and power in modem times. At this stage, I take Gellner's definition of 
the nation-state as a modem institution whose political and cultural boundaries are 
congruent, or that such a congruence is sought by nationalism.
I would argue that although the nation is the dominant modem container of identity, 
it is also simultaneously the one which functions as a medium of power depriving 
the majority o f ethnic groups o f the experience of independent nationhood and 
self-rule. Gellner has already told us that a world of nation-states does not exist; it is 
a mere "optical illusion". The majority of human ethnic collectivities do not have 
their own independent nation-states. However this reality is disguised by the power of 
those who do.
The nation-state as a modem political institution gains its meaning, as Gellner 
suggested, in the centralising procedures and practices of a national-state to make
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cultural boundaries congruent with political boundaries. Noting that the number of 
the ethnic groups in the world are far greater than the number of nation-states, 
indicates that nationhood is not the norm of human communities, but a medium of 
power aiming to exclude the majority of human groups from the experience of 
independent nationhood. In this sense, the congruence of the political and cultural 
boundaries is a modern political aim, and a political achievement, and hence directly 
linked to power relationships in the international sphere.
Part One: THE SYNTHESIS
In what follows in this part, I wish to establish a synthesis of the contributions of 
Kedourie, Anderson, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Naim and Smith in understanding the 
different facets of the phenomenon of the nation-state as a modem unit of collective 
identity. As mentioned earlier the rationale of suggesting the synthesis is to locate 
the institution of the nation-state in Modernity and its temporal and spatial 
parameters, in order to develop this argument later to see how the structures of 
postmodemity may affect the nation-state. Obviously there have already been 
scholars who have analysed the nation-state as a Modem entity. I will show that their 
‘objective’ examination of the nation-state excludes a very important facet of 
nationhood, that of subjectivity and a notion of an ethnic historical commonality. 
This should be brought back into the definition of the nation-state without implying a 
synonymity of ethnic identity and national identity. Folk ‘ethnic’ communities can 
not be taken synonymously to the ‘nation-state’ as the latter is a political institution 
cemented and preserved by a central power mechanism from the above. The aim of 
this chapter is therefore:
1) To substantiate the first assertion that the formation of the nation-state and 
national identity, as the media of expressing and representing what constitutes 
the distinctiveness of a people, goes back to the post-Enlightenment and French 
Revolution period. Therefore it has to be studied in reference to the main 
underlying and time bound factors of this period, rather than to timeless factors.
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2) To arrive at a new synthesised definition of the nation-state that combines its 
‘Modernity’ and ‘mortality’ with its ‘timelessness’ and ethnic ‘immortality’;
3) To analyse the nation-state as a modem apparatus of power;
4) To prepare the grounds for a postmodern analysis of the nation-state in the next 
two chapters.
1) The Epistemology of the Nation State
The Enlightenment, wrote Adomo and Horkheimer in Dialectic o f Enlightenment 
aimed to disillusion the world with religious and magical explanations, and replace 
them with scientific and secular reason and rationality. Abstraction, the tool of the 
Enlightenment, evolved to be used to classify, codify and categorise the subjects of 
knowledge; the heterogeneous, the concrete and the local in order to create 
homogeneous, objective and universal truth, law and morality.
At the heart of the epistemology of Modernity as a social and cultural entity, since the 
18th century, has remained a self-legitimising belief in a universal truth; in techno- 
scientific development and rational administration, as the criteria of human progress. 
Industrial capitalism in its expansion and dominance in the world employed and 
embodied sciences, rationality and secular reason. The nation-state is the entity that is 
bit by bit built on these pillars.
The establishment of a state of affairs in society that operated on principles of this 
kind, also meant that humanity should be divided into units of political organisation 
and administration, whereby impersonal and abstract rules prevail. The philosophy of 
the Enlightenment prevalent in Europe in the eighteenth century held that the
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universe was governed by uniform and unvarying laws of nature. These laws could be 
unravelled and comprehended by reason.
The new politics to which the Enlightenment gave rise was that "the Enlightened 
ruler regulates the economic activities of the subjects, provides them with education, 
looks after their health and sanitation, supplies uniform and expeditious justice, and 
generally concerns himself... with his subjects welfare.." (Kedourie. 1994, p. 3). The 
state on this philosophical view is a collection of individuals who live together to 
secure their welfare by means of reason. The principle of popular sovereignty is 
hereby bom.
The French Revolution inspired the wordings of the Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and the Citizens saying that " the principle of sovereignty resides essentially in the 
Nation; no body of men, no individual can exercise authority that does not emanate 
expressly from it" (ibid p.4) This vision laid down the political foundation upon 
which nationalism since then has been built; the principle of popular sovereignty 
began to reside in the nation.
The convergence of the words ‘nation5 and ‘sovereignty5 is an important one 
deserving more attention. Up to the eighteenth century, the monarch in any dynastic 
realm was the bearer of sovereignty. The notion of ’people’ was a negative one 
referring to the passive subjects of a monarch whose fate could be decided upon by 
the rulers. Slowly, as Greenfeld shows in her Nationalism. from the 16th century a 
new meaning around the notion of ’people’ emerged that transformed it into a 
positive concept. She argues that the root of this transformation is to be found in 
Protestantism, which through the Reformation period furnished the grounds for the 
emergence of a national consciousness.
By national consciousness, she means the kind of consciousness that places the task 
of obtaining and preserving sovereignty in the 'people' who are homogeneous, united
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and the bearer of their own political destiny. In this sense the notion of 'people' 
acquires a positive meaning, and converges with the 'nation'. The belief in 
sovereignty, unity and homogeneity borne by a nation which can determine its 
future, gives us the ideology of nationalism.
The notion of ‘sovereignty5, or self-determination is also essential in Kedourie's 
analysis of nationalism. However the political and economic constitution of such an 
ideology in the form of the Nation-state begins with the French Revolution of 1789, 
and the vision of the Enlightenment that separates knowledge from morality, 
primarily positivism.
It is now that the individual becomes the very centre and the arbiter of the universe, 
who can explore and discover the natural law; who can determine and change his/her 
fate; who is autonomous; who is a citizen. As Kedourie shows in his book, this 
principle of sovereignty meant that the origins of any state and its rulers can be 
subject to scrutiny of its citizens. The nation is now more than the King and the 
Aristocracy. The citizens of the nation can legislate a common law representing the 
equality and liberty of its members; the nation is a sovereign entity to whom its 
government is responsible and accountable; and without the vote of its citizens the 
state can not easily claim legitimacy.
The nation becomes the vehicle of political change. And of course to obtain and 
retain political power, one must already have or create a nation first. Here the notions 
of the nation and the state, too, converge; one without the other cannot fulfil the 
principle of self-determination and sovereignty, which irreversibly, has characterised 
the political life of the last 200 years. The nation-state has become the only legitimate 
and internationally recognised medium of power for determining, planning and 
allocating natural and social resources. New battlefields in the last two hundred years 
have emerged under the name of nationalism, which is the formal ideology for the 
formation and/or preservation of a nation-state. For any people who want to
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determine their destiny, a state is needed; for any state who wants to be legitimate, a 
nation is needed, and what is the language? Nationalism of course.
Hence, the essential aim of nationalism is self -determination; ie the acquisition of 
'legitimate' secular political power. Nation-building and/or state-building is the 
instrument. The congruence of the political and the cultural boundaries is the 
mechanism of maintaining such a power.
In Kedourie’s work the nation-state and its quest for acquiring and/or preserving 
sovereignty are inseparable from the Enlightenment epistemology. The 
Enlightenment wanted to liberate men from forces of unreason that had ruled them 
for centuries; it wanted to give power to the individual to seek explanation and reason 
for what s/he is to believe; and it wanted to exercise authority with accountability 
within a sovereign unit. All the components of this vision are expressed in the 
language of nationalism in nation/state-building processes and/or in preservation of 
the nation-state as a sovereign, homogenous and united unit. On the other hand the 
abstract temporal and spatial imagination of the nation-state and national identity was 
also founded by the vision of the Enlightenment which paved the way for these 
homogenous, sovereign and united units to unfold in their own national time and 
space (territory).
I now turn to look at the mechanisms whereby the pursuit of congruence of political 
and cultural boundaries, and of secular power for self determination, unfolds in the 
body of the nation-state. "High Culture", "invention of tradition" and "imagined 
communities" are key concepts for analysing the process.
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2) Socio-Economic conditions of the Nation-State
If the Enlightenment provides the epistemological foundation of the nation-state, 
industrial capitalism gives us the infrastructural capacities whereby the nation-state 
can materialise and be embodied economically and socially. In other words the 
awakening and political self-assertion of the nation-states can only be explained in 
the age of industrial capitalism.
To Gellner, nationalism is about making the culture and the polity congruent. I 
believe this is the task of nationalism, and it is also the mechanism whereby the aim 
of obtaining and/or retaining secular political power for self determination, is 
pursued. Gellner calls such a congruence "High Culture” in (Gelner, 1983).
‘High Culture’ refers to an industrial capitalist culture in the modem period, whereby 
high productivity and a very complex and refined division of labour are required for 
perpetual and rapid growth and change. The idea of a perpetual and rapid change is of 
course rooted in the heart of Modernity where 'progress' and 'growth' are the aim of 
the economic activities in a never ending pursuit of profit. Individuals in the modem 
High Culture' can rarely remain in the same niches throughout their lives; they can 
rarely rest in them unlike in the agrarian society where positions were ascribed from 
birth. A high degree of mobility and a preparation for mobility are the immediate 
consequences of Modem society.
This in turn requires a standardised and specialised education and training. Gellner 
summarises the general and central features of industrial society as follow: "Universal 
literacy and a high level of numerical, technical, and general sophistication (of the 
public). Members are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to 
another, and must possess the generic training which enables them to follow the 
manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation. In the course of their work 
they must constantly communicate with large number of other men, with whom they 
frequently have no previous association, and with whom communication must
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consequently be explicit, rather than relying on context. They must also be able to 
communicate by means of written, impersonal, context-free, to whom-it-may-concem 
type messages. Hence these communications must be in the same shared and 
standardised linguistic medium and script. The educational system which guarantees 
this social achievement becomes large and is indispensable...” (Gellner, 1983, p. 35).
Hence, an educational infrastructure, that can produce standardised and homogeneous 
training and skill in an impersonal manner, is the major attribute of the High Culture' 
of industrial society. Because of its size, indispensability and its expense, only the 
state can control and maintain the education system. The significance of this is that 
culture is no longer locally and intimately bound or defined, as it was in pre-modem 
times; it is defined, controlled and administered from above by the State. And this is 
at the heart of the congruence of the polity and culture, which nationalism seeks. And 
of course perceptions and practices of an abstract national time and space are 
integral to the ‘high culture’.
Mobility, literacy, cultural homogeneity, objectivity and impersonality of training, 
standardisation of knowledge, together with abstract and rational methods of 
communication, in a 'national' market, with a 'national' currency and language, all of 
which are centrally administered and sustained by a legitimate agency of power that 
is the state, are the mechanisms whereby a nation -state unfolds and crystallises.
The nation-state is now extremely important, not only because it is the vehicle of self- 
determination and sovereignty, but also because it is where industrial capitalism, 
possessing a legitimate political power, can grow. The nation-state is therefore the 
institution in which the socio-economic parameters of capitalism unfold in 
conjunction with the parameters of the Enlightenment epistemology; and where the 
freedom of the individual and the sovereignty of the nation are expressed in their 
liaison with a ‘high culture’, standardised by the state.
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However, due to the modem impersonal, anonymous, and abstract ties between the 
members of the sovereign nation, their linkage has to live in the ’imagination'. To 
Anderson, the nation is a modem ’artefact’ that creates its own narrative in the hands 
of nationalism; it is "an imagined political community that is inherently limited and 
sovereign" (Anderson 1991, P. 6). It is imagined because as elaborated above, the 
linkage between the members of a nation is centrally administered and maintained 
from above; and as Anderson mentions himself, the members of a nation could never 
know the rest of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear from them. They 
remain anonymous to one another, but a national unit is constantly imagined by its 
citizens.
To Anderson the nation creates itself through the imagination; it is sovereign, as it is 
bom in the age of the Enlightenment as a negation of divinely-ordained and 
hierarchical dynastic realms. The nation is also limited because even the largest 
nations of the world have finite boundaries. Finally the nation is imagined as a lateral, 
horizontal community of comrades who are linked together with a sense of fraternity.
Anderson's central concern is to elaborate for us that this secular-horizontal, 
sovereign, limited community can only become imagined through the print industry 
as a capitalist enterprise. The most important step in this process was the 
revolutionary vemacularizing thrust of capitalism, which was stimulated by three 
factors; 1) the abolition of Latin, and increasing separation from ecclesiastical rule in 
every day life; 2) the impact of the Reformation, which owed a lot of its success to 
print industry, enabling the vernacular publication of the Bible. The coalition 
between Protestantism and print-capitalism helped immensely the rise of national 
consciousness in the decades and centuries after the Reformation, together with 3) 
spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralisation.
The educational infrastructure and the print language, argues Anderson, laid down the 
"bases for national consciousness in three distinct ways; firstly they created a network
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of communication and exchange below Latin, and above the spoken vernaculars. 
Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes or Spanishes, who might find it 
difficult, or even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became 
capable of comprehending one another via the print and paper. In the process they 
gradually became aware of hundreds of thousands, even millions of people in their 
particular language-field, and at the same time that only those hundreds, or 
thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow readers, to whom they were 
connected through print, formed, in their secular, particular, visible invisibility, the 
embryo of the nationally imagined community" (Anderson, 1991, p. 44).
Secondly, he goes on to say, that print capitalism gave fixity and permanence, and 
provided the image o f antiquity to the central idea of the nation. The printed book, 
capable of being infinitely reproduced, both spatially and temporally became an 
‘objective’ testimony to the immortality and timelessness of the nation-state, although 
ironically the printed book itself is a very modem product.
Thirdly, human linguistic diversity and print industry created languages of power 
which were different to the older administrative vernaculars. Certain languages 
dominated the final form of the printed language, and others lost caste. For instance, 
Anderson gives the example of ’"Northwestern German’ which became Platt Deustch, 
a largely spoken, thus sub-standard, German, because it was assimilable to print- 
German in a way that Bohemian spoken-Czech was not. High German, the King’s 
English, and, later Central Thai, were correspondingly elevated to a new political 
cultural eminence." (Anderson, 1991, p 45.)
These three factors under the productive relations of capitalism, gave rise to a 
technology of communication, which in the face of the human linguistic diversity, 
played the most crucial role in the formation of national imagination. The essential 
thing for Anderson is that the interplay between insurmountable differences between 
particular languages, and their association with certain territories, technology and
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capitalism is what nourishes national 'imagination', and links this 'imagination' to 
power.
In this conjuncture Anderson defines the nation as a "modem artefact" that has been 
"imagined" into an objective and universal reality, whose truth and rationale derive 
from its Modernity. Industrial capitalism and its print industry enabled this imagined 
and novel modem community to assume objectivity, universality and timelessness.
The 'imagined' community can be envisioned, writes Anderson, through two 
obliquely related sources. Firstly through calendrical coincidence; "the date at the top 
of the newspaper, the single most important emblem on it provides the essential 
connection- the steady onward clocking of homogeneous empty time" (Anderson, 
1991, p 33). The second source of imagined linkage is in the relationship "between 
the newspaper, as a form of book, and the market" (ibid, p. 33). These two conditions 
create a private confidence of the presence of thousands or millions of others who 
read the same newspaper and live in the same calendrical time.
This view is basically reiterated by Hobsbawm in his Nations and Nationalism since 
1780 (1990). He opens his first chapter by saying that " the basic characteristic of the 
modem nation and eveiy thing connected with it is its modernity" (p 14). He refers to 
the discourse of citizenship and sovereignty, and shows that both of these concepts 
are rooted in the equation of nation=state=people. I shall look at Hobsbawm's book in 
greater detail in the second part, but it would suffice here to show that alongside with 
Anderson he, too, sees the nation as a novelty of the post-French Revolution time 
whose existence is given fixity and eternity through the print industry.
In this light, the nation-state is a historical category that belongs to the period of 
political Modernity and modernisation of post-French Revolution; epistemologically 
to post-Enlightenment and economically to industrial capitalism. The nation-state is 
treated by Hobsbawm and Anderson as a temporal phenomenon that is expressed
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timelessly by nationalism. The nation-state claims to be universally true, and has 
evolved to become the sole constituent unit of collective identity.
So far, the origins of the modem nation-state have been explained in the vision of the 
Enlightenment, and in the social, economic and political aspects of industrial 
capitalism. It is fair to say that these contributions, indeed understand and explain the 
nation-state from an Enlightened' positivistic position, and offer an analysis that does 
not give much weight to the subjectivity of the nation. The institution of the nation­
state is one thing and the way it is lived and performed by its citizens is something 
else. The latter requires a closer observation.
One of the most striking characteristics of all nationalisms, is that they do not believe 
in their historical newness, and their Modernity. The most fundamental claim of all 
nationalists is their antiquity, that is their timelessness and eternity which points to a 
very important ingredient of the nation and its discourse; the idea of a common 
ancestry, common traditions and past. This brings me to the subjective aspects of the 
nation. I believe that the objectivity and the subjectivity of the nation-state can not be 
separated in explaining it; they have to be synthesised. I also believe that placing too 
much emphasis on nationalism's 'self deception', 'fabrication', 'fallacy' in the way in 
which Modernist expositions explain the nation does not actually enrich our grasp of 
its pervasiveness, even if these claims are true. The more important task is looking at 
why the nation-state needs to have a subjective and historical perception of itself.
3) History and the Nation-State
There are two major contributions in the field that I would like to look at, and once 
again show that both cover angles that are undeniably invaluable in explaining the 
complex phenomenon of the nation-state; the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Anthony 
D. Smith.
66
For Hobsbawm, the nation is a political novelty that 'invents' its own traditions, and 
for Smith the nation is rooted in the ethnic past and traditions. In The Invention o f 
Tradition Hobsbawm maintains that not only are nations modem novelties, but their 
traditions are also "invented" in order to claim continuity with the past. So, for 
example, the National Flag, Anthem and Emblem are "invented" as symbols of 
identity and sovereignty of each nation. Hobsbawm suggests that the principle of 
nationality transformed the peasants or the subjects of pre-1789 into citizens, whose 
public lives as members of the national work force, armed forces, schools, etc, 
created them as homogeneous nations. They learned to speak a "standardised national 
language" and read about their National History' and in these senses the ’traditions’ of 
nationhood were 'invented' by the central state.
Consequently, according to Hobsbawm, most national 'traditions' of the nation-state 
are very recent inventions in history , but they are symbolically accepted to inculcate 
certain values and norms, which aim to create the impression of continuity with a 
historic past, whereas they are essentially processes of normalisation and 
ritualization of nationhood. Hobsbawm does not explain why these inventions are 
needed in the daily lives of people. He believes that it is the state that needs these 
inventions. The state is systematically involved in inventing traditions and the real 
cause is the acquisition or maintenance of political power.
Hobsbawm gives us a rich selection of examples: Christmas Broadcast in Britain 
were only 'invented' in 1932; "festival pavilions, structures for the display of flags, 
temples for offerings, processions, bell ringing, tableaux, gun-salutes, government 
delegations in the honour of the festival, dinners, toasts and oratory.." (ibid P. 6).
On the other hand, the convergence of the notions of 'people', 'nation', 'society' and 
'state' in the modem time, has led to the 'invention' of mass traditions, such as state 
education, which in an administered and standardised form "transformed people into 
citizens of a specific country; peasants into Frenchmen" (ibid P. 264), or quoting
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d'Azeglio in the 19th century saying, "we have made Italy, now we must make 
Italians" ( P 266). With the widespread progress of electoral democracy, and respect 
for citizenship, a type of mass politics emerged, that according to him, encouraged 
the invention of official traditions in the period 1870-1914; by 1914 some form of 
"extensive if not universal manhood suffrage was operating in Australia (1901), 
Austria (1907), Belgium (1894), Denmark (1849), Finland (1905), France (1875), 
Germany (1871), Italy (1913), Norway (1898), Sweden (1907), Switzerland (1848- 
79) the United Kingdom (1867-84)" (P 267). The 'tradition' of Social Democracy was 
largely 'invented' in this period, to replace the church and monarchy, and function as a 
cementing factor in the society.
In this way, the 'tradition' of Social Democracy emerging from the convergence of the 
notions of 'people', 'society*, 'nation' and the 'state', required and went hand in hand 
with the 'invention' of 'public and national' language, mass education, ceremonies, 
monuments, uniforms, parades, bands, etc to signify the antiquity of the traditions of 
the civil society. I shall look at some of the examples that Hobsbawm gives us in the 
second part on the relationship between the Nation-state and power, but here I would 
like to turn to the work of Anthony Smith who scrutinises the Modernity of nations 
at a different level in his ’The Ethnic Origins o f the Nations'.
Smith does not refute the validity of what Kedourie, Gellner, Anderson and 
Hobsbawm tell us about the modem essence of the nation-state, but he refuses to 
accept that the nation-state is "purely" or "strictly" a modem phenomenon. He says:
"in a sense, the 'modernists' are right. Nationalism, as an ideology and movement is a 
phenomenon that dates from the later eighteenth century... the 'nation-state', too, as a
political norm is quite modern it was not until the nineteenth century that these
(European) states began to be converted into 'nation-states’, and hence a system of 
'nation- states’ came into being. Even the 'nation' and its 'national character' would 
appear to be modern: certainly it was not until the early modern period in Europe... that 
the idea of populations being divided by 'national character' and possessing a common 
identity became widespread among the European educated classes." (Smith, 1994, P.
11).
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However, what he wants to establish is that in accepting the Modernity of the nation­
state, we can not assume "a radical break between pre-modem units and sentiments 
and modem nations and nationalism" (Smith, 1994, P. 13). We should hot 
dichotomise between 'industrial and modem' and 'agrarian and pre-modern’ societies, 
since even if "the break is radical in some respects, in the sphere of culture it is not as 
all-encompassing and penetrative as was supposed" (ibid p. 13). The most crucial 
concept in the work of Smith is 'ethnic' and the symbolism and the sentiments that go 
with it. To him 'ethnie' is a continuum that weaves the 'past' into the 'present'; the 
'subjectivity1 of the nation into its 'objectivity' and its 'antiquity' into its ‘modernity'. 
'Ethnie' is what coheres the nation around common (mythical or real) ancestry, 
traditions, myths and symbols.
Although his focal point gives the impression that he understands the nation-state in 
terms of the former categories (ie past, subjectivity, antiquity, common historical 
myths and symbols), more heavily than the latter ones ( present, objectivity and 
modernity), I would argue that his work can be read in a different way; that his effort 
is to bring back sentiments, emotions, subjectivity and a 'heart' into the objective, 
factual and head orientated modernist expositions of the nation-state.
I am not sure if ethnicity is the core of nation-building , but I would certainly agree 
that ethnic components, and a belief in a common distinctive past, even if they are 
'invented', are cementing cultural factors in the processes of national identification; 
they are like the raw material in the final product. Obviously the final product, that is 
'national identity, needs certain industries and technologies that produce the 'high 
culture' and an 'imagination' of the experience of 'nationhood'. Undoubtedly these 
technologies are bound to industrial capitalism and its mode of production and 
reproduction of cultural entities; the technological capacities that make the 
institution of the nation-state viable are very modem indeed; in the ways it gives 
meaning to, and employs, 'ethnicity', and in how its 'imagination' of itself is produced, 
the nation-state is indeed very modem, but there is nothing modem about the raw
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material itself. A popularly convincing idea of the past is crucial for the nation to 
feel united and distinctive from other nations.
Hence, in this sense, 'ethnicity' has to be processed industrially and politically, before 
it can weave, brutally or smoothly, into the final product of the nation-state. Smith 
would be the first to admit this. In fact chapter six of his book looks at this issue. He 
believes that "generally speaking_citizenship and ethnic solidarity operate in 
separate spheres... and there is friction and unease between them..."(Smith, 1994, p. 
151) They require different loyalties; the nation is a ''territorially centralised, 
politicised, legal and economically unified unit, bound by a common civic outlook 
and ideology....that must take over some of the attributes of pre-existing ethnie and 
assimilate many of their myths, memories and symbols, or invent ones of its own" 
(Smith, 1994, p. 152). He is obviously aware that ethnic identity does not 
automatically transform and translate into national identity, and that there is a 
tension between them.
The fundamental difference between Hobsbawm and Smith lies in the way they focus 
on the nature of the tension between ethnic and national identities. In their 
expositions, Hobsbawm does not disagree with the fact that 'traditions’ and 
‘ethnicities’ are needed in the making of the nation-states, but he merely looks at the 
way they are invented. On the other hand, as quoted above, Smith does not really 
disagree that an idea of the past ethnic traditions can be 'invented', but he focuses on 
how these traditions are needed as a continuum to avoid the dichotomisation of 
past/present, even if this continuum is presumed or imagined. The past/present 
dichotomisation is, on the other hand, an essential part of Hobsbawm's positivistic 
stance; to him the invented traditions bear no relation to the past and its 'proto- 
national' identities. To Smith collective identities are the result of an idea of the 
ethnic traditions and the past.
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Towards a New Definition of the Nation state
I have tried to argue that a complete separation between the past/present dichotomy is 
not necessary in defining the nation-state. In this sense the division between 'civic* 
and 'genealogical' nations is merely an analytical one; 'perennialists' and 'modernists' 
need one another in explaining the nation-state. Objective and subjective dimensions 
are both needed in the process of nation/state building and ethnicity is essential in 
weaving the discourse of nationality. I propose the following definition of the nation­
state, which I believe synthesises the major existing theoretical contributions covered 
above.
The nation-state is a distinct modem political institution o f administration and 
representation o f collective identity, that is anchored in the vision o f the 
Enlightenment, and rooted in the era o f industrial capitalism which utilises, adopts 
and/or invents incommensurable human historical cultural differences, and 
employs them in obtaining and/or retaining political power. Nationalism is the 
language o f such endeavour.
In this definition, all the above positions are embedded; Kedourie’s account of the 
Modem epistemology of the nation, Gellner and Anderson’s accounts of the links 
between the nation and a capitalist political economy, Hobsbawm’s notion of 
‘invented traditions’ in the making of modem nations and Smith’s elaboration of the 
‘ethnic past’ of the nations are all synthesised.
In such a synthesis, the nation-state is the Modem Janus and it is two faced. The 
nation-state administers the unification of collective past/present, fact/fiction, 
subjectivity/objectivity, eternity and immutibility/ historical newness and mutability 
in the name of ‘national identity’. In the body of this Modem ‘Frankenstein Monster’ 
called the nation-state, the human desire for eternity and immortality (at a collective 
level) is ironically linked to the modem technologies and discourses that make its 
expression possible.
71
Part Two: THE NATION-STATE & POWER
In this part, I wish to argue that although the nation is the dominant modem political 
container of collective identity, it is also simultaneously one which functions as a 
medium of power depriving the majority of human distinct ethnic cultures of the 
power to form their own nation-states. In a sense Gellner is right to tell us that a 
world of nation-states does not exist; it is a mere "optical illusion". However this 
^optical illusion' is reinforced because the world is based on international and 
transnational relations, that only recognise the nation-state as the legitimate unit of 
collective identity. The fact that the majority of ethnic groups do not possess their 
independent nation-states remains largely invisible in this international scene. Most 
ethnic communities either forcefully or voluntarily live in the body of a nation-state.
Similarly, Walker Connor (1978), breaks down the discrepancy between the potential 
nations and existing nation-states as follow:
"1) Only 12 states (9.1%) can justifiably be described as nation-states.
2) Twenty five (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for more 
than 90% of the state's total population but also contain an important minority.
3) Another 25 (18.9%) contain a nation or potential nation accounting for between 
75% and 89% of the population.
4) In 31 (23.5%), the largest ethnic element accounts for 50% to 74% of the 
population.
5) In 39 (29.5%), the largest nation or potential nation accounts for less than half of 
the population" (Connor, 1978, p 382).
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The significance of this picture is clear; the majority of the nation-states in the world 
in fact are national-states which contain several ethnic groups, under their 
homogenising rule.
On the other hand, Gellner takes the criterion of language to refer to the 
distinctiveness of a culture, and shows that for about 8000 spoken languages in the 
world, only about 200 nation-states exist ( Gellner, 1983, p. 45). This means for each 
official 'national' language, there are 40 other languages, and ethnic groups, that are 
deprived of their official speech and administration and from the formation of their 
own nation-state, although some may not fight for them. For instance in Iran the 
official national language is Farsi. This means that Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic, 
Armenian, and Balouchi languages, and their respective ethnic communities, are 
deprived of their own national language and state. Of course, some of these linguistic 
communities may not have any desire for autonomy, but surely some, especially the 
Kurds and Armenians, do.
Likewise, the idea of the ‘national’ imposed by the colonial states in Africa and Asia, 
is the result of the colonial conquests and power of the western nation-states, and has 
no intrinsic relationship to the indigenous cultural and ethnic boundaries of the these 
areas.
The denial of the right of ethnic communities to form their own nation-states that are 
congruent with their ethnic past, clearly shows that ethnicity cannot sufficiently 
explain the parameters of nation/state building. Power and politics are essential tools 
for such formations. The nation-state as a dominant political power vehicle in the 
world politicises culture, language, race, religion, ethnicity etc. Some of these 
politicised cultures are in positions of power , and some others are represented as 
’ethnic minorities'. In this sense, 'ethnic minorities' always appear as if they do not 
quite fit into the ‘normative’ national ways or do not sufficiently desire to become
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independent nation-states; the ‘national’ assumes superiority over the 'ethnic' and as 
Anthony Smith argues there is a tension between them.
The formation and preservation of the nation-state, must therefore be looked at in the 
context of power relationships within and outside the national boundaries. The 
process of nation-state building is the mechanism whereby political power is sought. I 
am now about to look further at several components of this process .
The making of the ‘National*
In the process of nation-state building three important criteria are used by 
nationalisms to indicate the distinctiveness of their nation-state or nation-state-to-be 
in order to acquire and/or maintain power: language, ethnicity and religion.
LANGUAGE
In the era before general primary education, writes Hobsbawm, "there was and could 
be no spoken 'national' language...and the popular audience across dialectal 
boundaries" could not be addressed” (Hobsbaum 1990 p. 52). This ability had to be 
slowly developed and administered with the technical abilities of the print industry 
and the idea of a standardised and homogenised 'national' education. Hence a 
'national' literary language is always to some extent artificial and 'invented'. It is not 
an existential concept. It is a literary concept and the choice of it is always political or 
has political implications. Let me look at some examples that are given by 
Hobsbawm.
Croats spoke three dialects, cakavian, kajkavian and stokavian. Only one of them 
was spoken by the Serbs. The latter two "developed literary versions. The great Croat 
apostle of Illyrianism, Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72), though a native speaker and writer of 
Kajkavian Croat switched his own writing from this dialect to Stokavian in 1838, in 
order to underline the basic unity of southern Slavs, thus ensuring that a) Serbo-Croat
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developed more or less as one literary language...b) depriving Croat nationalism of 
convenient linguistic justification and c) providing both Serbs and later Croats with 
an excuse with later expansionism.” (ibid p 55).
In Norway , a purely Norwegian language as distinct from a Danicized written 
language was constructed (in 1808-45) which is called Nynorsk today. In spite of 
Norway's independence and official support for this language, the language has 
remained a minority one in the country, spoken by only 20% of Norwegians.
The Welsh claim that their language is the most ancient living literary language 
going back to the 6th century, but it has remained a ‘minority* language, and they have 
to receive official education in English.
In 1789, 50% of "Frenchmen" did not speak French, only 12-13% spoke it 'correctly', 
and indeed outside the central region it was not usually habitually spoken....In 
northern and southern France virtually nobody talked French.
Likewise in the vast Chinese empire, it was only through the language of the central 
government that people could start to understand one another, above the diversity of 
languages and dialects that existed in the empire.
In most ex-colonies, the official national spoken language is imported into the 
country by the colonialists; English for British past colonies, French for the French 
past colonies, and so on.
Russian was imposed on the multi-cthnic/lingual population of the ex-Soviet Union.
Therefore it would be justified to claim that the national language for communication 
and administration, the language that homogenises and unifies the nation-state, the 
language that inspires 'national consciousness', has to be selected from many existing
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vernacular (or non-vernacular in the colonial cases) languages. This selection is done 
by the state, or the nationalist intellectuals aspiring to form a state. And in that 
selection, the language that constitutes the national language is empowered to treat 
the non-national languages as 'minority' ones.
ETHNICITY
Ethnicity refers to common cohering cultural characteristics of a group, that are not 
acquired through national language and education. Although the concept of ethnicity 
is utilised, instrumentalised and politicised by Modem practices, an ethnic group can 
only be explained in terms of a common past. It is interesting to know that, as Connor 
mentioned above, there are only about 12 nation-states whose national boundaries 
roughly correspond with their ethnic boundaries; Germany, Iceland, Japan, the two 
Koreas, Finland, and a few others. The national boundaries of the rest do not 
correspond with ethnic boundaries.
The most obvious implication of this observation, is that the rest are either a) 
national-states which contain several ethnic groups, and are, therefore, ethnically 
heterogeneous like Spain, France, Britain, Belgium, or b) colonial nation-states that 
strictly 'invent' ethnicity, as in Nigeria, Ghana, Zaire, the Gulf states, Jordan and the 
rest. The national homogenisation of identity, therefore, is a medium of power to 
impose a new type of identity on the previously heterogeneous ethnic populations. In 
this sense, through the process of nation-state building, and in the age of nationalism, 
ethnicity is politicised in order to fit into the nation-state. This explains further the 
nature of the tension between ethnic and national identities.
The politicisation of the ethnie is looked at by Smith. He says any ethnie
"that aspires to nationhood, must become politicised and stake out claims in the 
competition of power and influence in the state arena...but it applies also to ethnie which 
remains within a larger state, and even to those which do not seek 'national status'" 
(Smith, 1994, PP. 155-7).
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Basques and Bretons, Scots and Croats, Kurds, Eritreans, Armenians have to be first 
politicised, before they can obtain a base for mobilising resources and power. 
Nationalism, unavoidably becomes the only language that they can adopt; 
'rediscovery1 or 'invention' of history is one of the focal points of all nationalisms, 
which is absolutely essential for the creation of the nation-state and the idea of the 
national. The point substantiated here, is that what links nationalism to ethnicity is 
the unequal distribution of modem political power.
The above point shows clearly the difference between ethnicity and nation-state. The 
latter is a modem political container of identity that has access to resources and 
power; the former is a politicised cultural discourse that is 'invented' and/or used 
creatively in the process of nation-state building. In this sense, all nation-states need 
an ethnic past, even if they have to create it from scratch. However, it would be naive 
and tautological to think that all ethnicities will lead to a 'nation-state' or that all 
'nation-states' have had an ethnic past.
In this sense, Hobsbawm is both right and wrong in his claim that "ethnicity has no 
historic relation to what is the crux of the modem nation, namely the formation of 
'nation-state'.." (Hobsbawm 1990, p 64). He is wrong because an idea of ethnicity, 
even if it is totally invented, is needed in the cultural discourses of the nation-state. 
He is also right; nation-states and ethnic groups are two incommensurable socio­
economic and cultural entities; ethnicities do not have political boundaries; they are 
not the containers of modem political power unless they are the dominant ethnicity in 
the nation-state, like the English in Britain.
RELIGION
Hobsbawm proceeds to explore the relationship between religion and national 
consciousness. The examples of Ireland, Israel, Pakistan demonstrate a very close 
link between the two. In Zionism, which led to the creation of Israel in 1948, Judaism 
and the Jewish 'national consciousness" were inseparable. In Ireland, Catholicism is
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an indispensable element in explaining Irish nationalism. In their refusal to follow the 
English into the Reformation, the Irish national identity had been linked to 
Catholicism. The creation of the nation-state of Pakistan is based purely on Islam.
However can we claim that all nation-states are based on a distinctive religious 
identity? The answer is clearly not; such an affinity does not explain why the Muslim, 
Christianor Buddhist worlds are divided among many diverse, and at times 
belligerent nation-states. The major religious mobilisation of this century to unify all 
the Muslims of the world, under one banner -Islamic Fundamentalism- is the one that 
does not promote the idea of nationalism in any sense; it seeks the unity of all the 
Muslims in the spiritual realms against the 'Satan*. However, the fact that the Muslims 
of the world belong to different nation-states is one factor that has effectively 
prevented such a religious unity. In other words nationalism or the nation-state has 
largely prevented a religiously defined ethnicity to take root. However this deduction 
is only tentative, as there are two obvious religiously defined communities who made 
their nation-states on the very basis of religion; Israel and Pakistan. It must therefore 
be acknowledged that religion has played a greater role in the formation of some 
nation-states.
On the other hand, religion is in decline. Increasingly the traditional tasks of the 
clergy in transmitting and disseminating a sense of a common past, memory and 
identity have declined, giving this function to systems of formal education. Hence 
even if religion has been more tied in with the nationalist sentiments in the past, over 
time more secular types of identification characterises national sentiments.
THE ELITE
The above observations bring me to my last point, which is that the most decisive 
criterion behind the formation of national consciousness is a sense of belonging to a 
lasting political entity. If the nation-state is defined politically, as I have tried to 
argue, then in most cases the nation-state and its vocabulary that later constitutes the
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national language includes "only a small fraction of the inhabitants of the state, 
namely the privileged elite, or nobility and gentry" (Hobsbawm, 1990, P. 73). This 
nationalism of the nobility may certainly be regarded as proto-nationalism, as the 
unification of the concepts of state=nation=society , "that is the categories of 
’nationality’, ’political loyalty' and 'political commonwealth' were united in the socio­
political consciousness and the emotions of a group within society..." (Hobsbawm, 
1990, p. 74).
The characteristics of the modem western state, which found its precise shape after 
the French Revolution evolved from the European principalities of the 16th and 17th 
century. These characteristics were novel in a number of ways; firstly the modem 
state territorialized the unit of rule out of the previous dynastic and religious realms, 
and with that identity was territorialized. Secondly the rule of the Modem State was 
tied in with modem notions of sovereignty, citizenship, democracy and nationalism. 
Thirdly, the State machinery of implementing these notions were central 
administration, census, ’national’ police, education, communications, transport, and 
democratisation of politics, all of which, since the 19th century, have linked the 
population of any specific territory together, and have furnished the grounds for 
’imagining’ a national unit of ’us', distinctive from ’them’. Fourthly, history and 
ethnicity were politicised; elements of them were prioritised in the process of 
inclusion and exclusion, to culturally cement the new unit of identity.
The modem state, very similarly to the pre-modem state, has been interested to 
secure power. However in the new political atmosphere, the loyalty and approval of 
the citizens are cmcial in the maintenance of power. For this reason the congruence 
of the political and cultural boundary is sought throughnationalism. The 
development of this network called the nation-state has evolved through different 
routes in the world, but nation-state building involves all of the above elements. 
However, the order by which these elements are combined, depends on specific
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conditions that, because of incommensurable human cultural diversities and power 
relations in the context o f’capitalist uneven development', cannot be generalised.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have suggested that a synthesis of the major theoretical contributions 
to the study of the nation-state is necessary if the nation-state is to be defined in a 
new way that is more reflective of its complex character. In the body of this complex 
institution called the nation-state, the shared ancestry and traditions of the nation 
meet the technologies of capitalism; past is woven into the present; ethnicities unfold 
in modem frameworks; Modernity finds its immortality; and humans are categorised 
on the basis of race and nationality and placed in hierarchies of power and control.
I  have defined the nation-state to be a ”distinct modern political institution o f 
administration and representation o f collective identity that is anchored in the vision 
o f the Enlightenment, and rooted in the era o f industrial capitalism that utilises, 
adopts and/or invents incommensurable human historical cultural differences, and 
employs them in obtaining and/or retaining political power ” Nationalism is the 
language o f such endeavour.
The nationalism of an existing nation-state has the language and technologies of 
power that exclude 'ethnic minorities' from their representative share of state power. 
The nationalism that seeks to build a nation-state has a more difficult time; it has to 
directly confront the institution of (its respective) nation-state for its share of state 
power. If all ethnic groups could have their own nation-states, the world would 
comprise lots of small nations.1
1 As Smith writes: "a world of small nations is a decentralised world, and as a model, decentralisation flies 
in the face of much accepted ... social planning (I read this to mean, the machinery of homogenisation and 
standardisation of identity and control of the world's resources). It also flies in the face of the so-called 
'realities of power', founded on state maximisation of territory and resources, including man-power, and 
now regarded as almost sacrosanct, even if state sovereignty is cloaked with the legitimisation of popular, 
that is national, consent They (the state elite) claim that their state constitutes a 'nation', and the nation is
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"The inherent drive towards national congruence, that is to make the state, the 
territory, the culture and the population coterminous and homogeneous, inevitably 
destabilises the regional systems..." (Smith 1994 p. 221), and such a congruence can 
only happen through the modem state apparatus of power. The original French and 
British models of the nation-state then become a point of aspiration and emulation for 
others. However in the context of "uneven capitalist development such aspirations 
have created nationalistic battlegrounds in the late 20th century involving genocide 
and ethnic cleansing. Hence what deprives the majority of human ethnic communities 
of the chance of having their own nation-state, is ironically the embodied aspiration 
itself. That is, centralised power in the form of the nation-state that seeks to 
nationalise culture, and eradicate cultural difference for creating a ‘homogeneous’, 
‘united’ and ‘sovereign’ national-state.
The standardisation and homogenisation of culture and identity from above, is a 
prime example of what Adomo and Horkheimer in their original critique of 
Modernity called 'culture industry’, which locates the questions of identity and culture 
in the context of macro and micro power relationships and political economy. 
Critical theory has left an unmistakable impact on the formation of postmodern 
theory, to which I am about to turn. In the next chapter, a model of a postmodern 
critique of the nation-state is offered.
sovereign and therefore integral and alone legitimate, with the result that nationalism becomes an ’official' 
doctrine and the nation is taken over by the territorial and bureaucratic state” (Smith, 1994, p. 221).
Chapter Three:
A Postmodern Critique 
of the Nation-State
Having established the nation-state as a gigantic modern institution of power and 
administration of collective identity, I intend, in this chapter, to develop a 
postmodern critique of the phenomenon of the nation-state. In attempting to do so, I 
will combine the work of Benedict Anderson and Edward Said with that of Homi 
Bhabha. The rationale behind this combination, is that in the work of Anderson and 
Said, the questions of national and cultural identity are analysed in the macro­
contexts of colonial and imperial power relationships . And in the work of Bhabha, 
such a question is tightly linked to the narrative processes and discourses of power 
within what he calls the ‘Nation-Space’.
National identity, as a specific form of collective identity, is embodied in the 
institution of the nation-state. The focal point of this chapter is to develop a 
postmodern analysis and critique of national identity, and to offer a model of 
deconstruction of the nationalist representation of the nation-state as a unit in which 
people are united around a historical, sovereign and homogeneous common core. In 
deconstructing the nationalist representation of the nation-state, this chapter looks at 
how contingent and heterogeneous human collectivities are constructed as 
dichotomised and homogenous ‘us’ and ‘them’, both structurally through colonialism 
and subjectively through narratives of nation-building.
In chapter two, I proposed the following definition of the nation-state:
The nation-state is a distinctive modem political institution o f collective identity that 
is anchored in the vision o f the Enlightenment, and rooted in the era o f industrial
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capitalism which utilises, adopts and'or invents incommensurable human historical 
cultural differences, and employs them in obtaining and/or retaining political power. 
Nationalism is the language o f such endeavour.
In the above definition, the nation-state is located in the modem era, and is analysed 
as an institution of Modernity that administers and standardises diverse human 
historical cultural differences, for political power.
As soon as such a definition is proposed, the grounds for a postmodern critique of the 
nation-state is furnished. As argued in chapter one, postmodern theorists such as 
Lyotard, Foucault and others were essentially against meta-narrative discourses of 
Modernity, and of the Enlightenment's practice of establishing universal Truths. Such 
discourses are regarded as invariably ideological and linked to power relationships in 
organising and 'normalising' human identity. Now, if the nation-state is one of the 
prime dominant containers and organisers of a grand and homogeneous national 
identity, then from a Foucaultian perspective, it is an institution that is very similar to 
'the clinic', 'the hospital', 'the school', 'the prison', and is in itself a discourse of power, 
and a Modem institutional apparatus of both making and representing collective 
identity as synonymous with national identity.
On the other hand, as Benedict Anderson and Edward Said have shown , the question 
of national identity/culture cannot be separated from larger discourses of power; 
especially those of colonialism and imperialism.
The Modem and the postmodern subject
However, before proceeding, there remains some yet untackled questions regarding 
the distinction between a modem and a postmodern analysis of the nation-state: In 
what sense is a postmodern understanding of the human subject different from a 
Modernist conception? How is the question of representation of identity treated in 
these two perspectives? The answer is given to us by Stuart Hall. He offers three
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different conceptions of identity. These are the "(a) Enlightenment subject, (b) 
sociological subject, and (c) post-modern subject". (Hall, 1993, pp. 275-7). My 
concern here is with the first and the third categories.
The Enlightenment subject, explains Hall, adopts a conception of the human subject 
who is a "fully centred, unified individual, endowed with the capacities of reason, 
consciousness and action, whose ’centre' consisted of an inner core, which first 
emerged when the subject was bom, and unfolded with it, while remaining essentially 
the same- continuous or 'identical' with itself- throughout the individual's existence." 
(Hall, 1993, pp. 257-277). This conceptualisation of the subject as sovereign, rational 
and capable of reason, is undoubtedly very modem and closely linked to the 
Enlightenment.
The Enlightenment collective subject (the nation-state here), is also to be understood 
in reference to an inner core within the collectivity, which is present ontologically, 
self-referentially and as a priori in thought and action of the collectivity. This inner 
core within human collectivities distinguishes them from others, gives a meaningful 
significance to the separation of 'us' and 'them', and assumes some kind of 
unquestionable cultural homogeneity or commonality within each collectivity on 
which their political sovereignty is based. This is the philosophy of nationalism too, 
that has dominated the world ever since the French Revolution of 1789. And this is 
what constituted the spirit of The League of Nations in 1922; the 'legitimacy of 
national-states to attempt cultural and political congruence; and the belief behind the 
aspirations and ambitions of all 'ethnic groups' who want to build nation-states.
The notion of ethnie in Anthony Smith's work is a very good example of this usage. 
Nations and national identity, are consistently analysed and explained in his work on 
the basis of a self-referential inner core called ethnie that unfolds and represents itself 
in the body of the nation-state, and/or in the voice of nationalism. A dominant pre­
existent ‘ethnie’ is crucial for the formation of nation-states in Smith’s argument,
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A postmodern subject, on the other hand, is conceptualised by Stuart Hall as having 
no "fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a 'moveable feast': 
formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or 
addressed in the cultural systems which surround us". According to Hall, if we feel 
that we have a unified identity from birth to death, both individually and collectively, 
it is only because we narrate it as such; because we narrate it according to 
fundamental facets of Enlightenment thought.
A postmodern view holds that the human subject not only has formed different 
collective identities in different times and places, but also these formed identities 
have a hybrid nature; there is no unified, coherent, completed 'self, or an inner core 
that is spatially and temporally transverse. The only 'time' that is spatially and 
temporally transverse, is Anderson’s 'homogeneous empty time' in which anonymity 
of the individual is linked to an 'imagined community'. Or to look at it from a 
different angle, humanity has formed many different types of collective identities in 
different times and places, of which national identity is only one type. Some of these 
collective identities are based on kinship, tribes, clans, religions, dynasties, empires, 
ethnicities, regions and nation-states. The modem explanation of national identity 
based on an immemorial inner core, does not sufficiently explain why this inner core 
has only been represented by the nation-state, and in the form of national identity in 
the modem period.
In postmodern theory, the nationalised collective identity of the modem subject, in 
the body of the nation-state, is conceptualised as hybrid, ambivalent and fragmented 
in die processes of cultural representation (Bhabha); embodiments of 'disciplinary 
power1 (Foucault); the product of official nationalism and colonialism (Benedict 
Anderson) ; Orientalised and Occidentalised in the colonial relationships (Edward 
Said).
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To make it sound more familiar and in touch with postmodern literature, a 
postmodern critique of the nation-state deconstructs the Modernist accounts of the 
nations and nationalisms of themselves that are based on the assumptions of a 
distinctive common inner core, expressed in a homogeneous culture , embodied or 
to-be-embodied in the form of a nation-state. In a postmodern critique a different 
meaning is given to the phenomenon of the nation-state; to the distinction between 
'us' and 'them'; to the way they are formed and to what they represent.
Let me try to capture the critique by first looking at the work of Said and. Anderson, 
who posit the question of national identity in the context of colonialism, and then 
proceed to the work of Homi Bhabha.
In what comes below, I wish to link up the colonial context of the emergence of 
national identity and culture to the Foucaultian/Freudian/Saussurian analysis of Homi 
Bhabha in arriving at my postmodern conception of the nation-state.
1) The Nation-State & Colonialism
Edward Said offers one of the most illuminating contributions on the relationship 
between (National) culture and imperialism. In 'Orientalism' as well as in 'Culture 
and Imperialism', he puts the question of 'culture' in the context of colonialism and 
imperial power relationships, and elaborates that the 'Oriental' and the 'Occidental' are 
part of each other's definitions, not mutually exclusive identities. He analyses the 
colonial processes as being bound to material interests, that have gone into the 
making of 'Oriental' & 'Occidental' identities . To him the making of 'us' & 'them' 
must be understood as a discourse of power in a Foucaultian sense, that is crystallised 
in the colonial discourses and relationships.
The dichotomisation of the 'Oriental' and 'Occidental' as mutually exclusive identities, 
is analysed, by Said, as a function of language and power, not reality. He defines 
'Orientalism' as:
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”a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made 
between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident'....Thus a very large 
mass of writers, poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists and 
imperial administrators have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as 
the starting point...". (Said, 1978, p. 2).
He develops a style of analysis such as Foucault used in The Archaeology o f  
Knowledge and Discipline and PunisK to write his Orientalism. and to develop a 
postmodern methodology. His contention is that without "examining Orientalism as 
a discourse, one can not possibly understand the enormously systematic discipline by 
which European culture was able to manage, and even produce, the Orient politically, 
sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the 
post-Enlightenment period".(Said, 1978, P. 3).
In the above quotations, Said is clearly saying that the nexus of knowledge and power 
that has formed the discourse of 'Orientalism’ is largely an 'Occidental' phenomenon. 
The Orient has never been an autonomous and free subject in determining what is 
thought, taught and written about it; how it is represented, and what network of 
interests it serves. The narratives of the Orient are largely produced outside it; the 
Orient has been turned into a historical and cultural professional 'field' for the 
involvement of Franco-British and later American experts: scholars and academics, 
politicians, businessmen and economists, military forces and the rest. The Orient is 
an enterprise with a considerable material investment, a system of knowledge, or as 
Disraeli wrote in his novel Tancred. the East was a career.
The Orientalisation of the Orient, is largely an Occidental product. Orientalism in this 
sense is a western ideological and practical vehicle of producing 'knowledge', and 
authorising views that can be institutionalised, taught and learned about the Orient. 
Hence, in the very nature of the discourse is embedded a power relationship in which 
knowledge about the Orient is linked with hegemony over the Orient.
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In this discourse the ‘Occident’ is in a position that both creates its 'Other* ( here the 
Orient), and also does the knowing, representing, and displaying of its ’other1. The 
Orient, on the other hand, is both made/’Orientalised', subjectified, represented and 
displayed from its without; the Orient does not represent itself on its own terms; it is 
not a free subject in the process of representation; it is the exotic, erotic, savage... 
Other. Two main conclusions can be drawn from Said’s 'Orientalism':
1) On the one hand, Said shows that the Orient constitutes an academic and a 
practical career for the West, and is an integral part of Western material and 
intellectual civilisation. Thus the Orient is part of the definition of the West, 
in the same way that the West is integrated in the making and the definition 
of the Orient. The dichotomy of'us' and 'them' becomes very unstable in this 
light.
2) On the other hand, he contends that 'pure', 'objective' and 'scientific' 
knowledge has always been political and hegemonic in nature. Any 'pure' 
Tmowledge' about the cultural identity of the Orient and Occident is 
unavoidably linked to the positional superiority of the Occident. These 
positions are incommensurable, and the question of cultural representation 
in embedded in such a power relationship.
Like Gramsci and Foucault, Edward Said understands culture and cultural 
representation as essentially hegemonic systems. He builds an argument on the basis 
of this methodology, which is carried into Culture and Imperialism. He elaborates in 
his book that we can think of the 'national' culture as a hegemonic system. If nations’ 
subjective perceptions of themselves are largely based on narrations, then the power 
to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming or emerging, is an integral part 
of the making of the 'national'.
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Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities argues that two forms of imagining 
(and narrating) the nation, from the eighteenth century onwards, have been the novel 
and the newspaper. These two forms are technical means for 'representing' the kind of 
imagined community that is the Nation. Anderson argues that in both the novel and 
the newspaper the idea of 'simultaneity-along-time' in a Tiomogeneous empty time' is 
fundamental. The 'homogeneous empty time' is the time of the nation, and the time in 
which the Tiomogeneous’ nation lives. This Tiomogeneous' time is printed on top of 
the daily newspapers, and is omnipresent calendrically and in the clock. The idea of 
'simultaneity', which Anderson describes as cross-time and transverse, is fulfilled by 
the temporal coincidence of what the nation does in its national way of being; the 
nation's happening is confirmed by the news, the newspaper and the novel. In this 
sense, the nation is only aware of itself through a self-imagination that is produced 
and perpetuated by the print industry and through an 'empty homogeneous time' that 
links individual anonymity to his/her national identity, and to an idea of 'us'. 
(Anderson, 1991, pp. 24-25).
It is precisely the novel that Edward Said takes as his example in showing the 
colonial nature of what is regarded as national literature. He looks at many British 
novels in which the Tiomogeneous empty time' of the nation, includes 'other1 
simultaneous colonial spaces and times that are transformed into, and represented as 
spaces of subordination.
Said refers to many novels amongst which are: Dickens's Great Expectations, Robert 
Hughes's The Fatal Shore and Paul Carter’s The Road to Botany Bay. In these works 
of literature , references are made to Australia and 'white' colonies such as Ireland. 
"Australia was established as a penal colony in the eighteenth century for England to 
transport an irredeemable, unwanted excess population of felons to a place, 
originally charted by Captain Cook, that would also function as a colony replacing 
those lost in America. The pursuit of profit, the building of empire, and what Hughes 
calls social apartheid together produced modem Australia, which by the times
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Dickens first took an interest in it during the 1840s (in David Copperfield Wilkins 
Micawber happily immigrates there) had progressed somewhat into profitability and a 
sort of'free system'." (Said, 1993- Introduction, p. xvi)
In The Road to Botany. Carter makes an exploration of convicts, ethnographers, 
profiteers, soldiers whose presence in Australia is authorised by another social space 
called 'home'- England. The repatriation and rehabilitation of English criminals in 
this designated penal colony called Australia, is also reflected in Great Expectations. 
in which the character of Megawitch is transported there. In these 19th century 
novels, Said wants to show that 'other* colonial social spaces and times are integral 
and subordinated parts of the discourse of national imagination at 'home'.
What is essentially being said here is that the coloniser and the colonised, the 
'Orientals' and the 'Occidentals’ are part of each other’s national histories, 
geographies, narratives and discourses . The national history of the western societies 
incorporates the histories and the geographies of Africa, India, Asia, Latin America, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand; the question of national culture is pertinent to 
imperial relationships. It is within the context of colonialism and the 
incommensurability of the colonial positions, that systems of cultural representations, 
and cultural significations come into existence, and set the landscape for the national 
imagination.
Yet most cultural historians, Said continues, and almost all literary scholars have 
failed to remark the geographical notation, the theoretical mapping and charting of 
territory that underlies western fiction, and the philosophical discourse of the time. 
First comes the authority of the European observer, traveller, merchant, scholar, 
historian, novelist. Then comes the hierarchy of spaces, that a metropolitan economy 
is somehow dependent on an overseas territory to maintain prosperity at 'home'. 
Within this hierarchy of order, the 'other* is represented as existing as an 'object' of
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some passing references as if it has no bearing on the making of national identity at 
‘home’.
Said gives us a perfect example of such a socio-cultural vision in Jane Austen’s 
Mansfield Park, in which Thomas Bertram's slave plantation in Antigua is 
mysteriously necessary to the poise and the beauty of Mansfield park, a place 
described in moral and aesthetic terms well before the scramble for Africa, or before 
the age of empire officially began. Austen's description of Mansfield Park and its 
potent resonance, sublimates the hardships of the Caribbean exploitation to a few 
passing references to Antigua. The geographical and cultural centrality of Mansfield 
Park in the literature completely disguises its contingency, and hence its hybrid 
identity. On the other hand, the structure of attitude and references to overseas 
possessions, and the social informing that this novel does, fixes normative social 
values at 'home'.
Said connects imperialism and culture by looking at national literature. In the light 
of Said's analysis all cultures embed structures of domination and subordination. At 
the same time that all nationally defined cultures are aspirations to sovereignty and 
homogeneity, they are paradoxically hybrid historical experiences.
Hobsbawm’s edited book The Invention o f Tradition gives us many examples of this 
hybridity. For example, in an article called ‘Representing Authority in Victorian’ 
India, Benedict Cohen refers to the declaration of Queen Victoria as the Empress of 
India in 1876. Queen’s Viceroy, Lord Lytton, was sent there to greet and celebrate in 
'traditional' jamborees and durbras all over the country, as well as in a great Imperial 
Assemblage in Delhi, just like an old age national custom. The incorporation of the 
imperial Queen into the 'national' history of India, places the narratives of both 
'national' cultures of India and Britain in the context of colonial contingency (Cohen, 
“Representing Authority in Victorian India”. (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983, pp. 185- 
207).
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To give another vivid example in the 20th century, one can refer to the narrative 
structures in Ian Fleming novels during the Cold War period. In all Fleming's novels 
Casino Rovale (1953); Live and Let Die (1954); Moonraker (1955); Diamonds are 
Forever ((1956); From Russia with Love (1957); Dr No (1958); Goldfmser (1959); 
Thunderball (1961); On Her Majesty's Secret Service (1963) and You Only Live 
Twice (1964), there is a similar narrative structure. James Bond (Occidental hero, 
dutiful to the national interests, European, potent, virile, eventually in charge of the 
situation and successful) represents the nation and its national values. The villain 
represents the 'other1, (normally impotent, corrupt, with disgusting physical attributes, 
representing 'wrong' social values, in a suspicious country, and eventually defeated). 
The woman in all these novels is a pretty girl, who has to be saved from the control of 
the villain by Bond. (Eco, 1984, chapter 6)1
The binary opposition of Bond/villain is parallel to the binary opposition of'us/them', 
free world/repressive world and beauty/beast and in all these novels the national 
interests are sought by the Occident outside the boundaries of the nation.
These novels linked social spaces, times and characters across the globe, and put 
them in a hierarchical order in which one set authorised and controlled the 'other' in 
the 'homogeneous empty time' of 'simultaneity of the nation. Fleming's 'national' 
novels were made into 'national' films, and they fed the 'national' imagination of many 
generations enormously, not mentioning the great 'national' profits they made. They 
not only fed the 'national' imagination of the Occident, they also were (and still are) 
imported and consumed by the Orientals.
According to Said, these novelists have not just reflected on power relationships in 
their novels; they have also participated in making them, by weaving them into the
1 Eco does not intend to develop a postmodern critique of James Bond novels, but to deconstruct these 
novels on the basis of linguistic binary opposites in order to write a structuralist account of Fleming’s 
novels. However in doing so, the nationalistic nature of these novels is revealed.
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'national' imagination, and by incorporating them into the simultaneity of 'national' 
discourses. In this light, Anderson's idea of 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation, 
can also be read as the homogeneous empty time of the empire.
In fact Anderson does relate the ‘homogeneous empty time’ of the nation to 
‘universal-imperiaF interests himself, when he describes the state after the middle 
of 19th century as having a double status; 'universal-imperial' and 'particular-national'. 
The 'universal-imperial' status of the state concealed itself in the body of 'particular- 
national'. (Anderson, 1991, p. 85).
Inspired by Seton-Watson’s Nations and States. Anderson develops chapter six of his 
book on 'official nationalism and imperialism'. He looks at the formation of national 
identity in the 19th century, as being simultaneously a function of 'official 
nationalism' of the state and 'imperialism' on the one hand, and print capitalism on the 
other. 2
'Official nationalism' of the State merged the idea of the nation-state with dynastic 
empire, and the empire began to dress in a 'national' flag and speak a 'national' 
language. Under the Romanov rule, the Russification of the empire (in which French 
and German were the spoken languages of the St. Petersburg court and provincial 
nobility; half of the 'nation' were still serfs, and more than half spoke a mother 
tongue other than Russian) was imposed. In 1887 the Russian language was made 
compulsory in the state schools, and Russification and the making of a Russian 
'national' identity became an official policy of the empire.
2 Anderson maintains that by the mid 19th century some vemacularisation of the state language had happened in all 
dynasties (for a more detailed account, see his chapter two), which provided the foundation for a rapid national 
identification of all Euro-Mediterranean monarchies. "Romanovs discovered that they were Great Russians, 
Hanoverians that they were English, Hohenzollems that they were Germans".(Anderson, 1991, p. 85)
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Like Russification, Anglicization of British empire, provided vast opportunities for 
the armies of middle class metropolitans- functionaries, schoolmasters, merchants, 
planters and the rest to develop their career in 'Other* spaces. The British empire, 
scattered across all continents, anglicized the majority of subjected peoples who had 
no religious, linguistic, cultural and historical ties with the metropole.
The process of Japanification of the Koreans, Taiwanese and Manchurians, and after 
the outbreak of the Pacific War, Burmese, Indonesians and Filipinos also paralleled 
those processes of Russification and Anglicization after 1900.
In all these empires, the Japanified, Anglicized and Russified subjects were 
completely barred from entering the metropoles, or take positions of administration 
of the Russians, Englishmen, or Japanese. Ironically these empires were always 
resistant to any 'foreign' rule. Hence, these processes of nationalisation of diverse 
cultures in the hands of official nationalism of the imperial state, clearly and 
convincingly shows that the question of power is inseparably woven into the making 
of'national' identities of 18th century onwards, and must enter into the narratives of 
the nation-state. The modem narratives of nationhood conceal the hybridity of 
‘national identity5.3
Although the formation of the League of Nations in 1922, put an official end to 
high dynasticism, and established the nation-state as a legitimate international norm, 
the character of official nationalism of the state remains incomprehensible outside 
the framework of this colonial past.4
3 See Ronald Segal’s argument in The Black Diaspora (1995), where he clearly illustrates the 
interconnection of the processes of industrialisation of Britain, especially the cities such as Birmingham, 
Liverpool and Manchester with the slave trades of the 18th century. He shows that the industrial 
revolution, which characterises the modern Britain and is inseparable from British ‘national’ history 
evolved through the collective toil and death of the Other.
4 Anderson distinguishes between the official Nationalism of the state and ‘popular nationalism’ . He looks at the 
'last wave' of'popular nationalism' in the colonial territories of Asia and Africa, largely in the second half of the 20th 
century, as a conditioned response to colonialism and its makings. The transformation of 'official nationalism' of the 
empires during the 18th and 19th centuries into the state nationalism of the nation-state alter the first World War, in
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In the work of Anderson and Said, we can acquire a different perception of the 
essence of the 'nation-state' and national identity from a different angle:
- The nation-state, and 'national' identity are essentially hegemonic and hybrid 
systems, whose formation, function and imagination should be analysed in the 
context of the slave trade, colonialism and imperialism.
- National imagination is formed by the incorporation of 'other* spaces, times and 
characters. Thus the 'other1 is always part of the definition and conception of 'us'. 
The dichotomisation of us/them, is a function and a discourse of power. The 
incommensurability of positions in the structure of power relationships, is vital in the 
genesis of hegemonic systems such as 'national' culture.
- A postmodern conception of the nation-state, therefore, deconstructs the 
nationalistic perception of human subjects and their collectivities, that is based on an 
assumption of an ontological inner core within national boundaries.
Some of these conclusions are reached through the analysis of the nation made by 
Homi Bhabha in his Nation & Narration. He combines and adopts a 
Saussurian/Freudian/Foucaultian approach in developing his analysis of the notions of 
'nation' and 'national culture'.
turn shaped the 'national' imagination and aspirations of the intelligentsia in Asia and Africa, and the task of 
decolonisation itself, paradoxically, took a popular nationalistic form. The 'Official nationalism' of the empire led to 
a popular nationalism against the empire, a popular nationalism against the other 'Official Nationalism'. This gives 
nationalism a double character (Anderson 1991, Chapter 7).
The paradoxical nature of nationalism, is also reflected upon by Tom Naim in the Break-up o f Britain, where he 
describes (popular) nationalism as "Janus-headed". On the one hand nationalism aims to nation-state/build, and on 
the other hand in its popular formation in Latin America, Asia and Africa, (and later in Easton Europe, and in the 
former Soviet Union), it is a response against 'nationalising' activities of the imperial nation-States.
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2) A Postmodern Narrative of the Nation-State
Homi Bhabha writes on the category of the nation-state from the position of late 20th 
century ex-colonised people and communities, who are gathered in exile as 
immigrants, refugees, foreigners, ethnic minorities, and people of diaspora, and who 
live in the margins of the imagined community. He writes about the cultural 
construction of nationhood, which in the name of the 'people', conceals their 
heterogeneity, and the experience of those in the edges and margins of the nation.
He presents the nation as an abstract modem meta-narrative; a narrative strategy for 
the standardisation of identity; an apparatus of power; a form of institutionalised 
political rationality; a symbolic force generated by the narcissism of self- 
referentiality; signified by the notion of a 'people', and in which the real individual is 
anonymous.
In "Nation and Narration" , Bhabha looks at the concept of an imagined community 
which, on the one hand, comes from an immemorial past and glides into a timeless 
future, and on the other hand, has a historical newness in time and space of 
modernity. To Bhabha, this double meaning of the nation, indicates that nations and 
nationalisms by their very nature are ambivalent. Modem society, and the modem 
nation, are 'culturally ambivalent9 (Bhabha, 1990, pp. 291-320).
Bhabha looks at the cultural representation of this ambivalence, that is produced by 
the nation's "conceptual indeterminacy" and "transitional history". He continues by 
arguing that the narrative of the nation, that is, the language and rhetoric of the 
nation, is also ambivalent, and as Tom Naim puts it, 'Janus-headed'. Here both the 
narrative of the nation and the symbolic nation are agencies of ambivalence.
The ambivalence of the nation happens at three levels. Firstly, there is the temporal 
and spatial representation of the nation of itself that links its immemoriality to its
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historical newness. Secondly there is its psychic ambivalence of love and hatred 
embodied in the form of ’us' and 'them'; and thirdly its representation of itself as 
being based on 'unities' and 'homogeneities' that as abstract representations are in 
tension with the realities of'cultural difference'.
Below, I shall try to elaborate these three dimensions of 'ambivalence' in the work of 
Bhabha, in reference to Saussure, Freud and Foucault, whose influence on Bhabha, in 
my opinion, gives rise to the above levels of conceptualisation of ambivalence.
F. Saussures' influence on Bhabha
One way of establishing the ambivalence of the nation, for Bhabha, is to look at the 
narrative strategy of the nation that simultaneously fulfils two pedagogical and 
performative functions of the nation. These two functions link the nation's 
nationalistic self-conception of itself as immemorial and timeless, to the historical 
newness of the nation.
The Pedagogical function of the nation, in Bhabha, refers to the totality of social 
references that represent and signify the nation as immemorial and timeless; the 
way the nation is taught and thought by nationalism and by the official authorities, 
and by the institutions that represent the 'nation'.
The Performative function of the nation, on the other hand, refers to the unfolding 
and representation of the nation in its daily life by itself, where the nation lives and 
performs its modem national life . In this sense the nation is signified by its own 
daily activities and subjectivities in the present time.
In the body of these two functions, the nation is Hold* in a \'pedagogical* narrative, 
and it also does the Helling* o f itself in its ’performative* narrative.; the nation is both 
'signified* in its 'pedagogical' dimension, and is a 'signifier* o f itself in its 
['performance*; the nation is both a category of immemoriality and modernity ; of
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'past' and 'present'. The nation is both a structure and a practice; it synthesises the 
objectivity of the pedagogy that does the teaching, and the subjectivity of the 
participants who do the acting, feeling and self-narrating. The Modernist problematic 
of structure/agency is also resolved in such a conception of the nation.
The intertwining of performative/pedagogical; telling/told; signifier/signified; 
present/past of the nation is inspired by, and similar to, a Saussurian distinction 
between Langue and parole in language; one being the language of pedagogy and the 
other the language of people. However, the unity of these functions in the name of 
'people', makes 'people' like a linguistic 'sign' that always, according to Saussure, 
arbitrarily unites the signifier to the signified. He proposes to retain the word sign to 
designate the whole and to replace concept and sound-image respectively by signified 
and signifier.
The first principle that Saussure established about the nature of the sign is its 
arbitrary nature, by which he means that there is no innate relationship between the 
signified and the signifier.
The implication of this for the Nation, is that there is no innate relationship between 
the pedagogical/performative, immemorial/modem dimensions of the nation. The 
nation-state as a modem container of collective identity has no natural one-to-one 
relationship to immemoriality and the antiquity of ethnicities.
However this arbitrary connection is hidden in the name of the 'people', and in the 
‘nation-space’ of the cultural. The link is a political one living in the sphere of 
culture. I have already argued for 'culture' to be perceived as a hegemonic system as 
it is in Anderson’s and Said's work. Therefore it can be concluded that the arbitrary 
linkages of the narratives of the nation is a hegemonic phenomenon.
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The absence of an innate relationship between the immemorial nation signified by its 
pedagogues, and the modem nation that signifies itself in its performance , is 
precisely why Bhabha conceives the nation, and the 'national subject', to be 'split' in 
a 'd o u b le -tim eThe reason is that the category of'people' is the 'object' of narrating 
the nation in an immemorial sense by its pedagogues, and it is also simultaneously 
the 'subject' of narrating the nation in a modem sense by its performers. These 
disjunctive narratives, according to Bhabha, indicate the ambivalence of the nation at 
the level of language and consciousness.
Freud's influence on Bhabha
None of the above, however, can ever explain why the nation is so enthusiastically 
performed; why people sacrifice themselves for the nation; how national figures, 
symbols, traditions, legends and legacies get hooked into the nation's memories and 
sentiments.
A Freudian reading of Bhabha provides some answers to these questions, and 
explains the ambivalence of the nation in a different light - psychically. To Freud 
what binds people, communities and groups together always has a libidinal essence, 
that can only be analysed in reference to primary instincts and the 'unreason' of the 
group. Love and hate have to go hand in hand in giving rise to solid bondings and 
communities. Freud Says "it is always possible to bind together a considerable 
number of people in love, so long as there are other people left to receive the 
manifestation of their aggressiveness".(Freud, 1961, p. 114)
Ambivalence to Freud, is a psychic phenomenon. Its roots are in the period of early 
childhood when, in the case of little girls, their initial total love and desire for the 
mother has to be transformed into competition with the mother for the father's love. 
The little girl identifies with the mother, at the same time that she wants to replace 
her to gain father's love. In the case of the little boys, the original love for the mother 
also has to be followed by first a competition with the father for the love of the
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mother, but eventually the abandonment of the mother as the original love object, 
and an identification with the father.
Ambivalence, and the intertwining of love and hatred in the processes of 
identification, means that at the level of the group, individuals in their narcissistic 
search for the love (always libidinal in nature) of the group, have to give up their 
egoism for altruism and be united in the group, or as Freud says, identify with the 
group. However the psychic function of hatred, is embodied in the group's distinction 
of itself from the 'Other*, the 'foreigners’, and in the diversion of their hatred or 
aggressiveness towards them. (Freud, 1959)
The most famous study that has taken place within this Freudian proposition, is that 
of Theodor Adorno on "Freudian Theory and the Pattern o f Fascist Propaganda". In 
this analysis of Fascism during the 2nd World War, a Freudian approach has been 
adopted. The psychic ambivalence of love/hatred is manipulated for political 
purposes by Hitler. Through the excitement and sensationalisation of ’love for 
Germany', a very strong Fascist group is materialised around Hitler as the father 
figure, whose aggressiveness and hatred is then diverted against the Jews in the form 
of anti-semitism. According to Adorno no system of rationality can explain the 
Fascist propaganda and its barbaric genocides. Only the irrational, the unreason, the 
psychic can explain the mass psychological base of fascism. (Adorno, 1982, pp. 118- 
137).
The Freudian discovery of the unconscious furnishes the way to perceive human 
identity in term of symbolic and contradictory processes of identification. Thus when 
Bhabha talks about the intertwining of 'us' and 'them' in the 'liminality' (which I 
understand to mean the threshold of the unconscious) of the nation, he is in fact 
referring to this structure of the collective unconscious.
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What Bhabha is saying here, is that the nation's ambivalent psyche, automatically 
constitutes the borders beyond which the Other is posited, whereas the 'other' is part 
of the psychic structure of the nation. The nation and its locality is neither unified nor 
unitary in itself, but resides beyond and outside itself in its 'Other'.5 Here the other 
important concept in Bhabha, hybridity of identity, is produced and anchored psycho- 
analytically. The nation and its ‘other’ are located in the same psychic structure. The 
nation has a hybrid essence. Bhabha comes to a similar conclusion to those of Said 
and Anderson, from a psychoanalytic angle. The rhetoric of the nation in the hands 
of nationalism signifying an inner common core, is always 'incomplete in its 
signification', as it excludes the Other from its own definition. The ‘other’ is part of 
our definition even when we think and speak most intimately and indigenously 
between ourselves, Bhabha reiterates.
The Freudian scheme of psychic ambivalence such as desire/disavowal, 
narcissism/projection, self/other, unconscious/conscious etc, is admittedly very 
influential in Bhabha's work. To Freud the narcissism of the group, the cohering 
principle that bonds the group together can only happen if there is an ‘other that can 
be hated and enemised’. This unconscious ambivalence is the major psychic factor in 
any identification process. To Freud doubling, dividing and interchanging of the Self 
is part of being and becoming a group. And that is why Bhabha places the marginals, 
migrants, refugees, ethnic minorities, in the midst of the nation's liminality (collective 
unconscious).
The third highly influential thinker, that leaves an unmistakable impact on the work 
of Bhabha, is Michael Foucault.
5 Note how the psychic ambivalence of the nation and the way it resides in the Other, is similar to the 
Said’s conceptualisation of the Occidental/Oriental in Orientalism (1978), who also looks at the way 
the Orient and the Occident reside in each other4 s identities.
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Foucault's influence on Bhabha
Foucault gives us an account of the modem subjects, as 'docile bodies', who are the 
agents of materialisation of 'disciplinary power'. T)isciplinary power' is the 
'panopticon' function of modem institutions, whose technologies of, and concern with 
administration, regulation and surveillance produce 'normality' and maintain a 
particular order. The modem sites of 'disciplinary power1, according to Foucault, are 
the police, the school, the hospital, the clinic, the prison, the psychiatry, the mental 
institution, and to Bhabha, the nation-state, and its narrative strategies. Disciplinary 
power' refers to a kind of regime that produces and maintains 'normality', not so 
much by external force, but through its homogenising and regulating effects, here in 
the form of national identity. (Foucault, 1979).
Homi Bhabha takes the nation-state as one of the modem apparatuses of'disciplinary 
power' that standardises, homogenises and normalises a national identity around the 
dichotomy of 'us' and 'them'. The 'disciplinary power1 generates and preserves the 
rationality of nationality through the dominant state of 'knowledge' of the time; its 
discourses, practices, and conceptual system, which together form the notion of 
'truth'. This Foucaultian triangle of power, knowledge, truth (always temporally and 
spatially bound) is the basis of his genealogical and archaeological investigations in 
all his books. According to this triangle there is no system of power that does not 
need some form of 'legitimation', which in turn is endorsed by what is 'known' at the 
time to be 'true' and 'correct'.
However the significance of this triangle, with all its regulatory functions, is that it 
does not function merely 'objectively' and does not emanate merely from an external 
source; it enters into the very depth of human subjectivity, and his/her self perception. 
The triangle of power, knowledge, truth forms a mode of governing the soul and the 
body. It is in this light that Foucault presents the 'modem subject' as the agency of the 
actualisation of 'disciplinary power*. He says: "it does not matter who exercises
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power. Any individual, taken almost at random, can operate the machine".(Foucault, 
1979, 202).
In this light, the homogenising and normalising functions of the nation are facets of 
'disciplinary power’.And the homogenised community of the nation, is taught as a 
given in the pedagogical narrative strategies of the nation, and this is precisely the 
way power lives. It lives in narrative strategies of the pedagogues of the nation, and it 
lives in the performative function of the nation. Power lives in the mind, heart and 
the body of each individual, in the way they perceive themselves, and in the way their 
bodies are educated.
Bhabha, too, conveys the same message that power is embedded in the homogenising 
discourses and practices of the nation-state. Human subjectivity, human mind and 
body constitute the first and last 'stations' where these discourses and practices must 
live. Hence, the 'disciplinary power* works towards the docility of the mind and the 
body . A very good example of the way the body is regulated in specific manners to 
produce a different self perception, is given in Goffman’s Asylums which clearly 
shows how the treatment of human body and mind is transformed in the asylum 
centre, in generating and maintaining and administering control through a new self­
perception for the inmates (Goffinan, 1968)
In the light of this analysis, and by a Foucaultian definition, power is inseparable 
from the narrative strategies of the Nation. The imagined communities are docile 
communities. Their soldiers, clergymen, military men, teachers, politicians, doctors, 
police, work force as well as their criminals, actualise the discourse of the nation and 
how it should behave in solidarity, in unity, in war, at work and in other situations. 
Each receives specialised training of their minds and bodies in order to serve and 
actualise the Nation.
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Foucault conceptualises power in a totally fascinating new way; to him power and its 
operation is to be found in the processes of dispersion, dichotomisation and 
marginalisation; in individuals' bodies and identities. He rejects the modernist idea of 
power to be anchored in macro-structures and ruling classes. The operation of power, 
according to Foucault, does not happen so much through physical force, but through 
the hegemony of norms, technologies of normalisation, the shaping of the body and 
soul, the individual and group's subjective identity. For this reason, Foucault in 'The 
History o f Sexuality1 calls this new mode of power; bio-power'. 'Bio-power' links the 
'technologies of domination' to the 'technologies of self through the dominant 
paradigm of knowledge and discourse^ Foucault, 1980, Vol. 2).
I suggest Foucault's conceptualisation of 'technologies o f domination' is the same as 
Bhabha's 'pedagogical narrative' strategy of the nation. And his 'performative 
narrative' of the nation echoes Foucault's 'technologies o f self, where the nation 
performs its 'own' discourse in a daily 'national' life. The 'split' between the two, is 
conditioned by the structure of our psychic ambivalence, but in its external 
manifestation it is dichotomised and signified by the presence of the periphery, the 
marginal and the ‘other’. The people of the nation-state are both the embodiment of 
the mechanism of power over, and the exclusion of the ‘other’, while they also are 
the ‘other’ in their collective unconscious.
Bhabha argues,: “Once the liminality of the nation-space is established, and its 
'difference' is turned from the boundary 'outside' to its finitude 'within', the threat of 
cultural difference is no longer a problem of'other' people. It becomes the otherness 
of the people-as-one" since otherness is a psychic function. (Bhabha, 1990, p. 301)
Hence, the categories of ambivalence and hybridity are essential in Bhabha's 
postmodern reading of the nation-state; the concept of Power is also vital in his 
scheme as it explains how the ambivalence and hybridity of identity are administered 
and homogenised into dichotomised notions of 'us' and 'them'. Liminality on the
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other hand refers to the nation's collective unconscious where this dichotomisation of 
’us' and 'them' finds a psychic basis.
In an article called ''Reading Dissemination", Nikos Papastergiadis interprets 
Bhabha's theory of ambivalence and hybridity as one which attempts to understand 
the perplexity of cultural difference, and redefine the process of identification, and 
the practice of agency in modernity. In this light the post-colonial migrant, the 
'subaltern colonised', the 'minority/race' discourse, the 'marginalised', are all 
incorporated into the making of any 'homogeneous' nation, while they are concealed 
in the narratives of the nation. They are subjects of both identification and derision.
Conclusion
Postmodern theory in one sense is a critical analysis of, and reaction to Modernity 
and its vision. Modernity in social theory, on the one hand, is the intellectual legacy 
of the Enlightenment that adopts 'pure' reason and sciences to know and master its 
'subject' matter from an 'objective' position, and on the other hand Modernity 
constituted with its vision certain dichotomies such as objective/subjective, us/them, 
rational/emotional etc, that fractured the unity of human experience, language and 
knowledge. It constituted the 'other* in the depth of human identity.
The most gigantic modem institution of 'culture industry' that homogenises and 
standardises identity, in reference to the discourse of otherness, is the nation-state. 
In this chapter I have presented a postmodern critique of the nation-state that offers a 
radically different reading of the nation-state, as an apparatus of power that produces 
mega-narratives of a sovereign, homogenous and united collective identity in the 
name of the'people'.
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According to modem narratives of the nation, the nation is built on the basis of a 
historical homogeneous common core, which explains the ’unity’ of the nation, and 
unfolds itself immemorially and historically. A postmodern theory of the nation-state 
de-constructs this vision and anchors the question of national identity in the locus of 
the ‘other’, and in doing so, erases its totalising boundaries, thereby challenging the 
political and ideological manoeuvres that assume an essentialist core in the imagined 
communities, and argues for the hybridity of national identity.
I have tried to show how Anderson, Said and Bhabha, each in different ways, have 
developed a postmodern understanding on the nation. Anderson deciphers the nation 
as being originally a dynastic and imperial production. He shows that in almost every 
case, official nationalism hides a discrepancy between the nation and the dynastic 
realm; how Slovaks were Magyarized, Indians Anglicized, Koreans Japanified in a 
vertical system of power relationships which made their positions incommensurable. 
And he also shows how this vertical building of the nation by the state, forms a 
horizontal homogenous empty time in which the nation is homogenised as a 'unity.
Said’s deconstruction of the dichotomy of the ’Oriental’ and ’Occidental’ also serves to 
strengthen the argument for the hybridity of the nation, and once again he shows 
how hybridity is concealed in the dichotomised narratives of 'Oriental' and 
'Occidental'. This argument is further illustrated, when he deciphers the colonial 
space and time that are interwoven into the national literature and culture.
To Bhabha, the hybridity of the nation has been analysed from the locus of the 'other*; 
the ex-colonised^ migrants and refugees whose experience of nationhood is formed 
from the edges and margins of the nation. His postmodern analysis aims to locate 
them in the centrality of the national discourse. In doing so, he looks at narrative 
strategies of the nation, and develops his argument along psychoanalytic and 
linguistic lines to show that the {Pedagogical and performative) narratives of the 
nation are arbitrarily connected in the name of the 'people'. The notion of 'people' has
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arbitrarily been equated with the nation. He argues that these strategies are systems of 
cultural representation and signification, that firstly homogenise the nation against 
the 'other', who is then externalised, racialised, colonised, ethnicised and located 
either beyond 'national' borders, and/or at the margins of it. The other function of 
these narrative strategies is that they disguise the heterogeneities and diversities that 
exist internally, and lastly authority is exercised and concealed at the same time in 
these narratives and in the image of'people'.
Bhabha wants to deconstruct these narratives by adopting the Freudian concept of 
ambivalence, according to which all processes of identification entail both feelings of 
love and aversion. This psychic ambivalence conditions the bonding of the group, 
while simultaneously forming an 'other* for exclusion who Gan then be hated.
The combination of these contributions, gives a new meaning to the modem nation­
state as a hybrid and ambivalent system of cultural representation and signification 
that is formed in the colonial and imperial contexts of power relationships , and in 
the midst of the incommensurability of the power positions.
This critique of the nation-state reflects the theoretical resurgence of the ‘other’, 
(in the post-colonial period) to challenge the narrative strategies of the nation-state. 
The challenge is an attempt to deconstruct the Modernist dichotomised identities that 
are anchored in the heritage of colonialism and the Enlightenment, and reconstruct a 
new postmodern decolonised identity based on hybridity and ambivalence
Next, I turn to "Postmodern Political Economy and the Nation-State" where I 
examine the structural transformations of the late 20th century and their impacts on 
the nation-state and its boundaries. I believe that without a structural understanding 
of the postmodern society/culture, a comprehensive postmodern analysis cannot be 
achieved. The next chapter will examine the structural sources o f power, which is 
missing from both Foucault and Bhabha. In my opinion Foucault and Bhabha’s
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magnificent analyses are inadequate in providing the answer to why the narrative 




The Political Economy of Postmodernity 
and the Nation-State
The postmodern opposition to the Enlightenment’s totalising meta-narratives aims to 
deconstruct all homogenising and standardising narratives of identity in the national, 
racial, sexual and gender spheres. In doing so, all institutional forms of 
administration and representation of modem identity are analysed as discourses of 
power. The nation-state as the prime container of modem collective identity, in this 
light, can be deconstructed theoretically as a modem apparatus of power. A model of 
a postmodern analysis of the nation-state has been offered in the previous chapter.
In the work of Foucault, the school, the prison, the asylum centre, the psychiatric 
clinic/hospital etc, are analysed as the institutional forms of both making and 
representing human identity in a historically specific triangle discourse of power, 
truth and knowledge. In the work of Bhabha, Anderson and Said, as I have tried to 
show in chapter three, die Foucaultian concepts of power, discourse, truth and 
knowledge are employed to define the nation-state; to show how the discourse and 
truth of nationhood and the making of national identity are historically linked to 
specific power relationships. The very knowing of the nation of itself; the knowledge 
of nationhood that is embodied and represented in various national institutional 
forms; the nation's ’imagination’ of itself can be analysed as intertwined with the 
issue of power, emanating from the modem machinery of representation of identity. 
Accordingly the nation-state is a discourse of power that through the apparatus of the 
western modem state, has produced a few grand 'homogeneous' national identities,
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histories and geographies from diverse 'peoples', 'communities', 'localities' , and 
'ethnicities' that existed in the pre-modem world.
What is missing from a postmodern account of power, and Bhabha's account of the 
nation-state, is a conceptualisation of the infrastructure and location of power. It 
might even be a contradiction in terms for a postmodern theory to seek and explain 
the structural location of power since causal analysis is largely abandoned in 
postmodern theory. If that is the case, my suggestion is that the conceptualisation of 
power as dispersed and fragmented, and as incorporated into the discourses and 
practices of every day life, can be enriched if grounded in the political economy of 
the post-industrial or postmodern society. The question of political economy has 
always been pivotal in the analysis of power, and I do not think that a meaningful 
analysis can be made on the issue of power or its deconstruction in the postmodern 
society outside the framework of political economy . What are the infrastructures of 
social power? Which interests does power serve? and what are the structural forms 
and discourses of power? The answers to these questions are of paramount 
importance for a postmodern analysis of power and its institutional forms in any 
historical era.
I would like to save the invaluable Foucaultian postmodern approach to the question 
of power in which power operates in a diffuse force-field of relations of subjugation 
and struggle, but I would like 10 propose that this diffusion does not require us to 
deny that power is still controlled and integrated by specific and identifiable 
macrological positions of economic and political hegemony, such as transnational 
corporations, multinational banks, the mass media and the whole industry of 
software and digital telecommunications. Power may be dispersed, it may be 
operating through the 'technologies of self , and it is surely possible to perceive all 
power as ultimately 'bio-power', but there are certain social, cultural and political 
positions, fields' or 'habitus', as Bourdieu puts it, where power/knowledge is more 
concentrated than others. What Foucault does not adequately reflect on is that
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diffused and dispersed power is unevenly distributed, it does serve some more than 
others, and we can still distinguish between the macro-terminals of power located in 
the context of capitalist political economy and the micro-terminals of power where it 
is effectively integrated in the belief systems and the body. If this is so, then it should 
also be possible to conceptualise structures of power in relation to political economy.
What Foucault, and Bhabha, rarely analyse is the importance of macro-terminals of 
power, (such as transnational corporations, multinational banks, the mass media and 
the whole industry of software and digital telecommunications), and I believe this 
prevents their theories from being firmly grounded in macrological forces. Even if 
power is conceptualised as diffuse and disciplinary, it still needs to be more 
adequately conjoined with macro-perspectives that are necessary to illuminate a wide 
range of contemporary issues in the light of the hegemony o f capital.
The aim of this chapter is, therefore, to ground a postmodern critique of the nation­
state, as modelled in Chapter Three, in the political economy of postmodemity. By 
‘political economy of postmodemity’, I mean the structural changes that have 
occurred with the advent of micro-electronics as the third significant phase of 
capitalist development in the last few decades. It will be argued below that it is 
possible to ground postmodern theory, art, culture and society on a postmodern 
political economy, and develop a macro-perspective of it. Consequently, it will also 
be suggested that the deconstruction of modem macro-narratives of identity by 
postmodern theory, need not and cannot eliminate all macro-narratives in giving an 
account of postmodern society. To conceptualise a postmodern society and culture 
without linking the argument to the structures of late capitalist political economy, and 
its new spatial and temporal modes of governance, will lead to reductionism and part- 
understanding of the postmodern phenomena, because as I have explained above, an 
understanding of the political economy of late capitalism helps us to deepen our 
explanatory power on postmodern social and cultural phenomena.
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I shall therefore try to analyse the structural changes of late capitalism that have 
furnished the ground for a postmodern conceptualisation and transcendence of the 
time and space of the nation-state. The work of scholars such as Scott Lash and John 
Urry, David Harvey and Baudrillard who have made profound contributions in 
explaining the structural changes of late capitalism, will be examined.
The aim of this chapter is to explore the effects of die structural changes of the late 
20th century on the institution of the nation-state. This analysis will focus firstly on 
the general literature on globalisation, before proceeding to the second and third 
parts on the postmodern political economy and politics.
1) Globalisation
The blanket term ’globalisation' has been frequently used by many academics and 
non-academics alike to denote the structural changes that have occurred in the 
national society in the age of micro-electronics and to refer to the emergence of a 
global village of mass telecommunications. The primary concern of most traditional 
sociology text-books is to engage themselves with the analysis of 'modem society'. 
'Modem society1 is conventionally understood as a cohesive, bounded entity that can 
adequately and comprehensively lend itself to an investigation of different aspects of 
the social system. The notion of'modem society' normally becomes indistinguishable 
from the nation-state and the national society.
During the 1980s, the concept of globalisation appeared and rapidly became a 
normative word, not only within the social sciences, but also in the world of media, 
business, advertising, financial and intellectual circles. Many scholars believe that 
humanity has entered a new phase of its life that can best be understood as 'global', 
and the ‘global society’ is subsuming the ‘national society*.
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Rosenau proclaims that the world has entered the era of post-international politics, a 
’historical break-point’ in which "present premises and understanding of history’s 
dynamics must be treated as conceptual jails" (Rosenau, 1990. p. 5). To him the era 
of post-international policies is the time of post-national society as well.
Anthony McGrew suggests that "globalisation (is) simply the intensification of global 
interconnectedness, (and) it is transforming the existing world order most 
conspicuously through its direct challenge to the primacy of the nation-state in its 
present form" (McGrew 1992, P.63). In the same passage McGrew identifies the 
major globalising forces to be:
- the global financial system;
- the intensification of corporate activity;
- the existence of global telecommunications and media networks;
- the global production and dissemination of knowledge;
- escalating significance of transnational religious and ethnic ties;
- the enormous flows of people across national boundaries (as tourists, as immigrants, 
as refugees, and for business);
- the emerging authority of institutions and communities above the nation-state
These forces, he argues, are reconstituting the world as a single space. The task of 
sociology should be to look at the 'world society' that is constituted under the impact 
of these forces, instead of national society, in order to make sense of contemporary 
human conditions.
McGrew’s proposition is congruent with Wallerstein’s introduction of the concept of 
the ‘world system’ into the social sciences. Wallerstein has emphasised the pivotal 
role of capitalism in the process of globalisation. To him historical capitalism by its 
very essence is a globalising enterprise. The logic of capitalism is to conquer new 
markets, gain and maximise profit, and this logic is necessarily global in reach. The
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entire globe moves towards operating on the basis of a single social division of 
labour, single market and price mechanisms that we can call world-economy 
(Wallerstein 1984, P. 18). To Wallerstein, although the world-economy moves 
towards a single universal space, the fragmentation of power and wealth will not be 
eradicated, which in turn will cause periodic crises in the form of nationalist 
movements, socialist up-rising, and environmental campaigns. Hence the integrative 
global space of capitalism, is simultaneously a space of fragmentation, contradiction 
and crisis.
To Wallerstein the nation-state is an important political unit of the world to deal with 
the conflicts that have resulted from inequalities of wealth and power. The world- 
economy is conceived as having unequal structural arrangements linking the core to 
semi-peripheral and peripheral areas, each of which have a functional role in 
sustaining the global world-economy.
Two themes are important in Wallerstein's work. One is that globalisation does not 
mean homogenisation of culture, since the inequalities of wealth and power are 
sustained in both national and international levels. Globalisation merely means 
incorporation of difference at a world level within a framework that is formed by 
global forces. Secondly the capitalist economy is regarded as the structural 
mechanism behind processes of globalisation.
Contrary to Wallerstein, Rosenau stresses the primacy of technology and its 
transformative capacities in the processes of globalisation. He says:
“ It is technology... that has so greatly diminished geographic and social distances 
through the jet-powered airliner, the computer, the orbiting satellite, and the many 
other innovations that now move people, ideas and goods more rapidly and surely across 
space and time than ever before. It is technology that has profoundly altered the scale on 
which human affairs take place... H. (Rosenau, 1990. P.17)
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McGrew gives us a summary of Giddens’ conception of globalisation, according to 
which Giddens refers to globalisation as a multidimensional discourse of capitalism, 
the interstate system, militarism and industrialism. Each of these dimensions impose 
their own globalising imperatives, and entail distinct institutional and constitutional 
forces. Giddens’ account of globalisation connects the emergence and spread of 
capitalism, industrialism and the inter-state system, and holds them all responsible 
for the creation of a single world space (Giddens 1990, P. 283). Globalisation, for 
Giddens, should not be understood as a diffusion of western institutions across the 
world, crushing other cultures, but it should be perceived as multi-layered, 
contingent, patchy , heterogeneous, discontinuous process which is caused by 
diversity of intersecting dynamics; it is ..."a process of uneven development that 
fragments as it co-ordinates" (Giddens, 1990, P 175).
Appadurai’s ‘Disjunctive and Difference in the global Cultural Economy’ in Theory. 
Culture and Society (June 1990 Vol. 7 No. 2-3) proposes five dimensions of national 
fragmentation that in their re-articulation on a global level, constitute the 
infrastructure of the process of globalisation. He underlines five dimensions of the 
global culture:
a) "ethnoscapes" referring to tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles, guest-workers 
and other moving groups that form an essential feature of the postmodern world;
b) "Medioscapes" denoting the global nature of the media world;
c) "Ideoscapes" which are related to the production of images and impressions 
available throughout the world to the people through the media and the culture of 
consumerism;
d) "technoscapes" reflecting on the multinational and cross-boundaried character of 
informational technology and finally
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e) "finanscapes" referring to the rapid dispositions of global capital, currency, 
markets, stocks and exchanges.
These five parameters, which characterise the global culture, argues Appadurai, are in 
a deep disjunctive relationship, and provide an infrastructure for the postmodern 
socio-economic and cultural space. It is within this disjunctive framework that 
production and consumption strategies are integrated and enforced.
It is, therefore, the rise of a global infrastructure, which determines cultural strategies 
on the global level. According to Appadurai ethnic, media, ideological, financial and 
technological ’scapes' are first fractured and fragmented within the limits of the 
national bounds, and then re-articulated disjunctively at a global level. In this way 
the notions of cultural 'fragmentation', 'dispersion' and 'de-centring' of identity 
become explicable in reference to the political economy of the latest phase of 
capitalism
The first common conclusion, that most scholars who advocate the idea of 
globalisation arrive at, is that the process of globalisation does not entail 
homogenisation of a global culture. They theorise globalisation as a multi-layered, 
contingent, patchy, heterogeneous process which entails fragmentation and dispersion 
of national spaces of culture and identity along ethnic, ideological, financial, 
technological, and communication levels; it is also why Stuart Hall conceptualises the 
postmodern subject as 'de-centred' (Hall 1992, P. 285); and why in Bhabha's account 
'ambivalence' and 'hybridity' are at the core of human identity (Bhabha 1990).
I believe it is difficult for a postmodern theory to grasp the essence of fragmentation, 
dispersion, ambivalence, uncertainty and hybridity of 'postmodern identity/culture' if 
their accounts are not clearly linked to the deep infrastructural changes that
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characterise late 20th century capitalism. These structures are the focus of the rest of 
this chapter.
On this note, I now turn to look at the work of David Harvey , Scott Lash and John 
Urry, and Baudrillard whose works are dedicated to analysing the structural changes 
of capitalism in recent decades.
2) Postmodern political economy
The terms postmodemity and post-industrial structures are used synonymously in this 
chapter because they both denote the structural transformations of the last few 
decades that have resulted from the advent of computerisation and mass 
telecommunications. There are several theses that attempt to analyse the structural 
changes of late 20th century. Below I will briefly look at three of them; 1) The 
Flexible accumulation thesis; 2) The Disorganised capitalism thesis, and 3) 
Economies o f the sign thesis.
2.1- Flexible Accumulation thesis
David Harvey begins the second chapter of his book The Conditions o f Postmodemity 
with the assumption that the "basic rules of capitalist mode of production continue to 
operate as invariant shaping forces in historical (experience of time), and 
geographical (experience of space) developments" (Harvey 1989 p. 121). Seeking 
profit and expanding on the basis of such pursuit under the coercive laws of 
competition and over-accumulation in the local markets, remains the central attribute 
of the capitalist mode of production.
To overcome the problems caused by high competition and over-accumulation, 
capital has always had the tendency to expand to new territories and new markets. In 
doing so, in the last few decades there has evolved a new phase in the development of 
the capitalist mode of production. This phase is marked by a micro- electronic
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revolution that has led to a new mode of integration and control of global capital. 
There has also been a corresponding "transition in the regime of accumulation and 
associated modes of social and political regulation" (Harvey 1989, P. 121).
Due to the pressure of competition and over-accumulation, fall in prices and loss of 
profit, capitalism is always experimenting and innovating new methods of 
accumulation that reduce the turnover time, on the one hand, and on the other hand 
expand geographically to find new markets and cheaper resources. This means that 
capitalism by its very nature works towards the annihilation of time and integration of 
space.
The development of micro-electronic technologies, such as mass telecommunications 
and computerised network systems, fulfils both of the above strategies. They make 
the whole cycle of production much faster, while they enable capital to gain a new 
dimension in its geographical integration across national boundaries. As a result the 
previous rigid hierarchies in the structure and organisation of production have been 
replaced by more horizontal integration of capital both organisationally and 
structurally across space. Harvey calls this a transition from Fordism to post-Fordism 
and ’flexible accumulation’; a transition that involves new temporal and spatial 
strategies and allows for a much more flexible accumulation of capital across the 
globe.
In this sense the tendency of becoming global and beyond the boundaries of the 
nation-state, is simply part of the essence of capitalism. Harvey suggests that in a 
sense, the spatial and temporal confines of the nation-state, were largely responsible 
for the crisis o f over-accumulation. The time and space of the nation-state had to be 
overcome through global mechanisms of flexible accumulation, which also explains 
how the material growth of capitalism enlarges the spatial framework of capitalist 
production and organisation. This is echoed by Wallerstein, when he reminds us that
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capitalism from the beginning has never had any spatial commitment, and has always 
been globally tentative (Wallerstein 1983).
The fundamental changes that have shifted our experiences of time and space in the 
last few decades can therefore be explained in reference to the transition from Fordist 
methods of production to post-Fordism and a regime of flexible accumulation. In this 
historical transformation and transition from industrial capitalism to microelectronic 
capitalism , the vertical integration of capital has been replaced by a horizontal 
integration through computer networks and global telecommunication systems 
leading to a more flexible accumulation of capital. Financial centralisation, 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organisational forms of capital management have also 
been disintegrated at a vertical and bureaucratic level of the nation-state, and have 
horizontally been articulated into a global microelectronics and computerised 
networks of control and integration. Just-in-time, small-batch production and delivery 
system, sub-contracting, outsourcing, all have reduced the turnover times in many 
sectors of production.
Acceleration of the turnover time in production entails parallel accelerations in 
exchange, distribution and consumption. Electronic banking, plastic money, 
containerisation, computerised financial services are some of the media that speed up 
the rate of exchange, the rate of accumulation and profit. The postmodern forces and 
technologies of production such as computerised network systems and mass 
telecommunications speed up the distribution of commodities both in physical and 
imagery forms. And finally the consumerist culture, and the mobilisation of 
disposable fashions and commodities among masses are some of the ways of 
increasing the rate of consumption within a global economic network.
The first major consequence of the transition to the microelectronic phase of 
capitalism, according to Harvey, has been to "accentuate volatility and ephemerality 
of fashion, products, production, techniques, labour processes, ideas, ideologies,
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values and established practices" (Harvey 1989 P. 285). Disposability, instantaneity 
and the uninterrupted ephemerality of pleasurable pursuits and consumption affect 
the value structures of the society, enter into the cultural realm and lead to a break­
up and fragmentation of consensus. All that is solid melts into air. Solidities and 
continuities weaken and ‘difference’ becomes the sensibility of the day which is then 
celebrated and promoted by the cultural and economic strategists of the global 
economy.
Thus as the microelectronics technologies and the digital mass telecommunications 
transform the strategies of capital accumulation across time and space, and as they 
lay down the foundation of the political economy of postmodemity, they also shape 
new cultural sensibilities that are ironically united around notions such as 
fragmentation and difference. This argument clearly shows how the cultural forms 
and discourses of power, and the ideology or culture of postmodern/s/w, can be 
firmly rooted in the political economy and hegemony of (late) capitalism.
In the transnational force-field of late capitalism the material links between political- 
economic and cultural processes can be highlighted. Postmodernism. postmodern 
theory and postmodemity can be structurally linked. This linkage can also be 
explored and further strengthened from a different angle by looking at the categories 
of time and space in Modernity and in postmodemity. Modernity is about an ongoing 
process of techno-scientific 'development', 'advancement' and 'progress' of social and 
economic life. The obsession with the process of 'becoming' (looking forward to the 
next), rather than 'being' and remaining (immobility in space and place) characterises 
Modernity. Modernity has always had a higher emphasis on temporal acceleration, 
because 'time is gold', and the faster the beat of social life, the faster the accumulation 
of 'gold'.1
1 Foucault wondered about the modem processes in which space was treated as immobile, 
undialecticai, dead and fixed as opposed to time being associated with flux, life, fecundity and dialectic 
(1984, 70).
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On the other hand, any system of representation always involves an attempt to stop 
the flow of time, and spatialize what is being represented In other words any system 
of representation is always a spatialization of sorts which automatically freezes the 
flow of experience, and in doing so, it inevitably distorts what it strives to represent; 
For instance, we spatialize time, in the form of the clock, to represent it, to tell it; We 
spatialize family memory, in the form of an albiim; thought in the form of a book; life 
in the form of a home, an office, a car; and collective life in the form a nation-state. 
In all these forms of spatialization, humanity seeks to imprison the passing time, the 
flow of life into some recognisable form of spatial fixity that represents ‘secure 
belonging’ and ‘continuity’. This is why Harvey believes that space is compressed 
time, and that is what the space is for. However, the mode of spatial allocation and 
representation is always intrinsically linked to the question of political economy. On 
this basis it is conceivable that the postmodern political economy may also shift our 
strategies of spatialization in cultural realms. It is not surprising that the postmodern 
was first experienced and expressed in the field of architecture. And the space of the 
nation-state is the giant architecture of modem times.
But this is not all. Space, and the modes of utilising it, are also a discourse of power 
and are used in political strategies. Power is always spatialized. In fact geographers 
such as Edward Soja repeatedly stress the "inherent spatiality of power/knowledge" 
(Soja 1989, P.20). The spatial order of human existence arises from social production 
of space, and the social production of space involves the construction of geographies, 
boundaries, borders that have repeatedly been drawn and re-drawn in human history 
to represent territories of power.
In this sense, in the period of Modernity, from around 1880 to the outbreak of the 
First World War a "series of sweeping changes in technology and culture created 
distinctive new modes of experiencing time and space. Technological innovations 
including the telephone, wireless telegraph, x-ray, cinema, bicycle, automobile, 
locomotives and airline established the material foundation for re-orientation of
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cultural developments.... The result was a transformation of the dimensions of life 
and thought" (Kern, 1983, P. 1-2) that were and are fundamental to discourses of 
nation-state and national identity. This period also witnesses the "increasingly 
powerful national states, bureaucratically structured and operated, constantly striving 
to expand their power" (Berman, 1982,16).
Spatial representations, thus, have an inseparable link with experiences of time and 
discourses of power/knowledge/political economy. The intrinsic instinct of capitalism 
to crush boundaries and decrease the time of profit turnover, Modernity’s obsession 
with temporality, with ’becoming', with the ’new1 and the ’nexf, accelerates the flow of 
time, and inherently destabilises spatial representations of identity and the values 
they hold (here the nation-state). Harvey's argument maintains that the seeds of the 
negation of the nation-state, as the primary architecture of modem identities, are in 
fact planted by the temporal processes of Modernity itself.
Individual and collective identities unfold in the space and time of daily life; at 
work, at leisure and at home. The space and time of daily life themselves are created, 
given meaning to, and represented by both politico-economic and cultural activities; 
they are structurally organised around common practices. These structures and 
activities are the frameworks within which the collective memories and myths of the 
nation are spatialized, and collective identities represented in a national form. With 
the acceleration of time through the discourse of globalisation, these structures and 
activities and the very spatial and temporal frameworks of representation are 
unavoidably affected; the spatialized forms of national representation slowly lose 
stability under the capitalist logic o f ‘all that is solid, melts into air’.
The history of capitalism has been characterised by the acceleration in the pace of the 
daily life, to erase the spatial barriers. The pace and the extent of this process in the 
age of mass telecommunication and computerised network systems has become so 
fast that this has led to the formation of a 'global village of telecommunications'.
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Within this new space of experience, new modes of accumulation and integration are 
formed, which have an irreversible effect on the processes of spatial representation.
Harvey argues that in this village of telecommunications, it seems as if the world has 
collapsed inwards in front of us; the bombardment of images, commodities, 
information, news, knowledge, fashion, food, etc. This fast pace feels as if the present 
is all that there is; where all historical times and places that have been available to 
humanity as a whole, can now be re-experienced by a single generation. This is what 
Frederick Jameson calls "the world of schizophrenia" by which he refers to the world 
where all historical times can be simultaneously experienced by computer 
technology; where there is a constant state of perpetual present; when human 
experience is increasingly bound to an ephemeral Now, and loses a sense of historical 
location (Jameson, 1991)
Jameson’s world of "schizophrenia" can be read to refer to the same phenomenon as 
Harvey’s "imploded globe". This is the world where an overwhelming sense of 
compression of our spatial and temporal experiences has led to a relative 
"annihilation of space through time" (Harvey, 1989 P. 241). Or in other words, the 
acceleration of temporal processes has made world space collapse and shrink into our 
'local' space. This increasing ‘crossability’ and availability of world space in a 
diminishing time to the local population is what Harvey means by "a shrinking 
globe".
The faster the flux of time, the more the experience of ephemerality in individual and 
collective life; as the pace of change increases, memory finds a shorter and shorter 
span of time, of the previous era, of history. With this weakening sense of 
recollection of the past, comes the parallel reduction of the significance of continuity 
and representation in spatialized forms such as the nation-state.
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To conclude, the flexible accumulation thesis shows the existence of fundamental 
links between the political economy of capitalism, the temporal and spatial 
experiences of daily life, and the way individual and collective identities are 
constituted and represented spatially. Our experiences of space and time have 
radically changed in the postmodern world of the global telecommunication village. 
This shift corresponds to the politico-economic changes in late capitalism when and 
where a micro-electronically linked global capital has produced a single global space 
that can be experienced on the TV, in our daily diet, in the News we receive as our 
information, the knowledge we think, the styles and fashions available to us, etc.
The juxtaposition of all these different times and spaces of the world, and its effect 
on what we experience in our daily life, also has a fundamental impact on collective 
identities. The strong sense of the ’Other’, the homogeneity and distinctiveness of 'us' 
in the form of national identity, is being replaced by a weak sense of plural others 
whose demarcations with ’us’ are less and less definable within the discourse of 
globalisation.
2.2- Disorganised Capitalism thesis
Scott Lash & John Urry put forward the disorganised capitalism thesis in 1987. The 
transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation in Harvey, is echoed by Lash & 
Urry as a transition from 'organised capitalism' to 'disorganised capitalism' in their 
book The End o f Organised Capitalist. Lash & Urry's 'disorganisation thesis' is 
comprised of fundamental structural changes that characterise late capitalism (Lash 
& Urry 1987, P 5-6). These are briefly as follows:
1- Due to the globalisation of capital, world market, banking and price mechanisms, 
national markets have become less regulated by nationally based corporations, 
leading to effective de-concentration or de-centralisation of capital at a national level.
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2) The decline of manufacturing industries and the size of the working class has been 
paralleled with the escalation of the size of service industries which are largely 
integrated and controlled by information technology and computerised networks 
transnational^, and horizontally.
3) The de-centralisation of capital at a national level implies that nationally based 
social movements such as class politics and Trade-Unionism have declined. Instead 
social movements such as feminism, environmentalism, anti-nuclear campaigns, etc. 
have emerged. The distinctive feature of these movements is that they are not 
materially based or defined, neither are they national politics.
4) The decline of Manufacturing industries, trade-unionism and working-class 
politics, also implies that collective bargaining at a national level has severely been 
impaired. And corresponding to this, there is also a shift from Taylorism to part- 
time, flexible, contractual work organisation, increasing feminisation of the economy 
etc., and a growth of smaller plants. The fragmentation of a working class collective 
identity due to the decline of manufacturing industries is only explicable at a global 
level.
5) Due to the increasing independence of large monopolies which control markets 
through global systems of production, consumption and means of communication, the 
individual nation-states have less regulating and controlling power to determine 
political and economic strategies. Regional economies become re-structured 
according to the world division of labour, and world-market factories in the Third 
World become the main sites of labour-intensive activities. The service industries 
grow in the west.
6) The de-centralisation of capital at an economic level, has led to a growth in 
cultural fragmentation and pluralism with a problematising effect on a homogenous 
national collectivity.
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What Lash & Urry are in effect saying is that all these structural changes of late 
capitalism furnish the conditions of postmodemity which denotes a structural 
departure from the modem mode of integration and control at the cultural, political 
and economic levels. This new mode of economic control and integration is based on 
global technologies , and has had irreversible and distinct consequences for political 
and cultural modes of integration. The whole package comes under the title of 
'postmodern' (for a more detailed account of 'postmodern phenomena’ see chapter 
one).
It is obvious from these accounts that the postmodern 'society' is still a capitalist 
society which works on substantially different parameters of time and space in order 
to secure growth and accumulation. A new horizontal and global mode of economic 
integration has emerged that is slowly breaking down the parameters of the previous 
vertical and national one. Postmodern cultural forms and sensibilities are 
conditioned that reflect the fractures inflicted upon the old unities and 
homogeneities. Uncertainty permeates into the definitions of all modem constituted 
identities of nation, race, class, gender, sexuality that throughout the modem period 
preserved the boundaries of national society alongside ethnic, racial, class and gender 
boundaries (Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1989). As the economic foundations of scale, 
homogeneity and collective bargaining break down; as class economics and politics 
face irreversible crisis due to economic re-structurating of late capitalism; as the 
world enters its post-colonial phase, there develops a break-down of consensus.
The de-centring of identity conceptualised in most postmodern theories, can now be 
perceived in a new light: in the light of the political economy of the postmodern 
condition. The influence of the postmodern technologies and the mass media, 
disruptions in our perception of time and space on the national level of daily life and 
changes in the class structure, in particular of the working class, are among the main 
causes of fragmentation of identity.
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2.3- Economies o f the 'Sisnf thesis
So far we have argued that the globalisation of capitalism and the development of a 
new mode of social and economic integration, constitutes the political economy of 
cultural fragmentation and de-centring of identity. These themes will now be 
explored further in reference to the work of Baudrillard, Lash & Urry.
Baudrillard’s early works are in the framework of a neo-Marxian critique of capitalist 
societies, but later in his (1973) The Mirror o f Production and (1976) Symbolic 
Exchange and Death he broke up with classical Marxism, claiming that Marxist 
interpretations of the capitalist mode of production are outdated To Marx the 
relations of production were the central organising theme of the society to which 
corresponded the political and legal superstructure and all other forms of social 
activities and ideologies. In their relations of production men produced actual 
commodities which were exchanged according to their exchange-value. Baudrillard 
claims that this was true only for bourgeois societies. In postmodern societies 
production is no longer the organising theme, but the ‘sign’ is; and ‘exchange’ no 
longer involves actual commodities but largely ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’. Baudrillard 
makes a break with modem society, Modernity and the mode of production and 
instead declares the ‘end of political economy’; the end of the era in which 
production was the organising principle.
In theorising his postmodern culture, Baudrillard has failed to distinguish between 
postmodernism and postmodemtfy (see chapter one). His key categories of 
hyperreality, simulation and implosion are analysed in the cultural field. However as 
this argument has shown the postmodern cultural question can be anchored in the 
political economy of late capitalism. I will argue below that Baudrillard is wrong to 
speak of postmodemity as a society without a political economy.
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He states that the postmodern society constitutes a radical transformation in the 
'semiotics of every day life'. His argument essentially unfolds as follows: In industrial 
capitalism there is a firm relationship between the exchange-value and the use-value 
of the commodity. The exchange-value in the 'semiotics of every day life' is the 
'signifier' of the use-value as the 'signified'. The exchange-value or the 'signifier' is 
legitimated in reference to the utility of the use-value, and in this way the hegemony 
of capital permeates in the society through the 'social bond' between exchange and 
use-values expressed in the commodity as well as in the 'semiotics of daily life'. This 
social bond between the use-value and exchange-value, between the signifier and the 
signified, he claims, has been eradicated by the economies of ‘sign ’ where signs and 
images float freely with no referents.
The postmodern 'sign-value' is even more abstract than the modernist exchange- 
value. In the exchange-value it was possible to make some form of calculation of 
what amount of value ( labour, capital, raw material, cost of depreciation of 
machinery, fuel etc.,) had been invested in the commodity in order to determine its 
average social value . In the 'sign-value' this is impossible, as the 'sign-value' does not 
have any social-bond with the use-value. 'Sign-value', in a sense, cuts away from "the 
last remaining foundation of an already almost foundationless object. It clears away 
the last traces of territorialization of an already largely de-territorialized object" (Lash 
& Urry 1994, P. 14)
Baudrillard differentiates between industrial capitalism and consumer capitalism. 
Industrial capitalism for him characterises the period of Modernity geared to 
manufacturing goods and products. Consumer capitalism of the age of 
microelectronics, on the contrary, is not based on the production of actual goods and 
products, but images and signs. What we consume in the age of consumerism are 
signs and images, rather than actual commodities. Commodities comprise both the 
'signifier1 and the 'signified', one being its exchange-value and the other its use-value. 
Signs, on the other hand, float free from the referent (Poster 1981, PP 456-76).
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Baudrillard argues that the ‘exchange-value’ has been replaced with 'sign-value'. This 
substantial shift has led to the reconstruction and expression of our economic and 
cultural behaviour through the exchange of 'sign-values' in the culture of 
consumerism. However Baudrillard fails to account for the fact that the capitalist 
pursuit of profit and accumulation is still the main underlying principle of 
production even though what is produced maybe merely a sign. The fact that 
Baudrillard's society of signs and images or what he calls 'spectacles', is a ’hyperreaV 
society that is ruled by models and 'simulations' produced by the mass media, in 
particular the satellite television does not change the underlying principle that the 
pursuit of profit has remained fundamentally unchanged in Baudrillard’s hyperreal 
simulated society.
To Baudrillard collective identity in the postmodern information society is expressed 
through consumption of signs and models. The result is a situation in which the 
boundaries between the realm of culture and every-day life are continually blurred 
and transgressed in the context of global consumerism. Hyper-commodification 
finally erodes the distinction between commodified and non-commodified areas of 
life, and gives a twist to the commodification of meaning. The relationship between 
the signifier and the signified collapses under the reign of the simulated hyperreality.
In a postmodern hyperreal society the producing and consuming subject is de-centred 
and so the relations of production and power no longer have any force. The 
effectiveness of culture is so increased that only the relations between its symbolic 
contents, its 'signs’, have force. The postmodern experience consists of 
'hypersimulation', a double counter reflection in which life simulates the simulated 
contents of the mass media. In the society of simulation, identities are constructed by 
the assignment of images, and codes and models determine how individuals receive 
themselves and relate to other people. In this universe subjectivities are fragmented 
and lost, and a new terrain of experience appears that allegedly renders previous 
social theories and politics obsolete and irrelevant. Thus Baudrillard’s concepts of
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simulation, implosion o f meaning, and hyperreality combine to create a new 
postmodern culture. In this postmodern world individuals flee from the real and take 
ecstatic pleasures from the hyperreal world of computers, media and other 
technological ‘signs’ and to Baudrillard the subjects lose contact with the real and 
themselves fragment and dissolve. To Baudrillard the postmodern culture manifests 
an unlimited artificiality, where the satisfaction of primary human needs is replaced 
by an uninterrupted fabrication of pseudo-needs within the spectacle hyperreal 
society of simulacrum; an abstract non-society that has lost all its cohesive relations, 
social meaning, and ability of meaningful collective representation.
2.4) Postmodern Political Economy:
Digital Cavitalism and a new Spatial and Temporal Re-organisation
The above three theses on post-industrial, disorganised capitalism and postmodern 
culture are incomplete without one another. We are to be persuaded by Baudrillard 
that the central axial principle of postmodern society is the production of 'signs’ in a 
de-centralised network of global information technology. Lash & Urry's Economies o f 
Signs and Space adopts Baudrillard's conception of the 'signs', but places it in the 
political economy of late capitalism. They write on the "rapid circulation of subjects 
and objects, in multiple space odysseys where signs are emptied of meaning and 
significance, while this meaninglessness and insignificance are themselves regulated 
by and anchored in the political economy of late capitalism. The reason for this is 
that capitalism accelerates the pace of production and consumption, ensuring as 
rapidly as possible the disposability and ephemerality of products”. (Lash & Urry 
1994, P. 12).
In Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic o f Late Cavitalism (1991), Jameson too 
attempts to give a panoramic view of the postmodern cultural scene as a stage in the 
development of capitalism. In a Marxian line of analysis he sees the global 
postmodern culture of depthlessness, 'pastiche' and 'schizoid' to be the superstructural
130
expressions of the development of late capitalism. The contextualisation of 
postmodern culture and theory in the political economy of capitalism, allows 
Jameson to proceed to his assertion that the schizophrenic breakdown of the subject 
into a fragmented, hybrid, de-centred and plural self is intelligible only in the context 
of late capitalism where the logic of postmodernism is geared. This echoes Lash & 
Urry's ’emptying out' of meaning of the subject in the postmodern hyperspace of 
simulacra and images.
The concept of the ‘sign ’ is very important because it does represent the postmodern 
hyperreal phenomenon but only descriptively. It is now time to question what is a 
‘sign 7 In the analysis of Baudrillard, as well as Lash & Urry, we are never presented 
with a clear definition of a ‘sign’ or ‘model’, even though the economy of the sign is 
supposed to be imperative to the analysis of postmodern society. The problem in the 
work of Baudrillard is that his argument on the semiological significations of the sign 
is totally divorced from the process of economic production whereas it does not need 
to be. In defying Marx’s alleged economic determinism, Baudrillard develops a 
determinism around semiology and in doing so he declares the end of political 
economy. However I would like to suggest that the sign contributes towards a new 
historical conjuncture in the political economy of late capitalism by shaping the 
current forms of production, property and political organisation. The ‘sign’, which is 
increasingly the digital sign, is the new institutional force-field and habitus of 
capitalism which enables capital to flow and pursue its historical essence of profit 
maximisation without any restrictions across all borders in the global age. The 
‘digital sign’ is the new locus of the hegemony of capital.
2.4a) Postmodern Habitus
It can be asserted that postmodemity or the political economy of late capitalism 
resides in a new global force-field or habitus. Capitalism imposes its new particular
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logic on incorporation and inhabits new forms of objectified global institutions . 
Bourdieu writes on the concept of habitus as follow:
“the habitus is constituted in the course of an individual history, imposing its particular 
logic on incorporation, and through which agents partake of the history objectified in 
institutions, is what makes it possible to inhabit institutions, to appropriate them 
practically, and so to keep them in activity, continuously pulling them from the state of 
dead letters, reviving the sense deposited in them, but at the same time imposing the 
revisions and transformations that reactivation entails. Or rather, the habitus is what 
enables the institution to attain full realisation: it is through the capacity for 
incorporation, which exploits the body’s readiness to take seriously the performative 
magic of the social, that the king, the banker or the priest are hereditary monarchy, 
financial capitalism or the church made flesh...” (Bourdieu, 1990 p. 57)
To apply this definition of the history of capitalist development, one can suggest a 
new force-field has been developed for capitalism to inhabit and expand. This force- 
field is comprised of the postmodern technologies of mass digital 
telecommunications and the computerised network systems which are globally linked 
by big monopolies. The digital sign and commodities constitute the force-fields of 
capital as well as the symbolic systems of a society in a semiological manner . In all 
societies information is one form of power, but in the postmodern society control 
over the generation, storage and dissemination of information has assumed greater 
significance and they are largely centralised in the core metropolitan cities. These 
new technologies are incredibly flexible and fluid and allow capital flow in the 
habitus of global digital sign. This transborder flow overpowers and incorporates 
the national imagination which is based on national print industries. Print becomes 
secondary to, and a result of, the primacy of the global digital sign. This “is done by 
capitalism “imposing its particular logic (of profit maximisation) on incorporation... 
(and) at the same time imposing the revisions and transformations that reactivation 
entails....to attain fu ll realisation. ” (Bourdieu, 1990 p 57)
In this historical transformation and transition from industrial print capitalism to 
global digital capitalism, the vertical integration and control of capital at a ‘national’ 
level has been replaced by a horizontal integration of capital through global computer
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networks and communication systems leading to a more flexible accumulation of 
surplus.
The digital sign is a transborder computerised data that flows internationally. The 
flow of indistinguishable transborder digital data is what Baudrillard calls hyperreal 
objects, but in line with a Marxian frame of analysis they can be analysed as flows in 
the process of capitalist trade and production through mass telecommunications and 
microelectronic technologies. The use of transborder data flows and software in 
trade and production allows the commodification processes to be extended to intact 
markets which simultaneously reinforces centralised control of these operations in 
the core cities where the infrastructures of microelectronics and mass 
telecommunications reside. Both of the issues of capitalist expansion and control are 
tightly embedded in the economies of the sign, even though the sign is free floating.
In the past decades, transborder data flows have become increasingly central to the 
international business operations of transnational corporations who are the major 
users. These major users of postmodern technologies share an instantaneous time 
beyond and over geographical barriers. Corporate activities and executives do not 
have a nation-state. They can virtually be in the same room across the globe and do 
instant business. Instant global communication allows them to carry out more 
specialised tasks and assemble their production more effectively across the globe. 
Hence in this light digitality is hyperreality, transnationality, fragmentation and 
dispersion, but it certainly is not the end of political economy, as Baudrillard would 
have it.
Digital commodities represent software, computerised networks, data processing and 
satellite telecommunications. These commodities do have social meaning within the 
context of capitalist production and exchange and for the purpose of flexible 
accumulation in the global economy. In this sense the digital transborder flows, or the 
‘signs’, are the new habitus and force-field of late capitalism to which correspond
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emerging transnational legal and political institutions and a postmodern consumerist 
culture.
Baudrillard’s hyperreal simulated society refers to postmodernism where the 
semiological discourses of late capitalist culture prevail. My argument is that this 
semiological discourse, or postmodernism, is tightly linked with the political 
economy of digital capitalism, or postmodern//)/. The emphasis of postmodern 
theories on cultural difference, fragmentation, depthlessness, indeterminacy and 
hybridity of identity can be understood adequately in the systemic context of digital 
capitalism. Without this conjoint analysis postmodern theory remains speculative and 
itself free floating without any referent.
As soon as diverse dimensions of postmodern phenomena, such as postmodern 
theory, culture, economy, technology and politics are contextualised in the latest 
phase of capitalism, it would be possible to look at the institutional forms of 
spatialization of global capitalism, and of postmodemity.
2.4b) Postmodern institutions and spaces of governance
Lash & Urry formulate institutions of spatial regulation. They argue that the free­
flow of objects and subjects and the de-centring of identity, on a global level, are 
"significantly mediated and determined through a set of very specific institutions , the 
institutions of'economic governance'" (Lash & Urry, 1994, P. 17) . These institutions 
of economic governance are the same as institutions of spatial governance in which 
goods, people, money, information, images, knowledge are mobile. There are three 
main postmodern economic spaces of governance.
Firstly the 'core' of organised and industrial capitalism was about manufacturing of 
goods and products around networks of heavy industries of chemicals, motor, steel 
and electronics . The 'core' of post-industrial, or disorganised capitalism is clustered
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around information, communications, telecommunications, and service industries. 
Spatially this new ’core’ is centred in global cities. The main economic institution of 
these global cities where people, money, images and signs, goods, capital, labour and 
information flow freely is the market. The more markets are unconstrained by 
economic governance of the state, the more freely the flow of objects and subjects 
takes place. In recent decades all advanced industrial societies have moved towards 
complete de-politicisation of the markets.
Postmodern markets are intrinsically global places, which push the state and its 
national economic institutions and spaces outwards. The welfare state comes under 
fire; poverty, unemployment, housing, health, education and all related social 
problems become slowly privatised and the sphere of the market is increasingly freed 
from all sorts of moral responsibility. The state's funding, subsidies and regulatory 
mechanisms towards the public sector shrink. Public housing is up for sale; 
nationalisation becomes 'old-fashioned' and is replaced by privatisation policies. The 
market forcefully imposes its imperatives, which determine the governing principles 
of economic activity as a whole. The space of many economic institutions and 
activities, previously subsidised and governed by the state, shrinks.
Some major deregulatory events that in the last decade have cut off the hand of the 
state from regulation of the markets are the abolition of exchange rate mechanisms 
in 1970s, which led to outflow of substantial pension and portfolio capitals in all 
major capitalist countries, the London Big Bang in 1986, global electronisation and 
computerisation of trading systems, all of which have led to remarkable changes in 
the nature of capital markets. These changes are unavoidably paralleled by the 
decline of the sovereignty of the national-state and its regulatory economic 
hierarchies.
The second spatial institution of postmodern governance are 'networks', that both 
facilitate and integrate disorganised digital capitalism and flexible accumulation.
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These networks are comprised of six principal media, used in telecommunications to 
move information from one place to another. Lash & Uriy summarise these six media 
as follow:
“1- Transportation: including mail and express services, slow but suitable for small 
users;
2- Wire cable: very sturdy, but low volume of information can be carried by them;
3- Co-axical cable: expensive, but suitable to carry images with a large bandwidth 
(volume of information carried);
4- Micro-wave channel, with a large bandwidth, cheap but susceptible to intersections 
by atmospheric conditions;
5- Earth satellites: cheap and suitable for isolated places;
6- Fibre-optic cables: expensive, has a large bandwidth; can carry 40000 
conversations, and transmit 246 bites of information per second”. (Lash & Urry 
1994, P. 25)
During the era of Modernity, the paradigmatic means of mobility were networks of 
railways, telegraphs, telephones, postal services and roads. These media created time- 
space convergence at the National level and constituted the grounds for a National 
discourse and identity. The new networks of mobility belong to the era of 
disorganised capitalism, and they correspond to a new level of time-space 
convergence’ on a global scale. Hence it should follow that the postmodern 
institutional network of mobility, communication and transport should spatialize 
global discourses of identity.
On a third level, the global 'time-space convergence' also leads to another way of 
conceptualising 'core' and 'periphery' on an international scale. The classic usage of 
these words, places advanced industrial countries as the 'core' in the face of the third 
world and eastern European countries as 'peripheries' and 'semi-peripheries. Lash and 
Urry suggest that "the core comprises of heavily networked more or less global cities,
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as a 'wired village of non-contiguous communities'. And the periphery consists of 
isolated areas in the same countries, in the former eastern Europe or in the Third 
World. In terms of time-space convergence, the disparity between core and periphery 
in a restructured world order is, we think, likely to grow greater" (Lash & Urry 1994, 
P.28).
Both 'markets' and 'networks' are non-hierarchical spaces and are largely 
horizontally integrated and concentrated in global cities or the 'core'. The 
horizontality of these 'networks' and 'markets' is not to suggest a lack of stratification 
systems, but that the strata around the new technologies can largely be conceptualised 
on a global level, as opposed to a national level. The Transnational Corporation class 
controls the largest sums of capital. The politicians, the managerial-professional 
classes in media, advertising, banking, computing, information technology, and other 
professionals who control the production of global information (such as academics), 
are at the top of the scale, and are highly mobile in the global 'core'.
This differentiates the postmodern institutional spaces of economic governance from 
the state controlled spaces of economic governance which are largely concentrated in 
the nation-state, such as manufacturing industries. As old manufacturing industries 
shrink, and the remaining ones are de-centralised, they emigrate to the suburbs and 
'peripheries' where labour/land is cheaper, the new industries in the 'core' become 
increasingly less distinct from telecommunications and computing networks.
With this fundamental shift in the economic structure of the world, the balance of 
economic activity within given national boundaries tends to become much less 
significant. The global networks of communicational and computerised 




Time and space are both categories that enter into the social organisation of being 
and modes of representation of identity; they are both constitutive features of social 
organisations and social systems, and they are both ingredients of thought. Giddens’ 
'time-space distantiation' and Harvey's 'time-space compression' are the phrases that 
are associated with the spatial and temporal mode of integration in disorganised 
informational capitalism.
As stated before, collective identities and their unique commonalities can be 
expressed in the forms of kinship, clan, tribal, nomadic, agrarian, dynastic, religious, 
imperial, ethnic, regional, national and even global. Each of these forms of collective 
identities has a distinct mode of governance and time/space articulation, which in 
turn has an intrinsic relationship with the question of political economy and 
technological capacities.
Harvey compares Medieval and Post-Renaissance experiences of time and space and 
shows that post-Renaissance mapping was absolutely pivotal for the formation of 
nation-states and national identity after the 18th century. According to David Harvey, 
in Medieval times, ‘place’ and ‘space’ coincided , as temporal relationships were 
merely sensuously experienced. There was no abstract, objective and rational 
perception of time and space beyond the limits of sensory experience. The nation­
state, on the other hand, can not imagine itself as a unified entity if perceptions of 
time and space are only sensory; almost all of the nation-state practices require 
abstract notions of time and space.
Totalising, objective, rational and territorial maps allowed for strong senses of 
abstract collective (national) identities to be constructed in the midst of geographical 
differences. With this new development, a new mode of belonging (national) to an
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'imagined community’ of 'empty homogeneous time' (Anderson 1983) evolved that 
proved to be crucial in nationalist sentiments of nation/state building.
What maps did to space, was replicated by the calendar in relation to time; just as the 
map replaces the discontinuous patchy space of practical paths by the homogeneous, 
continuous space of geometry, so the calendar substitutes a linear, homogeneous 
continuous calendrical time for practical and natural time.2
Harvey's argument shows that the Enlightenment's vision, and its 
perceptual/conceptual/linguistic practices are inherently linked to a specific 
experience of time and space that are fundamental in the later development of the 
nation-state and its transverse 'homogeneous empty time’.
This argument firmly locates the notion of time in 'society', and shows adequately 
that abstract time and space are socially organised. The Nuer for example have no 
sense of time and that it can be wasted, saved or spent. Time is not a resource in their 
culture (Evans-Pritchard 1940). 'Leisure time' did not exist as a social concept in pre- 
industrial societies.3
2 Of course during the ancient and medieval epochs, some notion of ‘empty time’ did also exist . 
However those conceptions were not used by masses in performing their daily activities, nor were they 
used in pedagogy in teaching a specific mode of collective identity
3 The calendar and clock-time which are the dominant temporal base for modem social life have been incorporated 
in the analysis of many scholars such as Karl Marx in calculating the 'rate of exploitation1 of the Proletariat. The 
working classes for Marx were exploited on two levels; firstly the extension of the working day by the employer, 
and secondly the acceleration of the pace of work. What was happening in both methods, Marx shows, was that 
through the dynamics of capitalist production the 'surplus labour1 or 'unpaid labour1 was produced in 'surplus time' 
or 'unpaid time'. Hence the notion of 'time' was not only incorporated in the very definition of the working class and 
Bourgeoisie, but also in their class strategies. Marx provides one of the most radical analyses of socially organised 
'time' grounded in the context of (capitalist) political economy (Marx 1954).
Weber wrote cm the culture of Calvinism: " Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. The 
span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of one's own election. Loss of time through 
sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary to health... is worthy of absolute moral 
condemnation" (Weber 1930 P. 158)
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The notion of time has remained crucial in organising labour resistance movements 
and social conflicts since the nineteenth century, and not surprisingly it was Henry 
Ford who first devised the mass production of clocks and watches in 1880s. In the 
last two centuries therefore, there has been a growing time consciousness which has 
permeated into the structures of work, leisure, discipline, and in regulating and 
planning social activities.
In the second half of 19th century the co-ordination of European countries, 
increasingly needed a time co-ordination, which eventually led to the adoption of 
Greenwich mean time at the International Meridian Conference in 1884. This had 
profound consequences: "gradually all other countries began to adopt the time zone 
system based on the prime Meridian of Greenwich, the specifically western temporal 
regime which had emerged with the invention of the clock in medieval Europe 
became the universal standard of time measurement. Indeed this hegemonic 
development signified the irreversible destruction of all other temporal regimes in the 
world, the last vestiges of which remain only in the form of historical and 
anthropological curiosities" (Nguyen 1992, P.33).
Greenwich mean time, therefore, is not an ontological state of temporal awareness, 
but another discourse of power/ political economy aiming towards the temporal 
homogenisation and centralisation of human experience and awareness of absence 
and presence. It is Anderson's 'homogeneous empty time'.
This 'homogenised empty time' has irreducibly been part of the modem mode of 
being of human collectivities and their identities in the last two centuries. The 
intimate relationship between (national) time and (national) geography has been 
drawn upon by Giddens. He argues that we are not only restrained by physical and 
geographical boundaries, but also by 'time-space walls on all sides' (Giddens 1984 P. 
114) that impose constraints on the horizons of thought. The more time and space 
converge due to faster mobility in time, the less they impose a constraint on mobility
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in time and space. In other words the further the convergence of time and space will 
accelerate and ‘lubricate’ the flow of energy, allowing for larger amounts of energy to 
be transferred across borders in a shorter span of time. The solidity and significance 
of (national) space, therefore, will reduce.
The invention of the media of networks of roads, rail, telegraphs, telephones and 
postal services, compressed time and space at the level of the boundaries of the 
nation-state. The development of the territorially bounded nation-state with its 
expanded powers of documentation and standardisation, also means the dominance 
of national time-space. The time and space of the nation-state are two important 
parameters that have entered into the construction of national discourses, and are 
dimensions of national disciplinary power.
With the changing frontiers of satellite telecommunications and computerised 
network systems, Giddens’ ’time-space distantiation' suggests that societies are 
'stretched' over shorter spans of time across space. Such 'stretching1 reflects the fact 
that social activities increasingly depend upon interactions with those who are absent 
in the time-space of the nation-state, but on whom there is an increasing dependence. 
(Giddens, 1985, Ch. 7).
The most crucial comparison between global and national time is made by Rifkin. 
Rifkin talks of how computers and other electronic equipment that work on the basis 
of seconds, influence many important activities that take place below the threshold 
of human consciousness, and that social time which is organised by electronic 
equipment becomes increasingly irrelevant to the (national) time that is organised by 
the clock. He says "the events being processed in the computer world exist in a time 
realm that we will never be able to experience. The new 'computime' (instantaneous 
global computer time) represents the final abstraction of time and its complete 
separation from human natural experience and rhythms of nature",. (Rifkin 1987 P. 
15).
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The crucial implication for the nation-state and national identity , is that the 
instantaneous global 'computime' is gaining preponderance in organising global 
economic relationships compared to the 'homogeneous empty time' of the nation­
state. Clock-time was the organising principle of Modernity. The instantaneous global 
computime is far more abstract than the clock time of the nation, because it crosses 
the nation in an instant. The global time is the business time of multinational 
corporate activities and links global markets and networks.
In what has been said so far, I have suggested that under the conditions of the 
postmodern political economy or digital capitalism, a new configuration of social life 
has emerged whose economy, culture, modes of spatial and temporal governance and 
technologies, paradigmatically shift the old boundaries in human life. These cultural 
and material transformations transcend the infrastructural grounds on which the 
nation-state has resided since the 18th century. Although the world is still visibly 
divided among the national-states, the 'clock-time' of the nation-state is beginning to 
be made secondary to the computime of the global society in determining social and 
economic movements.
3) Postmodernitv & Politics
The rapidity of 'time-space compression' to the extent of the 'implosion' of the globe 
in recent years, has definite geopolitical implications for our mental maps, political 
attitudes and political institutions such as the nation-state. The serious diminution of 
the power of the nation-state over strategies of capital accumulation, fiscal and 
monetary policies have been paralleled with a shift towards an internationalisation 
of politics to deal with political, economic, security, military, environmental and 
some social issues such as poverty, drugs, AIDS and crime. On a cultural level too, 
postmodern sensibilities encourage difference, individuality, fragmentation,
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disjunction, heterogeneity and dispersion. All these tendencies are in fundamental 
tension with the homogeneity and unity of the national-states. In this section, I shall 
consider some of the global forces that have undermined the political sovereignty of 
the national-state.
Political Modernity o f the National-State
I have argued for the contextualisation of the phenomenon of the nation-state as the 
modem container of collective identity in the second chapter. Here I would like to 
add some historical and theoretical accounts to the argument with reference to the 
modem state.
The nineteenth century was the great epoch of nation-building in the west; the era 
saw the emergence of the nation-state system we view as natural today. In the 1800s 
mass education, national lines of communication, the infrastructure of industrial 
capitalism, the standardisation of national language that was authorised to reflect on 
the public sphere, together with military conscription, censuses, and the emergence of 
national institutions of governance, all determined the horizons of thought and 
practice in national terms. The power of the state was multiplied with its ability to 
administer and standardise diverse ethnic and linguistic communities into the 
discourse of the nation.
In the last decade of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century , a 
massive build-up of armaments and secret diplomacy characterised the fatal 
competitions that existed between western nation-states over colonies in Africa, the 
Middle East, and Asia. In the great age of imperialism, and by the first World War, 
all parts of the planet were carved up inch by inch and bounded as the territories of 
influence by European, American and Japanese States. This is also the period which 
is known as the age of nationalism and the age of nation/state building.
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Internally most European governments were prepared to legislate for a range of social 
protections at ‘home’, from extending the power of the state in the economy, to 
providing welfare to the jobless, poor and homeless; from imposing free national 
compulsory education and health to making the citizens pay for it by income tax; and 
to the legislation and harnessing of a public mass culture. All these became the 
major functions of the modem state.
The world divided and organised by nation-states originated in Europe, but was later 
replicated across the globe under the disciplinary forces of the European states. 
Nationalist movements in the Third World have their roots in opposing the cruelty, 
exploitation and increasing weakness of colonial states.
The paradoxical situation is, however, that the nation in the Third World for which 
sovereignty was claimed frequently had very little meaning, considering that different 
ethnic, linguistic, religious and social groups were lumped together into areas with 
little historical experience. The borders which were artificially drawn by European 
powers, became themselves the borders of nationalist movements against western 
power. The modem state subsequently played a crucial role in creating national unity 
out of diverse elements in the third world as well as at home. Territoriality and the 
creation of a common ’culture’ went hand in hand in materialising national projects. 
In fact it is suggested by Horsman and Marshall that territoriality is very closely 
linked to the political drive for nationhood through relentless reference to common 
culture. “The physical aspect of nationalism, that is, its territoriality, pervades its 
mythology. This is not just the remembering of great historical events which took 
place at specific locations, but the reverence for landscape, for the environment in its 
broadest sense.’’ (Horsman & Marshall, 1994 p. 45)
In this sense the existence of modem borders is first a function of the modem state to 
create and maintain areas of influence, defend them militarily, and also the function
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of disciplinary power for the administration and regulation of a 'national' culture and 
identity.
The world divided by nation-states was for the first time broken beyond repair during 
the Second World War, when the modem state became the industrial vehicle of the 
administration of genocide and massacre in creating and preserving an ideal 'national' 
subject. National self-determination and genocide coincided in perhaps the most 
barbaric 'incident' of human history- in Fascism.
Ever since the Second World War, it has been possible for theoreticians to develop 
critical accounts of the nation-state and nationalism. The legitimacy of the nation­
state and the nationalist aspirations which were indisputable prior to the Second 
World War, were shaken afterwards.
With the emergence of the world economy dominated by TNCs the salience of the 
borders along temporal, spatial, technological, economic and cultural lines has also 
been reduced to the point that today's functions of the state under the political 
economy of postmodemity have shrunk in some important directions that will be 
considered shortly.
Political Modernisation involved a concentration of the means of administration in 
the centralised state machinery, a process which was subsequently accelerated by 
centralisation and concentration in the economy and mass media. The process of 
modernisation of politics involved differentiation of political functions, 
bureaucratisation of organisation and the rationalisation of political action.
The terms 'differentiation', 'rationalisation' and 'bureaucratisation' are inexorably 
linked to the Durkheimian and Weberian traditions of thought in their analyses of 
Modernity. According to the Weberian scheme, bureaucratisation and rationalisation 
processes are the Modem mechanisms that aim to maximise efficiency through
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calculable, deliberate, systematic and impersonal arrangements. To Weber, the purest 
type of'rational-legal authority' was, of course, bureaucracy and its hierarchical, rule- 
oriented structure. Bureaucracies, and their employment of impersonal, technical and 
specialised knowledge, are the most viable social mechanisms that maximise 
rational gains. The structure of the modem state is a significant example of the 
Weberian ‘rational-legal’ type of authority.
The essence of the modem state can not be separated from bureaucracy and its levels 
of administration. Bureaucratic politics, legislative mles, administrative procedures 
and the modem state are intertwined. This huge paradigmatic mechanism ensured the 
implementation of the central state functions. These functions are captured by Crook, 
Pakulski & Waters (1992) as follows:
- Internal stabilisation by mediation and arbitration in industrial conflicts;
- Economic regulation, co-ordination and harmonisation of increasingly complex 
activities;
- The development of an economic infrastructure of transport, communication, etc., 
and the running of education, training and research;
- The reparation of industrial side-effects including environmental damage, regional 
poverty and urban plight;
- Legitimisation: justifying and defending policies and mobilising generalised 
normative support;
- External stabilisation, through military and political bloc arrangements
It has been argued above that all these functions have been undermined in the last 
few decades. The most fundamental suggestion here, is that with the advent of 
information techhology, strategies of flexible accumulation, de-centralisation of 
production and consumption, horizontal mode of integration through computer 
network systems etc., the pillars of bureaucracy are shaken. With that, the state’s
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ability to regulate and govern has been shaken too and there are grounds for believing 
that the modem state shrinks in the context of a postmodern political economy4.
Crook et al (1992) distinguish three different types of corporate states in the modem 
period which either have collapsed or have become impaired in their functions; 'The 
workers state’, ’the fascist state’ and a ’liberal-democratic-bureaucratic state'.
The 'workers state' in its Leninist-Stalinist version was the type whose pivotal concern 
to create and maintain a centrally managed 'command economy’ led to the fusion of 
party, state, economy and ideology that ruled the whole country; and administered, 
coerced and mobilised the ’mass’ culture. The ideological nature of the new socialist 
national identity was not disguised. Nor was the 'necessity' of the development of a 
new politics based on the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' to create the new (Soviet) 
identity, denied.
The second type of state, mentioned by Crook, is the Fascist state whose project was 
to administer a racially homogeneous nation. The national identity that the fascists 
wanted to preserve was defined by race and religion, and the state machineries and 
bureaucracies were engaged in implementing the fascist definition of a pure nation.
The third type of bureaucratic state is the liberal form which emerged in Western 
Europe. It has had no apparent aspiration to stand above the law of the market and 
has respected certain freedoms which underlay the functioning of civil society. It 
largely relied on administrative-redistributive bureaucracies.
4 Anthony Smith challenges this point of view in Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era He writes: 
“If the state’s economic control is now being challenged by the vast transnational companies and 
practices that dominate much of the globe, if its military preponderance has been limited first by the 
superpowers’ nuclear dominance and then by the internationalisation of command structures and 
military technology, its social and cultural power and penetration have, if anything, been
enhanced mainly in three areas: public education, the mass media and cultural and social policy. All
three bear closely on the ethnic character and nationality of the state’s population” (Smith, 1995 pp. 90- 
91). However chapter six of this thesis demonstrates empirically that there has been a decline in a sense 
of national sovereignty and unity in the Britain of the late 20th century compared to the earlier decades.
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The first two types of bureaucratic states have already collapsed, and the third type 
has allegedly shrunk. The decline of the third type of modem state and the 
weakening of modem bureaucracies in regulating national life, is associated with the 
most radical form of “political-administrative de-centralisation and devolution due to 
postmodern political economy: Privatisation, marketization and deregulation" (Crook, 
Pakulski & Waters, 1992, P.97).
Postmodern forces o f national deregulation, privatisation & marketization
Crook, Pakulski & Waters in their Postmodemization (1992) look at these three main 
themes. Their argument runs as follow:
Decentralisation: The process of economic decentralisation shifts state power from 
monocentric spatializations into polycentric ones. A lot of state power is shifted to 
relatively autonomous and non-governmental bodies such as specialised agencies, 
and public corporations. Since the 1970s, these bodies have grown in Britain: "by the 
end of 1990, 34 such agencies had been created, and a further 28 departments were 
candidates for agency status. The reforms foreshadowed by the 'Next Step' initiatives 
despatched over half a million civil servants into free-standing executive agencies" 
(Crook, Pakulski & Waters, 1992, P. 97)
As a result of this process a large portion of power has been vertically de­
concentrated. The deliberate de-bureaucratisation of power and the privatisation of 
some state functions, shift the associated responsibilities out of the sphere of the 
state. This changes the political configuration of the ’society' by making it more 
pluralistic, fragmented, and polycentric.
Alongside decentralisation of state power, comes the whole strategy of selling 
nationalised properties and corporations to the private sector and withdrawing
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centralized administrative regulations. The selling off of what was once 'national' to 
the 'markets' and 'networks', is synonymous to selling off to the postmodern 
institutional spaces of governance (see above).
The twin strategy of privatisation and marketization is most pronounced in Britain, 
but it has hit many other advanced capitalist countries such as France, Germany, 
Austria, Scandinavia etc. In the last decade in Britain "40 per cent of the state sector 
has been transformed into private enterprise; more than one million public housing 
tenants have become home owners; the proportion of share owners grew from 6 per 
cent to over 22 per cent; more than 600,000 government employees have been 
transferred to the private sector" (Crook et al, 1992, P. 101). Parallel to privatisation 
and marketization of previously state owned properties and power, is the process of 
the removal of the state power from strategies of production, prices, wages and 
salaries. State-provided welfare is under tremendous pressure; nationalised education 
and health are subject to heated public controversies, and state money is increasingly 
withdrawn from them. Public housing is under attack, and most of it is in the process 
of being sold off. The principle of 'market efficiency' under global marketization of 
economy brings a "post-welfare paradigm" ( Bennett 1990 P. 12).
Analogous to what happens inside the boundaries of the nation-state in undermining 
the power of effectiveness of the state regulatory mechanisms, there is also a growth 
in size of international agencies and politics that are not state agencies. These forces 
include the UN bodies, EC organisations, cartels such as OPEC, regulative agencies, 
International Monetary Fund, Transnational Corporations, etc. "Between 1950 and 
late 1980s the number of intergovernmental organisations increased 3.5 times to 
about 400; the number of international non-governmental organisations grew 6 times 
to about 5000. UN agencies alone grew from about five in the late 1940s to fifteen in 
the late 1980s. The number of employees has increased to over 50,000. The annual 
budgets of specialised agencies exceeded $1 billion" (Crook et al 1992 P. 101)
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All these trends suggest that the centralising, administrative and regulative power of 
the modem state may be diminishing in the face of multi-layered forces of 
marketization and globalization. These postmodern forces reduce the nation-state’s 
autonomy and sovereignty. The role of the state in administering 'national’ identity 
decreases as the process of postmodemisation accelerates.5
The breakdown of an organised and vertically integrated capitalism, and its 
associated bureaucracies, has had consequences for collective identity. As argued 
above, with the development of a flexible accumulation strategy in the age of digital 
capitalism, a postmodern culture of fragmentation and dispersion uniting around the 
sensibilities of difference and lacking an axial referential theme of unity grows. This 
together with the fact that the individual nation-states have also been subject to a 
variety of global technologies and processes that affect the economic organisation of 
wages, markets, division of labour, production and consumption, trade and exchange, 
suggests that global processes gain increasing power which affect and blur the 
boundaries of the nation-state and what these boundaries symbolise.
National decentralisation and global centralisation
The process of national decentralisation is twinned with a process of global 
centralisation. Transborder data flows decentralise production at a national level by 
allowing firms to co-ordinate production activities in different locations. However, as 
Sara Schoonmaker has made clear in her argument on “Capitalism and the Code” in 
Baudrillard (1994), centralised control over the work done at corporate headquarters 
has increased at the same time. Headquarters functions operate to co-ordinate and 
manage a global production system with corporate branches across the globe. “The 
decentralisation of the firm’s production system and labour force has created a 
countervailing tendency toward central control and planning. Firms with dispersed
5 This relationship between die sovereignty and homogeneity of the nation-state and globalisation will be 
empirically tested in the next chapter.
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locational structures have tended to provide top-level management, planning, 
specialised business services, research, and technical functions from national 
headquarters” (Kellner ed. 1994 p. 176). The centralisation of global corporate 
control over national and international economic operations has largely been made 
possible by the development of the digital telecommunications infrastructure, 
concentrated in the core cities where the corporate headquarters are based.
A new class composition emerges on a global scale which reflects a new global 
stratification. Transnational corporations, multinational trusts and corporate 
businesses control the mass media, telecommunications, computer/software and 
information/knowledge technologies. This global ‘class’ has a very high degree of 
control of the technologies of production, storage and dissemination of signs, 
images, information and knowledge with a direct controlling effect of the semiotics 
of daily life. Then there are high profile professionals and senior officers and 
managers who are in charge of the operation of the global strategies on a local and 
regional level. A large clerical and technical- mostly computer literate - work force in 
the service sector constitute the next major class, and they process the transactions of 
these goods, signs and images, and at the bottom of the stratification system are the 
low-waged/unemployed, immigrants and refugees.
4) Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the phenomenon of the nation-state, as the most 
gigantic institution of Modernity, is undergoing fundamental changes, that would 
radically alter the material conditions for the existence of the nation-states as 
sovereign units of economic and political decision-making.
These fundamental changes are conditioned by the third wave of the industrial 
revolution known as the microelectronic phase, which has transformed the spatial and
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the temporal boundaries of experience beyond the limits of the nation-state. The issue 
of the political economy of the latest phase of capitalism and its analysis, is therefore 
vital for an understanding of the transformative changes of the last few decades.
Three theses that have concentrated their attention on the question of political 
economy have been considered: Harvey's 'flexible accumulation' thesis, Lash & Urry’s 
'disorganised capitalism' thesis, and Baudrillard's 'economies of sign' thesis. In all 
these three theses, it has been maintained that capitalism has undergone such 
fundamental changes in the spheres of production, distribution and exchange that 
these have irreversibly affected its institutional and organisational structures. The 
previous phase of 'industrial capitalism' was characterised by large-scale factory 
production, heavy industries, concentration of man-power as well as capital in the 
same space, so that it was vertically and hierarchically integrated. The new phase of 
microelectronic digital capitalism, on the contrary is characterised by small scale, 
just-in-time production, with a dispersed labour force and spatial segmentation. The 
latest phase of capitalism is integrated by horizontal networks of satellite 
telecommunication and computerised systems.
These changes have produced different modes of spatial and temporal governance. In 
spatial terms bureaucracies and vertical managerial structures which were largely 
integrated within the confines of the national-states, are slowly being segmented and 
replaced by networks of global corporate business and/or by non-governmental 
agencies locally through the telecommunications and computerised infrastructures. 
Temporally too, the 'homogeneous empty time’ of the nation is juxtaposed with an 
instantaneous global 'computime', allowing for transborder data flows to be 
exchanged across the globe instantaneously.
These parameters of the political economy of postmodemity have transformed the 
essential structural pillars of the national-states. They segmentalise, fracture and 
disperse national institutions and transcend their modes of spatial and temporal
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governance. These socio-economic segmentations, fragmentation and dispersions 
lead to similar effects in the sphere of culture. Postmodern cultural productions and 
sensibilities are also described as promoting a lack of cohesion, unity, centre, aim, 
order, homogeneity, emphasising notions such as plurality and difference.
Postmodern theory with its obsession to dismantle and deconstruct the 
Enlightenment's legacy around the production of meta-narratives of identity is, I 
would argue, the theoretical expression of what late capitalism, and its globalising 
processes, are themselves doing at the level of culture and political economy. The 
disjunctive processes of globalisation with their dispersed structures, spaces, times 
and man-power in the post-colonial era no longer need a universal narrative of truth 
and progress. Modernity’s epistemology, its political institutions, ideologies , 
identities, and its national societies are eroded in the age of digital capitalism with its 
flexible accumulation strategies. It is on this basis that I suggest that postmodern 
theory ought to anchor itself in the conditions of postmodemity, and in the political 
economy of post-industrial capitalism in order to be empirically grounded.
The postmodern total negation of meta-narratives, is therefore, challenged in this 
chapter, as the argument has unfolded itself on the basis of the global discourse and 
hegemony of capital, which continues to be narrated as a meta-narrative itself even 
though it has led to the fragmentation and dispersion of economic and cultural 
production.
Having said this, I do not mean to promote a romantic vision of globalisation, and to 
claim that under globalisation processes humanity will live next to each other in 
better harmony. What is being maintained here is that under globalisation the 
institution of the nation-state, and its administrative and representative authority will 
diminish in significance, and will be eventually made obsolete under the imperatives 
of global capitalist development. Through the process of globalisation a sense of 
difference and distinctiveness is constantly sharpened, while simultaneously they are
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commodified and invested in by capitalist flexible accumulation strategies. This can 
be better argued in the context of the dialectic of globalisation and localisation which 
is the title of the next chapter.
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\Chapter five:
The Dialectic of 
Globalisation and Localisation
Despite the radical changes that have affected the nation-state's sovereignty in the last 
few decades, the nation-state is still the most important single institution of 
belonging. Despite the advent of the global village of digital telecommunications and 
irrespective of many indicators of globalisation, most national-states resist to 
succumb to the idea of globalisation, and cling to the idea of national sovereignty. 
Citizens continue to hold their national governments accountable on social issues 
over which the state has had an autonomous control, and a sense of allegiance to the 
nation-state borne by its citizens has not been radically undermined.
Moreover the resurgence of ethnic, regional and nationalist movements in the same 
period of globalisation, poses a dilemma in asserting that globalisation is an all- 
encompassing process. It is precisely the will for belonging and continuity against 
globalising processes that shifts our attention to the paradox of the process at a 
political as well as cultural/sentimental levels. The forces of'time-space compression' 
are in a dialectical relationship with the emotional forces of ethnicities and 
communities that seek a continuous and spatialized sense of belonging to crystallise 
their distinctiveness. Hence, on the one hand, the time and space of the nation-state 
lose strength in reversing globalisation forces, yet on the other hand, on the emotional 
and subjective fronts globalisation has not fostered a comfortable sense of global 
identity yet
Indeed this is why Anthony Smith's article "Towards a Global Culture?" (1990) 
echoes a voice that cannot be disregarded. For him the notion of a global culture is 
meaningless, since it has no past and no history; a global culture has no emotional or
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affective connotations attached to it, since its very integration is based on and 
controlled by non-human factors of mass telecommunications and computer network 
systems; the signs, images and symbols of a so-called global culture do not have any 
hold on real human memories of the past, and hence do not possess the capacity to 
overcome particular histories and cultures that crystallise the experiences of 
historically distinct peoples. A global culture, argues Smith, has no past, no roots in 
people’s memories, and thus it can not have a common future. Above all else, Smith 
would not agree with the "economic determinism" that allegedly is implicit in the 
postmodern analysis of national identity. In other words even if a global economic 
union has emerged, a global culture will not by any means have to follow. Nations are 
ethnically and historically distinct and will remain so. (Smith 1990, PP. 171-193).
This dilemma is worth closer investigation. I will argue below that globalisation 
need not to be in contradiction with expressions of ethnic identity and even its 
spatialisation in marginalised, localised, and national forms. It only becomes 
confusing when ethnicities and national-states are regarded as the same phenomena.
This paradoxical situation can be examined in terms of the "Dialectic of 
Globalisation and Localisation". I shall focus my attention on the mechanisms 
whereby the global and the local are dialectically linked, leading to perpetuation and 
strengthening of local identities in the disjunctive processes of globalisation. 
However local or ethnic identities are not synonymous with national identities. In fact 
nationalisation and standardisation of identity by the national-states in the midst of 
human ethnic, linguistic and geographical differences has undermined the conditions 
of ethnic belonging and expression. The centralised power mechanisms of national- 
states which have been in charge of producing a homogeneous national identity since 
the 18th century are absent in globalising processes. Some have argued that the global 
culture of consumerism works towards the creation of a global identity. There is 
equal truth in maintaining that the global culture of consumerism opens its way into
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different markets by an emphasis on difference and heterogeneity. And in this 
complex situation the global and local/ethnic are united in their tension.
Raphael Samuel has in his introduction to Patriotism pointed to the whole range of 
changes in the realms of economy, politics, culture that have occurred in British 
society since the Second World War, which do not allow ’nationality' to be taken for 
granted any longer (Samuel, 1989). Samuel argues that with the decline of British 
imperialism which during its peak underlined and celebrated the idea of British 
Nationality1, and with the transformations of the last thirty years, British sovereignty 
has been severely undermined. There has emerged a political division between the 
north and the south; minority identities do not fit into the idea of the nation as an 
organic whole, and hence, a new cultural and political pluralism has damaged both 
the "uniqueness of English identity" and its consensus politics. Immigration and 
foreign settlements have brought the third world communities into the heart of major 
cities, making it fictional, if not publicly offensive, to regard the idea of the British as 
a common nation.
On the other hand, with the globalisation of the City of London by global capital, 
argues Samuel, the economic sovereignty of the 1930s, when the label of "made in 
Britain" was a token of durability and quality and indicative of national economic 
supremacy and self sufficiency, when 40% of films in circuit were home made, and 
foreign travels were severely restricted due to exchange controls, all this has been 
eroded.
Along with the structural economic and political changes that to some extent have 
eroded the borders of a distinctive and sovereign nation, there are cultural changes 
too, continues Samuel. In the last 30 years American cultural and commercial 
penetrations into British society have gone unresisted and even unresented. National 
diet, clothing, designs, artistic and architectural styles, fashion, production and 
consumption all have incorporated ideas of 'difference' and 'ethnic'. The
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commercialisation and promotion of 'difference' and 'ethnicity' by global capitalist 
strategies, indicates that capitalism is not committed to the national idea, but it 
dresses in a national costume when home markets are targeted; commodity (or the 
sign) appears in a national or ethnic dress depending on what image is being 
produced, and what market is being penetrated . The ephemera of "Georgian", 
"Edwardian" or "Victorian" traditions, for example, can easily be revived and 
commercialised in response to a nostalgia for the past.
Raphael Samuel is not denying that there is a will for distinct cultural spaces of 
identity, but he is referring to how this will is employed and utilised by capital, and 
how difference and heterogeneity become the cultural sensibilities of the postmodern 
times. We live in a society that "creates a theatre of appearances at the very moment 
when the substance is slipping from our grasp. It preserves facials while allowing the 
interiors to be ruthlessly stripped..."(Samuel, 1989, P.l)
This nostalgia for 'home', 'simplicity1 and 'past' at a time when capitalism is becoming 
more cosmopolitan, is one of the attributes of postmodern culture and it lives in 
tension with global consumerist culture. The more cosmopolitan capitalism becomes, 
the more it advertises its local affiliations, and goes nomadic. Something of the same 
nature may be true of the British people as a whole. Geographically the population 
may be becoming more mobile, but imaginatively it cleaves to a sense of place; new 
offices and housing developments take the names of villages, and the sentiments of 
nationalism and national identity increasingly become integrated with imagination 
and invention. The idea of nationality, says Samuel, has not got much relationship 
with what we really are, but with what we imagine we are.
Another challenge to the Modernist version of ethnicity, from a different angle is 
offered by Tonkin in her introduction to History and Ethnicity. Echoing Anderson, 
Raphael Samuel maintained that through national imagination we recreate ourselves 
as a traditional entity. Tonkin wants to investigate the same thing anthropologically.
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She is interested to know how can the present create the past?, how can identities 
construct their uniqueness and their exclusive history? Tonkin recognises that group 
identity is a passage to the assertion or construction of self-definition, and successful 
self-defining entities such as nations create their history retrospectively, and in 
relation to the identities of 'Other1. The construction of one's history in relation to 
other identities always entails elements of fiction, but as long as people believe in 
them, then their history is true. Here Tonkin tries to elaborate that the truth of one's 
identity and the history that the 'present' creates, do not necessarily depend on their 
factuality; history and myth are not mutually exclusive realms, not even when a 
historical 'fact' is used in empirical research, and is transformed into empirical 
material. And in turn this empirical material constantly constructs the past and re­
establishes the difference between ’us’ and 'them'.
It is obvious here that Tonkin is essentially implying that the establishment of the 
epistemology and consciousness behind separate national identities is intrinsically 
linked to the epistemology of the Enlightenment that separated sciences from myth 
and believed that 'fact' and 'fiction' belong to two different realms. The negation of 
such a division is another criterion that separates Modernity from postmodemity.
Tonkin explores these remarks in terms of a very important notion in social sciences 
today (which she believes should have never been allowed into academic use), that is, 
ethnicity. The concept of 'ethnicity' which first arrived into the Oxford English 
Dictionary in 1953, can only be applied to a group from without and in identity 
differentiating processes, argues Tonkin. No child growing up at home ever feels that 
s/he is a member of an ethnic group. In other words ethnicity is an abstract noun that 
is not derived from vernacular morphological processes, but from the discourse of 
Otherness. Interestingly enough, although the term ethnicity expresses commonalities 
of various kind, of culture, language, religion, race, etc, no ethnic studies of 
majorities or nations have ever taken place by anthropologists, except perhaps in the
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case of Japan which is one of the few mono-ethnic nation-states in the world. The 
term has remained to express the identity of minority, the opposition, the Other.
In this sense the term ethnicity is loaded by power relationships. Tonkin believes that 
ethnicity should be understood only in the context of relativities of the process of 
identification. In this light an anthropological study and grasp of nation would 
suggest that the very definition of the nation is dependent upon a process of 
identification that can only happen in relation to ethnicity, race and the Other. Hence 
the discourse of ethnicity that has tended to concern itself only with sub-national 
units or minorities of some kind or another, has been criticised by Tonkin as biased 
and imprecise, suggesting that either anthropology should come ’home’ and study 'us' 
as an ethnic group too, or the term should be abandoned altogether by social 
scientists.
Tonkin's argument is a challenge to Modernist conceptions of the nation as rooted 
identities that can be defined in reference to their own inherent attributes from 
within. To Tonkin all identities are shaped in interaction and in relativity. Hence, the 
very definition of collective identities, here nations, includes the notion of the Other; 
the Other in this sense is never external. Secondly, the process of self-identification, 
always entails myth and imagination as media used by the 'present' to construct a 
'past'. Past and present are mutually inclusive.
In this sense, nationality and ethnicity can be analysed as two fundamentally 
different entities. Under the process of nation-state building, ethnicities, that is the 
real communities to which people are sensuously and tangibly tied, are incorporated 
into a standardised national identity, and the expressions of their differences are 
discouraged and blunted. Only those excluded from the nation are regarded as 
'ethnic'. Under the process of globalisation, on the other hand, expressions of 
ethnicity and difference are gaining firmer ground rather than the reverse. In other 
words globalisation and localisation are mutually inclusive processes that work
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towards de-construction of grand national identities in which difference was largely 
disguised in the name of homogeneity and unity of the national culture.
A similar theme has been echoed by Stuart Hall in his contribution to King's Culture, 
Globalisation, and the New World Svstemi 1991). To Stuart Hall ethnicity in a sense 
has been rediscovered by the English in the last few decades to salvage the English 
past and identity. The new nationalism of the last few decades uses race and ethnicity 
in a structure of binary representation of English identity. Britishness, according to 
Hall, has always absorbed the heterogeneities within, such as class, regional, 
linguistic and ethnic differences, and negotiated itself as a homogeneous entity 
against difference with the other outside and inside national boundaries.
On a cultural level the continuous migration of labour in the post-war period, the 
development of an ecological consciousness, the expansion of global mass culture 
dominated by signs and images that reconstitute popular life and popular 
entertainment, all indicate the evolution of a new social and economic fabric which is 
largely woven by the global forces rather than national ones. The logic of this global 
culture is to promote mass production and mass consumption, and it employs the 
techniques of 'just-in-time production', new flexible accumulation strategies, 
segmented markets, post-Fordist modes of spatial and temporal organisation, all 
aiming at a diversified and localised mass consumption in the global market
In this sense Stuart Hall is arguing that at the heart of a postmodern global culture lies 
a contradiction and also a unity. This echoes what Raphael Samuel said, that the 
global opened its way through the local and the ethnic. The global is therefore a 
contradictory and disjunctive discourse that incorporates, gives space to, and 
empowers difference and heterogeneity. The hegemony of global capital is not the 
disappearance or destruction of difference, it is the construction of a global culture 
through difference in the age of digital communication and for the purpose of flexible 
accumulation.
161
Ronald Robertson , one of the other contributors to Theory. Culture and Society 
(June 1990 vol. 7 numbers 2-3, PP. 15-31), suggests that the expectations of 
particularity on the one hand, and on the other hand, the expectations of universality 
should be tied together as part of a global cultural nexus. In harmony with Hall, he 
calls the dialectic of globalisation and localisation "particularisation of universalism" 
which can be interpreted to mean the global culture is expressed through 
1 ocali sation/ethni cizati on, that is, through incommensurable human ethnic 
differences.
In response to the question “can there be such a thing as a world culture?”, Immanuel 
Wallerstein looks at the national, as the prototype of the ‘particular’ in the process of 
globalisation (King 1991, P. 93). He argues that the universality of the nation-state as 
our primary cultural container came into existence only in the 19th century. Over 
time, the particular nation-states have evolved to resemble each other more and more 
in their structural and cultural forms. In Wallerstein’s words “all nation-states have 
today standard political forms; a national currency, a school system , a legislature, a 
constitution, a bureaucracy” (King 1991, P. 93). Wallerstein implies that this evolved 
similarity of the nation-states has been taken as an ontological and inherent one 
disguising the temporality of the nation-state.
The modernist binary logic in the dichotomisation of heterogeneity/homogeneity, 
integration/disintegration, unity/diversity, is challenged by these postmodern 
propositions. Accordingly, these terms are not mutually exclusive; they are both 
explanatory dimensions of the global culture. Postmodernism to Featherstone is " 
both a symptom and a powerful cultural image of the swing away from the 
conceptualisations of the global culture less in terms of alleged (Modernist) 
homogenising processes... and more in terms of the diversity, variety and richness of 
popular and local discourses, codes and practices which resist and play-back 
systemicity and order” (Featherstone, 1990, P. 2).
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Hence it is obvious that for Hall, Robertson, Featherstone and Wallerstein, the 
process of globalisation does not entail homogenisation. This ties into with the 
aforementioned positions of Appadurai and Giddens as the other proponents of 
globalisation theory. To them too globalisation is a multi-layered, contingent, 
patchy , heterogeneous, discontinuous process which is caused by the diversity of 
intersecting dynamics; it is "a process of uneven development that fragments as it co­
ordinates" (Giddens, 1990, P. 175), and this infrastructure for Appadurai is deeply 
disjunctive.
Consequently the central argument suggests that the general power of the centralised 
Modem state diminishes, while simultaneously ethnic differences and localised 
strategies and spatializations strengthen in the discourse of postmodemization. While 
under the conditions of postmodemity the global forces of digital capitalism diminish 
the power of a sovereign and centralised state in regulating an independent national 
society and culture, they do strengthen certain incommensurable folk identities at the 
local levels. This assertion has been fully explored in chapter four. It was suggested 
that the modes of vertical integration and control in bureaucratic structures in the 
industrial time, are slowly being replaced by a more horizontal mode of integration 
and control in the post-industrial society due to postmodern technologies and flexible 
accumulation strategy of digital capitalism. The national-state is a prime example of 
a vertical and bureaucratic power mechanism.
Raymond Williams and Daniel Bell both have suggested that the nation-state is too 
small for resolving global problems and too big for tackling local problems in the 
postmodern times (Williams 1983, PP. 197-9; Bell 1988, P. 116). With the growth of 
global problems and global modes of governance, we need to think globally and act 
locally. The dialectic of global and local can be segmented analytically at the 
following levels:
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Internationalisation of economy, politics , culture, and the 'hollowing’ out of 
the national-state lead us to think globally. The diversity of local, regional and 
ethnic characteristics with their diverse beliefs, conditions and traditions 
localise the reception of the global phenomena. All global processes are 
locally spatialized, and all local characteristics are subject to global processes.
Transnational Companies subdivide their operations and spatialize their 
diverse activities locally and within different markets. BT and BA for 
example operate Transnationally. The telephone bills we receive every quarter 
as well as the London-Liverpool air tickets are both produced by very cheap 
labour in Dehli.
Centralised national hierarchies break down and the body politics are both 
globalised/ Europeanised and dispersed nationally to local governments, 
private sector, non-governmental agencies, councils, etc.
Localities are the spaces for social interaction and such interactions provide 
the local context for interpretation of global processes, gathering of 
information, arranging coalitions and contracts, and developing initiatives and 
rules of acceptable behaviour.(Amin & Thrift 1992)
The globalisation of the City of London is another example of local 
spatialization of global financial mechanisms. The increasing number of 
foreign banks from 100 in 1961 to about 450 in the 1980s spatially 
transformed the City of London to facilitate for the flows of global money 
and finance, leading to effective de-nationalisation of the economy. (Lash & 
Urry 1994, PP. 288/89). International problems relating to overwhelming 
consumerism such as holes in the ozone layer, global warming, acid rain, 
nuclear accidents, as well as poverty, over-population, famine, AIDS,
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unemployment, defence all pose a common future for humanity, and can only 
be tackled by global strategies and implemented locally.
Global processes have increased ethnic and local awareness at two levels: 
firstly at a constructed and commodified level; the image of many ethnicities 
is exploited, commodified and partially constructed through the advertising 
strategies of late capitalism to promote further sale of ethnic art, fashion, 
tourism, package holidays. This is what MacCannell calls 'reconstructed 
ethnicity', an 'ethnicity-for-tourism’ in which 'other* cultures are exoticized 
for tourist attraction. (MacCannell 1992,158).
Secondly is the resurgence of ethnic and nationalist movements of real 
historical cultures of real people against the modem centralising state that 
through the modem period forced them into the meta-narrative of the 
national-state. The collapse of the Soviet Union national-state and the rise of 
many small ethnic nations and the ethnic wars in Yugoslavia are only some 
examples. The new nation-states that are created from the remains of the old 
ones, are largely (mono) ethnic communities whose identities are not 
administered and standardised through the state mechanism of national 
education.
In this context, it will be possible to explain the resurgence of ethnic conflicts and 
uprisings in the last few decades, without contradicting the assertion that the 
sovereign power of the bureaucratic modem state that administered and standardised 
diverse human identities into the meta-narrative of one national identity is 
diminishing. With this assertion, then, it will also be possible to speak of the 
weakening of national identity without meaning to say a similar thing on an ethnic 
level.
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The real difference between the nation and ethnic identity is that the former is a 
Modem discourse of power/knowledge/political economy and is vertically articulated 
in the time and space of Modernity by the modem state, whereas the latter is based on 
essentialist historical human cultural differences, and their nationalisms come from 
their peripheral locations. These differences in turn are commodified by the global 
economic infrastructure, and enter into cultural sensibilities of the postmodern time.
Nation-states are the dominant political institutions of the modem time. Ethnicities 
on the other hand, although heavily racialized and politicized in the modem processes 
of nation/state-building, in themselves are based on genuine incommensurable 
historical folk human differences. The process of postmodemization transcends the 
parameters of Modernity and hence the parameters of the nation-state, while it 
strengthens ethnic nationalism.
Ethnic nationalism
The distinction between cultural nations and political nations is one of the most 
famous and illuminating distinctions that has been made in the enquiries regarding 
the nation. This thesis so far has concerned itself with the political nation-state as a 
modem container of collective identity. It is, however, time to look at cultural 
communities and nations that existed in pre-modem times and have persisted into the 
modem times. As I have maintained in the above section, I shall be arguing further 
that while the process of globalisation diminishes the power of the nation-state, 
cultural or ethnic nationalism is reviving, and will continue to do so.
The political nation-state is the making of Modernity and its modem territorial state , 
and it centres around the idea of individual and collective self-determination. The 
concept of political nation-state has been most vividly crystallised in France, Britain 
and the United States; a process of political transformation regarded a community of 
aware citizens equal in the eyes of the law irrespective of their ethnic, religious, 
linguistic and cultural origins. The nation and the state constituted a unifying whole,
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and through the state project of nationalisation, the cultural and political boundaries 
were made to slowly coincide. Thus the national-State is made from above , and 
through centralised power mechanisms. Ethnic groups and what unites them, on the 
other hand' are not modern makings, only their position in the nation-state is; they 
are historical and cultural entities that existed prior to modem times. Modernity has 
not generated ethnicity, but it has generated the institution o f the nation-state.
The existence of an ethnic community is constituted by the consciousness of the 
social groups wanting and believing in being one community and is based on 
seemingly objective criteria such as a distinct area of settlement, language, customs 
and traditions
These two types of nations have been respectively called Western-territorial 
nations' and 'Eastern ethnic nations' by Anthony Smith. The 'Western-Territorial 
Nations’ or 'Civic Nations’ such as Britain, France, Holland, Spain, Sweden and 
Russia are the ones that gradually transformed themselves into territorial national- 
states due to the unification of the "economy, territorial centralization, the provision 
of equal rights for more and more strata, and the growth of public mass education 
system" (Smith, 1986, P. 138). Territoriality, citizenship rights, legal codes and the 
development of a political culture are the main features of the western model. Smith 
stresses that as European inter-State rivalries grew, the national-state moved to 
subordinate and standardise the peripheral populations and their ethnic cultures, as 
happened in Gaelic Highlands.
The western model of nation/state-building was initially imported to African and 
Asian colonies by the western rulers, and later it was adopted by 'indigenous' 
political elite and intellectuals in their nationalist aspirations for de-colonisation of 
their countries.
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The second type of nation is the 'Eastern ethnic’ model that developed 
'genealogically' during the 19th century in Central, Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East, and it "revealed the growing influence of 'ethnic' and ethnic models of the 
nation, on the trajectories and concepts of nationhood" (Smith 1986, P. 145). Ethnic 
ties and sentiments, a vernacular culture, emphasis on a unique collective past and 
destiny were the basis of popular and national mobilisation.
It is the rise o f the second type o f nationalism, that is the ethnic nationalism, against 
the nationalism o f the national-states that imderlies the resurgence o f national and 
ethnic movements o f the last few  decades. Since the Second World War most 
European nation-states have been facing ethnic resistance from peripheral areas. In 
1980 a new law was introduced in Belgium that transformed Belgium from a 
centrally unified national-state into a federation allowing not only the Flemings and 
the Walloons but also the Germans-speaking minority in Eupen and Malmedy in east 
Belgium the right to run their own affairs. (Alter 1985, P. 98).
In Cyprus, the two communities of Greeks and Turks, despite many unifying 
initiatives eventually decided to go their own ways in 1975, which has divided the 
island politically into two sections.
In Spain, France, Britain, Italy, national minorities express their will for self- 
determination, and demand decentralization of the power of the national-state so as to 
allow them to run their own affairs. Despite this the claim of homogeneity and unity 
of the national-states has not yet been abandoned by the central state. The Welsh and 
Scottish constitute distinctive cultural consciousnesses in Britain which has 
eventually led to the devolution of Scotland in 1997; Bretons, Corsicans, Alsatians 
and Provencals speak a second language different from French, which is not 
exercised at a political level; in Spain, out of many ethnic groups, only Catalan and 
Basque regionalism has ever managed to rise to the level of political significance.
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Although most of these ethnic communities aspire to run their own affairs, as a norm 
they do not want to constitute a separate national-state. Corsican regionalists for 
example do not want to secede from France, but want to share only the currency, 
foreign policy, defence and some elements of the judicial system with the mainland. 
That is why Hugh Seton-Watson has described regionalism as an unsatisfied 
nationalism. (Hugh Seton-Watson 1971, PP 3-13). Most of these ethnic nationalisms 
are in fact claiming their rights for self-determination of their own affairs which are 
denied by the national-states and their centralized power apparatus.
The sudden upsurge of ethnic revival in eastern and south eastern Europe after the 
collapse of the communist national-states marks the 1980s. The ethnic uprising of 
Azeris, Armenians, Tajiks, Uzbeks against the Russian state and against each other; 
the bloodiest ethnic cleansing war in Yugoslavia, years after modem events which 
artificially united different peoples in the body of the same nation-state at the end of 
First World War; the division of Czechoslovakia; the separation of the Baltic 
provinces and Ukraine from the Soviet State, all indicate the diminishing power of 
the centralised national-states and rising ethnic awareness.
These ethnic nationalisms constitute the category of Risorgimento nationalism for 
Alter (1985), which is defined as the principle of solidarity of the ethnic communities 
against the national-states which aim to assimilate and standardise diverse human 
identities into a national one from a centralised power position to produce a meta­
narrative of identity from the above.
In the third world countries of Asia and Africa, after the Second World War, the 
intellectuals and political leaders undertook to decolonise their territories from the 
imperialist domination of the western nation-state. Their newly formed nation-states 
have faced huge problems of ethnic diversity that destabilise the intended 
nationalisation processes. The Third World nationalism by its very essence is 
contradictory; on the one hand it aims for de-colonisation and independence, and on
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the other hand the territorial as well as the epistemologic framework within which 
the task of de-colonisation is undertaken is itself the legacy of colonialism and 
imperialism. But such is the agonising dilemma of Third World life!
According to what has been discussed above, it should now be more clear that the 
discourse of globalisation and localisation, has no inherent contradiction with the rise 
of ethnic nationalism. I have tried to show that in the intertwined processes of 
globalisation, localisation and ethnicization that characterise the postmodern times, 
the modem national-state and its centralising power is fundamentally undermined. 
The problematic of 'dual loyalty1 of ethnic belonging and national belonging (Smith 
1986, P 152), has remained unbridged towards the end of 20th century. The reason 
for this is that the former is historically transverse and the latter is historically time- 
bound.
Refugees, Exception Leave To Remains, Asvlum-Seekers and Exiles
It would be difficult to finish this argument without mentioning the increasing 
number of state-less people in the postmodern world such as refugees, those with 
Exceptional Leave to Remain, asylum-seekers and the exiles who live at the margins 
of the nation-state. As global capitalism grows and the culture of consumerism 
penetrates in every comer of the planet; as borders erode and the international 
movement of labour force increases; as difference and ethnic conflict are further 
empowered, the pace of mass population movements and immigration across the 
globe increases. According to Richmond “throughout the developing world there are 
mass movements of population from rural to urban areas,...An estimated 70 million 
persons live and work in other countries and more than a million emigrate 
permanently every year”. “There are an estimated 16.3 million refugees and asylum 
seekers around the world...In addition the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) recognises a further 6.6 million people live in refugee-like situations in 
their own regions” (Richmond 1994, introduction).
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The ethnic diversity of almost all post-industrial societies today raises the question of 
whether equality of opportunity and cooptation of immigrants with each other and 
with indigenous populations can be reconciled with the maintenance of separate 
national identities. It seems that homelessness, poverty, social exclusion, 
marginalisation and racism are the themes that unity and characterise the identities 
of refugees, asylum seekers and exiles rather than belonging to a nation-state. Yet 
‘they’ keep flowing to inhabit state-less social positions. As ethnic conflicts, 
environmental risk, poverty and over-population experienced at the local level push 
them away, the semiotics of global satellite communications, simultaneously pull 
them towards ‘better opportunities’ (and in most cases a chance for survival) from 
rural to urban areas and from urban areas to global core cities. The unity, 
inseparability of, and the tension between, the global and the local/ethnic is vividly 
crystallised in the locus and identity of refugees, asylum seekers and exiles. These 
people together with the long-term unemployed and low waged constitute the bottom 
layer of the global class society, while they also experience segregation and 
exclusion within the same layer. Nationality is the last thing that makes them unify.
Europeans and those of European descent in the Americas and Oceania are out­
numbered in an increasingly integrated world in a ratio of four to one. They fear they 
may lose their privileged life styles, power and control. They defend their national 
sovereignty by constantly reviewing their immigration policies to tighten their 
borders against foreigners and cling to a sense of History (with a capital H) which 
gave them their superiority in the last few centuries. However “as the senior legal 
advisor to the UNHCR has stated, even if the developed countries are based, by 
building new iron curtains and Berlin Walls around their common territory, the 
human flood would still find its ways”(Richmond, 1994, p. 216) .
The first step towards finding a solution to the problems arising from immigration is 
to come in terms with the logic of late capitalism and to perceive the phenomenon of
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mass immigration as ‘ours’ rather than ‘theirs’. The only peaceful solution to the 
future is that “We must all learn to live with ethno-cultural diversity, rapid social 
change, and mass migration” (Richmond, 1994, 217). Nationalism poses merely a 
barrier and a prejudice against preparing and learning new skills for a multicultural 
social life.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that globalisation reverses processes of homogenisation 
of identity by empowering ethnic identities and conflict. In explaining this assertion, I 
proposed to distinguish the national-state and national identity from ethnic identities. 
The former identity is obtained through centralised power mechanisms of the 
national-state and it is a discourse of power in the modem period, while the latter, 
irrespective of severe politicisation, is based on incommensurable human cultural 
differences that have been formed historically and culturally on a folk and vernacular 
level. The relationship between different ethnic groups only becomes hierarchical 
when they are swallowed by the nation-state and its centralised power mechanism.
It seems that the global has become the macrological dimension in which power 
should be theorised. Micrologically, power can continue to be perceived in a 
Foucaultian way as ‘operating through different and diffused force-fields of practices 
and discourses’. The global, unlike the national, does not and cannot speak a single 
language and it has to open its way into the local markets through pluralisation and 
deconstruction, but it is still from a position of power. If hegemony was implemented 
from the position of standardisation and homogenisation of culture and identity in the 
age of industrial capitalism and by the nation-state, it prevails through empowerment 
of difference, heterogeneity and pluralism in the postmodern times and against the 
power of the nation-state. Under the logic of late capitalism the sovereignty and unity 
of the nation-state diminishes, national borders lose significance, a global culture of 
consumerism together with massive rates of immigration and ethnic movements 
characterise the future.
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However neither of the above assertions are adequately indicative of an actual 
decline of the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state in the subjective realm. In the 






Js "Ilie Institution of the Nation-State Declining?
In the previous chapters it has been argued that under the conditions of 
postmodem/(y, ‘national’ societies have been undergoing fundamental changes in the 
spheres of production, distribution, consumption , modes of political and economic 
governance, time and space integration since the 1960s, with the advent of micro­
electronic capitalism, computerisation network systems and mass 
telecommunications. I have argued that in the context of a postmodern political 
economy, capitalism has evolved to a micro-electronic phase of its development 
which some people have called post-industrial. These post-industrial or postmodern 
transformations have caused the individual nation-states to become increasingly fused 
into global networks and experience a more horizontal integration with the global 
networks compared to more vertical and bureaucratic structures which characterised 
both mechanical and electronic phases of capitalist development in the modem 
period. I have suggested that together with capitalist structural transformations, there 
have also been corresponding changes in sensibilities and styles expressed in the 
cultural and aesthetic realms that are commonly called postmodem/s/w. Without 
attempting to recapitulate what postmodem/.vm entails it is useful to remember that in 
the first chapter of this thesis it has been suggested that postmodemwm is an umbrella 
term referring to cultural and aesthetic sensibilities and styles that, quite contrary to 
the avantgarde artistic and cultural styles, celebrate notions such as plurality, 
fragmentation, diversity , open endedness and an abandonment of a sense of 
completion and destination.
I have also argued that although af its face value the postmodern phenomena seem to 
be a confusing mixture of contradictory elements of ‘anything goes’, there are
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underlying explanatory developments which in this thesis have been analysed as the 
postmodern political economy. It is only in the context of a postmodern political 
economy, as the latest phase of capitalism, that the postmodern phenomena can be 
better explained. The abandonment of notions such as ‘destination’, ‘meaning’, 
‘completion’ and the adoption of alternative notions such as ‘plurality’, ‘diversity’, 
‘fragmentation’ and ‘juxtaposition’ in aesthetic expressions combined with the most 
advanced and powerful computerised technologies o f fashion, design, marketing and 
advertising speed up the cycle of production and consumption and increase the speed 
of disposability. An increase in the rhythm of social and cultural disposability means 
shorter production and consumption cycles and higher profitability which is the prime 
motive of capitalist production.
As regard the nation’s diminishing sense o f ‘homogeneity’, ‘unity’ and ‘sovereignty’, 
the same logic has been implemented. Under capitalist development “all that is solid, 
melts into air” and here, as an example, we are looking at the discourses of 
collective identity in the form of (the) national identity. It is in this context that I am 
proposing that under the conditions of postmodern political economy discourses of 
national identity are also losing power and the nation-state is increasingly less able to 
standardise, administer and represent a ‘sovereign’ and ‘hpmogenous’ collectivity. As 
a result nations also fee l less homogeneous and sovereign.
Putting it in other words, as the latest technologies create a sense of global 
simultaneity, juxtaposition of different experiences and disposability, the 
chronological, sequential and continuous experiencing of social life which was 
essential for historical perceptions and identities, loses its vigour and the 
juxtaposition of ‘diverse’ and ‘heterogeneous’ experiences over-ride chronological 
experiences of ‘united’ and ‘homogenous’ nations. History, based pn chronology, 
which has beep a crucial explanatory platform for nation-states to substantiate their 
‘distinctiveness’ and to lend meaning to their ‘homogeneity’, ‘unity’ and
176
‘sovereignty’, becomes less and less significant in the simultaneous experiences of 
modem computerised (internetworks of postmodern societies.
The aim of this chapter is to empirically test the proposition that under the conditions 
of postmodemity, and alongside the structural transformations of the socio-economic 
fabrics of post-industrial societies, there is also a diminishing sense of national 
‘sovereignty, unity and homogeneity’ in the context of globalisation together with a 
growing sense of plurality and heterogeneity within the space of the nation.
As will become apparent in this chapter, despite the fundamental transformations that 
nation-states have undergone in their social and economic lives, the nation-state is 
still the dominant institution for both making and representing collective identities. 
Therefore none of the postmodern structural changes that have been referred to above 
could automatically prove that the experience of nationhood in the subjective realm 
has also changed, especially now that the waves of ethnic nationalism have expanded 
in the last few decades rather than the reverse. This chapter has therefore been 
developed to test whether, and to what extent, the self-perception of the nation has 
changed since the 1920s in respect to its ‘unity’, ‘homogeneity’ and ‘sovereignty’. 
The purpose of this chapter is to make a historical comparison between the periods of 
1920s/1930s and 1970s/1980s/1990s. The chapter presents the data that is obtained 
from the two historical periods and examines the findings on the question of whether 
the western nation-state perceives its sovereignty, unity and homogeneity tp be in 
decline pr in question. I haye chosen Britain as my case-stucfy to answef empirically
%  following questipm “ttys thefe ^een a historical trend towards a sense pf declip'
S0V^ if T I ^  ffflffogehety w f  jjjjty in BntfW?” ' ■: . !
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Methodology
My objective is to find out whether there has been a historical trend towards a 
sense of decline of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in Britain.
I have chosen content analysis of the ‘text5 to investigate whether there has been a 
historical trend towards the decline of the sovereignty, homogeneity and unity of the 
western nation-state . Content analysis is a conventionally suitable method for 
investigation and extraction of valid references from the text. This is especially true if 
historical trends in social, group or institutional behaviour and attitudes are looked at. 
The method is appropriate for making inferences from the text in studying cultural 
patterns of change over time. As my intention is to find a historical trend in the 
nation’s self-perception of its sovereignty and unity, newspapers have been chosen 
for the purpose of content analysis because they have existed over long periods of 
time and are suitable for inferring historical trends. Newspapers are one of the most 
important media in which the nation unfolds itself on a daily basis, and it is relatively 
cost effective to have access to newspapers of the previous decades. Editorials and 
commentaries are the sections that have been looked at because daily interpretations 
and analyses of national life are more likely to be reflected upon in those areas.
There is a drawback in choosing newspapers for testing the strength of a sense of 
national identity, because newspapers constitute the very media for unfolding and 
representing the institution of the nation. They are the daily voice of the nation-state , 
through which as Anderson says, the nation ‘imagines itself , and as Bhabha says, the 
nation ‘performs itself. They are bound to voice the nation-state and in this sense it 
can be argued that I have chosen a biased medium. However newspapers have been 
chosen for the very reason of tjieir representation of the nation-state , because if the 
nation fyp updergpne fp its subjecpyp ppdprstanftn^ of itseff, t j p
newspapers are where Jfie tTpnd qf pjjaqge can be foupd-
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Britain has been chosen as my case-study because Britain is one of the oldest nation­
state s of Europe which has historically demonstrated a very high sense of national 
unity, homogeneity and sovereignty. It would therefore be significant to find out how 
the British national sentiments have changed over time since the 1920s. Four daily 
British newspapers that have been in print since 1920s have been selected: The Times 
and The Guardian from the quality papers and The Daily Express and The Daily 
Mirror from the tabloids. I have chosen The Times and The Daily Express because of 
their positions as so-called right-wing papers and The Guardian and The Daily Mirror 
because of their positions as centre and more left-wing papers. This combination will 
give us a tentatively balanced and representative coverage of the views of different 
sections of the population.
Sampling
The historical periods covered are three years in each decades of the 1920s and 1930. 
in all four newspapers, to be compared with three years in each decade of the 1970s. 
1980s and 1990s for the Times and the Guardian and the 1980s and 1990s for the 
Daily Express and The Daily Mirror. The years chosen are 1925-1926-1927/ 1935- 
1936-1937/ 1975^1976-1977/ 1985-1986-1987 & 1995-1996-1997. The 1970s period 
has not been covered in the tabloids. This is to reduce the scope of an already very 
large piece of research in order to save time and space, which at the same time has 
not affected the comparability of the two historical periods.
The 1920s and 1930s were chosen because I wanted to look at the pattern of attitudes 
to national identity in the early 20th century, the time that characterised the peak of 
the era of Modernity and the triumph of the western nation-state and nationalism; 
when the sovereignty of the nation-state was highly praised and undisputed. The 
decades of the 1970s (The Times and The Guardian only), 1980s, & 1990s were 
chosen to find out if the structures of postmodemity or post-industrial capitalism 
since the late 1960s have affected the nation’s subjective attitudes . Three years in
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each decade gives us 36 consecutive months in each decade. The three years of the 
5th to the 7th of each decade were randomly selected; one issue per week covering 
each day of the week (excluding Sundays) for 6 months and then moving to the next 
day. So for example Monday papers are only looked at from January 1925 to June 
1925; Tuesdays from July 1925 to December 1925; Wednesdays from January 1926 
to June 1926; Thursdays from July 1926 to December 1926; Fridays from January 
1927 to June 1927 and Saturdays from July 1927 to December 1927.
The information given above can be listed as follow:
Method: Content Analysis
Daily Newspapers: The Times, The Guardian, The Daily Express and The Daily
Mirror
Unit of Analysis: Individual editorials and commentaries.
Historical period: 1920s, 1930s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, for The Times & The
= Guardian.
Sampling universe 1920s, 1930s, 1980s, 1990s, for The Daily Express and The 
Daily Mirror
Sampling Frame: 36 months per decade of the years 5 to 7; one day a week,
covering each day of the week (Except Sundays) for 6 months
Size of the Sample: A total of 2808 editorials and commentaries:
(The Times) 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 15 years =780
(The Guardian) 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 15 years =780
(Daily Express) 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 12 years = 624
(Daily Mirror) 52 editorials and commentaries per year X 12 years — 624
Total________________________________________________________2808
Location of Research :British Newspaper Library in Colindale
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Concepts and Indicators
The very important task of determining concepts and indicators was subsequently 
undertaken. I wanted to find suitable and measurable indicators of the concept of 
‘national sovereignty, unity and homogeneity’. ‘Sovereignty’, ‘unity’ and 
‘homogeneity’ are abstract concepts that may be useful in constructing theories, but 
cannot be directly observed or operationalised. It is therefore necessary to find 
suitable indicators for these theoretical concepts which can be subjected to 
observation and measurement. This process is called ‘operationalisaion’ in social 
sciences which simply means that theoretical concepts and propositions must be 
translated into operational concepts and propositions before the research begins.
In order to establish valid indicators of the concept of ‘national sovereignty, unity and 
homogeneity’ a pilot study was conducted for a month to arrive at the main indicators 
that refer to the concept. In the course of a month’s pilot study, the four newspapers 
mentioned earlier were analysed and a surprisingly high range of dimensions and 
indicators were extracted. A whole range of issues such as oil, fuel, immigration, 
minorities, Europe, Wales and Scotland, Northern Ireland, the job situation, 
unemployment, EEC food producers, international prices and inflation, globalisation, 
the world economy, economic volatility and uncertainty, global interdependence, lack 
of career prospects, terrorism, overpopulation, environmental problems, HIV, decline 
of religion and family, sexual immorality, pornography, the Internet etc. were found 
to make stronger or weaker references to the concepts of national unity, homogeneity, 
sovereignty, or suggest implications and consequences for national identity.
It is important to underline here that neither the dimensions nor the indicators are 
selected and elaborated theoretically. They are selected on the basis of the empirical 
results of the pilot study which showed that newspapers use several dimensions for 
each (of our) theoretical concepts . I chose the most recurrent dimensions of the 
concepts of ‘sovereignty, ‘homogeneity’ and ‘unity’. Likewise the indicators of each
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dimension are merely chosen on the basis of the frequency of their recurrence. Those 
with the highest frequency of recurrence have been selected.
After the pilot study was completed, it was obvious that there was no way that all the 
indicators of a decline or continuity of the national sovereignty and unity could be 
incorporated into the research. I had to dispose of many of these indicators and select 
the ones that seemed more frequent and encompassing. I chose a few broad indicators 
through which the degree of the strength of national sovereignty or unity could be 
measured. The question I have been interested in is “Has there been a historical trend 
towards the decline of the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state ?” My research 
intends to measure to what extent, if any, the nation’s self-perception of its 
sovereignty and homogeneity has changed since 1920s. After the completion of the 
pilot study. I decided to choose six main dimensions of the concept of a ‘decline of 
national sovereignty and homogeneity’ and then proceed to extract the most 
frequently repeated indicators. The reason for this decision was to enhance the 
validity and reliability of the findings. Three dimensions have been chosen to express 
‘a diminishing sense of homogeneity and unity’ and three dimensions to express ‘a 
diminishing sense of sovereignty’. These are
Dimensions of the concept of a “diminishing sense of National Homogeneity & 
Unity’’
A- A diminishing sense of national belonging
B- An increasing sense of hybridity of the nation
C- Growing regional ethnicities against the national-state
Dimensions of the concent of a “diminishing sense of National Sovereignty”
D- A growing sense of inability to solve own problems 
E- A growing sense of Europeanism 
F- A growing sense of Globalisation
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For each of the above dimensions I have selected a number of dependent indicators 
which reveal their presence in the texts 1 have investigated. The dimensions and 
indicators to each dimension are presented below;
Dimensions
(of the concept of a ‘diminishing sense 
of National homogeneity and sovereignty*)
A- a diminishing sense of national belonging
B- an increasing sense of national hybridity
C- growing regional ethnicities
D- an increasing sense of inability to solve 
own problems
E- an increasing sense of Europeanisation 
F~ an increasing sense of globalisation
Dependent Indicators
and their codes
Al- a decline in social morality/integration
Bl - multiculturalism 
B2- pluralism
Cl- Scotland & Wales 
C2- Northern Ireland
D l- environment
D2- defence and security
D3- decline of national economy
El-Europe
FI- global village of consumerism/global culture 
F2- global technology 
F3- global economy
The above indicators are dependent on the Independent indicator of time. The 
measurement of the above dependent indicators against the independent indicator of 
time since the 1920s constitutes the pivotal task of this chapter.
The relationship between the dependent and independent indicators are shown in the 








The above six sets of dimension-indicators lead to six sets of operationalisable 
propositions for the measurement of the concept of ‘national sovereignty, unity and 
homogeneity’
Dimension-Indicator A -One of the most endemic and pervasive self-perceptions of 
all state nationalism has been that belonging to the nation-state is based on some 
‘homogenising and unifying ’ sets of values that are distinctive only to the members of 
a particular nation-state and exclusive of ‘others’. These ‘homogenising and 
unifying ’ sets of values can be based on one or more factors like common ancestry, 
territory, history, religion, language, etc. More often than not the nation is fractured in 
respect of socio-economic groupings such as class, gender, regions and ethnicities. 
These heterogeneities are normally diminished through a ‘national education’ and a 
‘national culture’, and people are more united around certain ‘core values’. Under 
the conditions of postmodemity metanarrative-based discourses of identity and 
belonging are fractured, giving rise to a more ambivalent sense of identification. The 
“national education’ can only deliver a weaker sense of ‘unity’ and the cultural 
‘homogeneity & unity ’ of the nation is expressed with a weaker language. Amongst 
these declining metanarratives is a sufficiently unifying moral vision of what is right 
and what is wrong. It seems that post-modern societies are less unified on judgements 
and practices of issues concerning social morality and solidarity. Consequently 
individuals of the nation-state have a more blurred sense of collective belonging.
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Indicator Al: ‘A decline in social morality/integration* has been chosen to 
investigate if, as far as it is reflected in the editorials and commentaries, there has 
been any historical change in the nation’s self-perception of its coherence and 
integration. Obviously if national newspapers express that such cohering principles 
have declined over time, they are reflecting on a weaker sense of national unity and a 
growing sense of national fragmentation. I have purposely left the indicator open to 
include the decline of any cohering and integrating sets of values that have made 
references to the question of social morality and integration in relation to 
heterogeneities within.
Data presented under column A are drawn from all the editorials and commentaries 
that have been written on moral and social issues in their relationship to 
‘national/social unity’. The column excludes editorials and commentaries about 
differences between political parties and their policies. Here we may put forward the 
following hypothesis for testing:
With the decline of a binding and cohering social morality. there follows a 
diminishing sense of social unity and belonging
Dimension -indicator Bl/2- Multiculturalism and pluralism are two indicators that 
have been most frequently repeated in the texts to indicate the extent by which the 
nation has transformed its perception of its cultural 4homogeneity and unity’ and has 
accepted a sense of cultural hybridity. The feeling of homogeneity is exclusive of 
‘others’ and is centred around a clear vision of ‘us’ and ‘them’. A sense of hybridity 
is indicative of the extent to which the nation perceives its definition of ‘us’ to 
include ‘otherness’ and to incorporate other cultures and ethnic groups. Both the 
indicators of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘pluralism’ are to measure the concept of 
hybridity of the nation, which also indicates a decline of the homogeneity of the 
nation. Multiculturalism and pluralism are used synonymously in the editorials and 
commentaries studied as well as in this text to indicate cultural hybridity.
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Data presented under column Bl/2 are drawn from all the editorials and 
commentaries that have been written on questions of 4multiculturalism ’ and 
'pluralism ’ in respect of the definition of national society. This suggests the 
following hypothesis to be tested:
With the growth of pluralism and multiculturalism, the nation has a diminishing 
sense of ‘unity and homogeneity * within and feels more hybrid.
Dimension-Indicator Cl/2: One of the attributes of the nation-state most insisted on 
by nationalists has been the *homogeneity and unity' of the nation. The emphasis on 
this matter has normally disguised the internal heterogeneities such as regional, 
ethnic, class and gender fractures within the nation. The aim of this dimension and 
indicator is to find out to what extent the consciousness of ethnic heterogeneities 
within the framework of the nation-state has increased over time in the case of 
Scotland and Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Data presented under column Cl/2 includes all the reflections that have been made 
on the question of Scottish/Welsh and Irish ethnic nationalisms in the editorials and 
commentaries. Here we may test the following proposition:
With the growth of ethnic consciousness. there is a sense of decline of the 
homogeneity and unity of the nation.
The above three indicators of A, Bl/2 & Cl/2 examine whether there has been a 
historically diminishing sense of national unity and homogeneity. The findings of 
each dimension are mutually supportive in their implications.
The three indicators of Dl/2/3, E & Fl/2/3 below aim to examine whether there has 
been a historically diminishing sense of national sovereignty. The findings of these
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three columns are also mutually supportive in their reflections on the question of 
national sovereignty.
Dimension-Indicator Dl/2/3: One of the dimensions focuses on whether the nation 
thinks of itself as a weaker entity in comparison with the past. This is indicated by its 
cincreasing sense o f inability to resolve its own problems' such as the environment, 
drugs, defence, security and the economy. This shakes the essential foundation of the 
‘sovereignty ’ of the nation-state . The cause of this sense of inability usually lies in 
the fact that these issues have gained global dimensions beyond the boundaries of 
decision- making of the national-states, and the resolution of such problems requires 
a higher degree of awareness of international dependency and contingency.
Three indicators that bear on these issues and have been more frequently repeated in 
the editorial texts are the environment, the defence/security and the economy. The 
data presented under the dimension Dl/2/3 reflects these three categories 
respectively. Here I would like to suggest the following hypothesis:
With the growth of global interdependence, the nation-state feels itself to be 
increasingly less sovereign and unable to independently tackle crucial human 
problems such as the environment, defence/security and the economy.
Dimension-Indicator E: The notion of Europeanism has grown considerably in the 
national literature of the nation-state . The growth of this notion expresses the 
question of national dependence on a larger unit of collective life, and has 
implications for the decline o f the nation-state as a sovereign unit of economic and 
to some extent political decision making. There has been a high degree of European 
co-operation in the form of the European Community, but crucial propositions 
regarding the erosion of national borders and currencies for the early 21st century 
have increasingly provoked concern about the decline of the sovereignty of the 
nation-state.
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Data presented under column E includes all the editorials and commentaries that 
have reflected on the issue of Europeanism and have questioned its impact on 
national sovereignty. Some of the articles are of course against Europeanisation, 
however they are all listed because of the growing concern over the question of 
Europe, whether negatively or positively, and national Sovereignty. The proposition I 
would like to test in this regard is:
There is a growing sense of Europeanism- critically or favourably- amongst the 
citizens of Europe, which indicates a diminishing sense of national sovereignty.
Dimension-Indicator F: With the development of postmodern technologies, there 
has been an accelerating global interdependence of human activities, practices and 
thoughts in all spheres of production, distribution , knowledge, information, work, 
and leisure. This global interdependence of fundamental human social practices and 
thoughts is reflective of the decline o f the sovereign power o f the Nation-state .
Data presented under the dimension F1/2/3 includes all the reflections that have been 
made on the questions of a global technology, global economy and global 
culture/village in relation to the question of national sovereignty. Here the 
proposition to be tested is:
With the intensification of dependency of national units on global technology, 
economy and consumerism. nations feel less self-reliant and sovereign.
To summarise, the general concept under consideration is a ‘diminishing sense of 
homogeneity & sovereignty of the nation-state This concept may be 
substantiated along the following dimensions: Three dimensions of ‘social
integration 4hybridity ’ and ‘ethnicity' have been selected through the pilot study to 
define the concept of ‘homogeneity' of the nation-state . Three dimensions of
188
‘growing inability to solve own problems \ ‘Europeanism ’ and \globalisation ’ have 
been selected to define the concept of 1sovereignty * of the nation-state .Our 
theoretical propositions can be summarised as follow:
Testable proposition A: With the decline of a binding and cohering social morality, 
there follows a diminishing sense of social imity and belonging.
Testable proposition B: With the growth of pluralism and multiculturalism, the 
nation has a diminishing sense of "unity and homogeneity ’ within and feels more 
hybrid.
Testable proposition C: With the growth of ethnic consciousness, there is a sense of 
decline of the homogeneity and unity of the nation.
Testable proposition D: With the growth of global interdependence, the nation-state 
feels to be increasingly less sovereign for independent tackling of crucial human 
problems such as the environment defence/security and the economy.
Testable proposition E: There is a growing sense of Europeanism- critically or 
favourably- amongst the citizens of Europe, which indicates a diminishing sense o f 
sovereignty.
Testable proposition F: With the intensification of dependency of national units on 
global technology, economy and consumerism, nations feel less sovereign.
As is shown above each theoretical proposition has been crystallised in the form of a 
set of concept-indicator(s) .The indicators) and their codification are listed in each 





Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of 
national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (l920s-1990s)
A) Summary of the findings
Before an analysis is made, it is useful to have a summarised picture of the findings. 
The table below shows the frequency of the repetition of the indicators since 1920s.
Table 1; Summary of the Findings- The Times
Al Bl/2
Dependent variables 
Cl/2__________ Dl/2/3________ El Fl/2/3
1920s 0 0 0 0
1930s 4 0 3 (D2) 0 0























1. The 1920s and 1930s:
During the 1920s no indications were found of a sense of diminishing sovereignty or 
unity of the nation. Far from it, British Society was a thriving colonial and imperial 
power which had a substantial part of the world under its rule. The terms ‘Britain’, 
‘us’ and the ‘British empire’ were largely used synonymously and as a matter of fact. 
The Royal edition of The Times was filled with colonial and imperial news and 
developments. The paper reflects on notions such as ‘industry’, ‘progress’, ‘new 
developments’ and ‘trade’ within the sphere of the empire with indisputable belief 
and vehemence. The nation continually enjoyed high levels of industrial development 
and expansion of the mines, railways, coal, steel and ship-building industries; the 
magic of the wire-less and the telegraph and the excitement of the first examples of 
private motorcars were all enthused and written about endlessly. The combination of 
these factors together with a strong sense of religious solidarity around the moral 
codes of Christianity, marriage and the family characterised the solid unity of a 
booming nation. The ‘separate’ identities of the ‘subjects’ in the colonies and also of 
the immigrants and the Jews were always reflected upon as ‘others’.
During the 1930s we only find that a sense of a cohering and binding social morality 
and a feeling o f inability to look after its own national security declined slightly 
compared to the 1920s. A larger entity than the nation-state , that is The League of 
Nations, was looked up to for a preservation of national security.
During the 1930s the closest the British nation came to perceive of itself to be part of 
a larger collectivity was ‘The League of Nations’ and the anxieties surrounding the 
‘security’ of the nations which were caused and intensified by an increasing sense of 
Fascism and the threat of Germany. However ‘The League of Nations’ was not an 
entity in itself overpowering individual nations. The League was comprised of 
separate sovereign nation-state s who wanted to co-operate for maintaining and
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strengthening security and peace in Europe. The significance of the League co­
operation is in its acknowledgement that issues such as ‘peace’, ‘defence’ and 
‘security’ can not be adequately acquired by any individual nation-states. In other 
words individual nation-state s were inadequate units for self-defence.
On the other hand, as regard to divisions within the nation, The Times newspaper for 
the first time writes about “The Jewish Dilemma” (October 10th 1936) inside Britain 
and the rise of an anti-Jewish movement in East London. At the same period issues 
such as ‘juvenile delinquency’ and the decline of Christianity and solidity of 
marriage are reflected upon. These references are historically the first ones to 
indicate divisions within the Nation.
Apart from these rare comments, that were not even made by all newspapers such as 
The Daily Express, the sense of sovereignty and unity of the nation was almost intact 
during the 1920s and 1930s. Only a handful of editorials expressed doubts about the 
unconditional unity of the nation . The rest showed an un-diminished and united 
passion about the new industrial developments and expansions that were enormous 
new sources of pride for the nation. The parliament was constantly busy looking at 
new bills such as the Housing Bill, The Education Bill, The Transport Bill to 
accommodate new developments.
2. The 1970s
Forty years later, during the 1970s the picture is very different. There were signs of 
decline of sovereignty and unity of the nation-state in the following ways:
Under dimension A there was a sense of a diminishing unity in moral and social 
terms compared to the 1920s and 30s (2xA). New industrial developments are no 
longer viewed with unquestionable admiration but with apprehension about their 
consequences for the solidarity of the Nation. With the decline of the British 
economy and rise of unemployment, poverty and violence, increasingly the Nation is
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concerned about the extent to which these developments are beneficial for its unity 
and welfare.
For the first time during the 1970s the Times reflects on the issues of hybridity of 
identity (2xBl/2):. The notions of ‘positive Discrimination’ and ‘cementing for a 
plural society’ are bom. It must be added the growth of multiculturalism and 
pluralism were very slow in Britain.
Ethnic consciousness and nationalism of Scottish/Welsh and Irish people grew 
unprecedentedly in the 1970s (13xCl/2). Thirteen references were found during the 
1970s to have been made on Scottish and Welsh nationalism compared to zero during 
1920s and 1930s.
The proud and economically thriving nation of the 1920s and 1930s showed growing 
anxiety about British economic decline together with the problem of high 
unemployment during the 1970s (23xDl/2/3). National industries such as coal, 
textiles, ship-building, steel, docklands, standards of education, housing and urban 
life all showed serious and at times irreversible signs of decay, decline and/or closure. 
Very few people could actually explain why it was happening. The Times expresses 
concern on this matter and seeks or gives explanations.
In this period the concepts of ‘Europeanism’ and Europe as one entity are bom 
(lxEl).
No indication of a sense of globalisation was found (OxF).
3. The 1980s
During 1980s the signs of decline of the sovereignty and unity of the nation-state in 
every dimension continued to grow. However with the introduction and rapid
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expansion of micro-electronics and new economic fields, the extent of the economic 
despair that the Times expressed during the 1970s reduced.
A very strong and unprecedented decline of unity in a moral and social sense was 
experienced (lOxAl).
The Times reflects on the hybridity of national identity, but plays it down (3xBl/ 2).
Ethnic disunities within the nation grew. There was a continuous conflict and 
controversy on Scottish /Welsh and Irish nationalisms which increased even more 
during the 1980s (14xCl/2).
A big economic recovery was registered by the Times compared to the 1970s. 
However it is no longer called ‘national’ economy, but merely ‘the’ economy 
(3xDl/2/3).
In this period the concept of Europeanism was used more frequently (2xEl).
The Times reflected on the new micro-electronic industries that characterised over 
50% of the British economy during 1980s causing a significant level of awareness of 
a declining sense of national sovereignty. (12xFl/2/3).
4. The 1990s
A strong sense of a ‘diminishing unity’ in a moral spheres continues to characterise 
the social life of the nation as expressed in the Times ( 6xAl).
The Times reflects on the issues of hybridity of British national identity , but still 
plays it down (3xBl/2):
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The Times reflects on the ‘ethnic disunities’ within the nation much more than the 
previous decades; reflections on the continuous Scottish /Welsh and Irish distinct 
identities increased considerably during the 1990s to the extent of the break-up of 
Britain and Scottish devolution in 1997 (25xCl/2).
The sense of inability to deal with own problems has increased further (6xDl/2/3).
In this period the concept of Europeanism expands unprecedentedly (16xEl).
In this period the concept of globalisation continues to signify important social and 
cultural changes at the price of national sovereignty (12xFl/2/3).
The Times;
B) Analysis of the findings
As previously stated, the objective of this chapter is to find out if there has been a 
historical trend towards a sense of decline of national homogeneity, unity and 
sovereignty.
The findings in the Times suggest that the answer to the above question is ‘yes’. 
There has been a steady decline of the sense of unity, homogeneity and sovereignty 
in Britain since the 1920s. The analysis of three sets of indicators (A, B & C) which 
measure the concept of ‘diminishing national homogeneity and imity' as well as the 
three sets of indicators (D, E & F) which are designed to measure the concept of 
‘diminishing national sovereignty ’ shows the following results:
A- Decline of social morality/integration
Figure 1.2 shows that tendencies of the nation sensing itself as less unified and 
homogenous grew from 0% in the 1920s by 16% during the 1930s , 20% during the
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1970s , 40% during the 1980s and 24% in the 1990s. (See section A in Figure 1.1 
which shows the above percentages in the form of graphs).
These Figures show a constant growth in the Times’ reflecting on a less unified and 
coherent nation with a sudden rise of such reflections during the 1980s. The rise can 
be explained by the fact that during the 1980s Britain moved away from home based 
industries under Mrs Thatcher’s government through integration into global spaces of 
‘privatisation’ and ‘market networks’ as the principle sources of economic 
organisers. Many people lost their jobs with no prospects for employability as they 
had worked in the traditional economic sections that were no longer needed. Vast 
degrees of privatisation and encouragement to ‘the individual’ to get what s/he can 
created a society that felt greedy and dis-united. As Mrs Thatcher claimed with pride 
“there is not such a thing as ‘society’, there are only individuals”. It is evidently the 
case that with the decline of the national economy and the integration of Britain into 
the network of global economic forces, the unifying power of the national society 
also decreases.
British society has experienced a higher degree of violence, hooliganism, and selfish 
individualism. The data found suggest that the reasons are ‘global economic forces’, 
‘break-down of the family’; ‘weakening of Christianity’, ‘decline of old-fashioned 
neighbourhood’, ‘collapse of a strong education system’ and too much ‘social 
permissiveness’ on issues such as ‘(homo)sexuality’, ‘abortion’, ‘adultery’, ‘women’s 
liberation’ and ‘children’.
An article called “Markets and Morality” dated 16/01/1987 on the Guinness Affair 
suggests that there is a link between “growing economic forces of the markets and the 
weakening sense of moral and political judgements and abandonment of moral codes 
of behaviour”. Another editorial on “The Decline o f Nuclear Family” of 12/12/87 
suggests that a diminishing sense of social unity is caused by decline of the nuclear 
family and Christianity which has had an impact on the growing inability of the
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education system to teach a ‘sense of right and wrong’ to the new generation. It says 
that the decline of ‘old fashioned neighbourhood, of nuclear family’ of church’s 
parochial structures... means there are heavy burdens on schools. However the lessons 
of right and wrong have been pushed to the margins of curriculum” and the new 
generation is brought up without having a clear idea of what is right and what is 
wrong.
Bl/2- Multiculturalism and Pluralism
The above two concepts were chosen to measure the degree to which a sense of 
national hybridity has increased over time. I have suggested that if the nation 
expresses a higher sense of hybridity, it feels less homogenous. Figure 1.3 shows that 
there were no references (0%) to multiculturalism or plurality of the society during 
the 1920s and 1930s. However the notions were used for the first time in the post­
war period by the newspapers. The rate of growth of the concepts of multiculturalism 
and pluralism are 33% during 1970s, 50% during the 1980s and 17% during the 
1990s. (Also see section B in Figure 1.1 which shows the same percentages in the 
form of graphs. The three coloured columns indicates the three decades of the 70s, 
‘80s & ‘90s.)
It is interesting to note that although the concepts of ‘multiculturalism and pluralism’ 
have been used by the editorials and commentaries, they are not used vastly and 
enthusiastically. Only a few articles have actually been written on the subject. The 
data found in The Times suggests that these concepts are more welcome in the field 
of religion. An editorial titled Islam In Britain of 20/08/87 writes “it is in the 
interests of the society as well as a requirement of human rights (that) Muslims in 
Britain should be free to observe their religion and build a community life with 
institutions of their own; a multicultural religious and social fabric is for a healthy 
British way of life”. In another editorial called “Black Road to Canterbury” of 
01/05/85, this can be read: “Black Christian presence in Britain is a significant 
enrichment of the religious life of the nation; it is perhaps no pity that it preserved its
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special character on arrival and did not assimilate too readily into the style of church 
worship that was customary here”. These two editorials are examples of the way 
religious multiculturalism is supported. Both articles encourage religious 
multiculturalism in Britain and describe black Christianity and Islam as enrichments 
to the religious life of the nation.
Cl/2-Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland
Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland were selected as indicators of the growth of 
ethnic consciousness and heterogeneity within the nation. Figure 1.4 shows that the 
level of ethnic consciousness during the 1920s and 30s stood at a 0% level and 
profoundly grew after the Second World War. Ethnic consciousness grew by 25% 
during the 1970s, 27% during the 1980s and 48% in the 1990s. (These percentages 
are indicated in the form of graphs in section C Figure 1.1. Also look at Figure 1.4)
Dl/2/3-Environment, Defence/Security & Decline of National Economy 
The individualised findings are listed in Table 1 above and also in Appendix A. 
These three indicators have been selected to measure the degree by which the nation 
finds itself less adequate to solve its own problems, as reflected in The Times.
Figure 1.5 shows that there were no signs of an ‘inability to solve own problems’ in 
the fields of environment, defence or the economy during the 1920s. A growth of 9% 
in the ‘sense of inability to deal with own problems’ is indicated during the 1930s, 
rising sharply to 65% in the 1970s, 9% in the 1980s and 17% in the 1990s. The 
composition of the data suggests that the sense of ‘inability to deal with national 
economic problems’ rose unprecedentedly during 1970s, with other factors such as 
the environment and defence rising steadily and less sharply during 70s, 80s and 90s. 
(These percentages are also shown in the form of graphs in section D of Figure 1.1)
The 9% increase during the 1930s only refers to a sense of threat by Germany that 
caused the British nation to feel a sense of vulnerability on issues regarding security
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and defence. Most articles expressing ‘inability to solve own problems’ in respect to 
‘defence and security’ were in relation to wanting the League of the Nations to do 
something effective against the rising threat of war by Germany.
During the 1970s, 22 out of 23 editorials that reflected a diminishing sense of 
sovereignty were on the ‘decline of national economy’ and a sense of national 
insecurity. The editorials covered issues such as the insecurity of food producers 
(farmers, fishermen, cattlemen) in the context of the EEC, insecurity of miners, 
economic deterioration of all manufacturing industries (such as the textiles, ship­
building & steel) and the economy in general, decline of the general level of 
investment, profitability and effective management together with high level of 
unemployment, poverty and a growing sense of insecurity about the future.
The findings suggest that the British society lost a lot of its national economic footing 
during the 1970s and a consequence of that was the national society perceived itself 
to be a weaker entity and less of a sense of sovereignty. This trend together with the 
simultaneous rise of micro-electronics and global economic networks suggest that the 
latter is the cause of the former and the nation-state loses some of its sovereignty in 
the global networks.
E-Europe
Figure 1.6 shows a very sharp rise of a sense of ‘Europeanism’ during the 1990s. The 
rise is 84% compared to the previous decades; an 11% rise in the 1980s, 5% in the 
1970s and 0% during the 20s and 30s. (These percentages are shown in section E of 
Figure 1.1.)
It can be concluded from the data found that a diminishing sense of sovereignty is 
unmistakably linked with the growth of ‘Europeanism’ together with a sharp decline 
of the national economy . The growth of Europeanism is an indication of the 
enlargement of the unit of collective economic organisation and its inevitability. The
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/findings suggest that in the new global order, the nation-state is increasingly less able 
to protect its sovereignty against the social and economic imperatives of the global 
age and there is also a growing sense of awareness of Europe as a kind of ‘future that 
will come anyway’. In nearly all the debates on Europe and examinations of its 
different facets and implications , the question of sovereignty is looked at. This 
suggests that with the growth of ‘Europeanism’, national sovereignty is perceived to 
diminish. The growth of ‘Europeanism’ has been so strong during the 1990s that The 
Times wrote in its editorials of 22/05/1997 Is Euro-Skepticism dead? In this editorial, 
the issues concerning the inevitability of a single currency are looked at in 
frustration. The editorial calls for more resistance against the European 
developments.
Fl/2/3 Global Village- Economy and Technology
The process of ‘globalisation’ started long before a mass awareness of it emerged 
and grow fast during the 1980s. Figure 1.7 shows a 71% rise of a sense of 
‘globalisation’ during the 1980s and a 29% rise during the 1990s compared to 0% 
during the 1920s, 1930s and even 1970s. ( These percentages are shown in section F 
of table 1.1.)
✓
As the national economy deteriorated in 1970s and ‘Europeanism’ started to occupy 
thoughts and debates more frequently, there has been another unmistakable trend in 
the British society that is perceived by j[he Times to undermine British national 
sovereignty, that of ‘globalisation’. As from the decade of the 1980s , simultaneous 
with the effective closure of most manufacturing industries, ‘the new global order’ 
and the ‘post-industrial society’ are commented on with frequent references to the 
question of sovereignty . The findings show a direct link between the ‘decline of 
home industries’, ‘growth of global economy’ and a sense of ‘diminishing 
sovereignty’.
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In an editorial called 1985 dated 12/31/1985 it is said that “by 1985 the boundaries of 
greater London are extended to Nicaragua...we become too blase about privatisation, 
(we are) private citizens, demythologised, de-regulated and de-banked”. The article 
captures the spirit of Britain of the 80s after the loss of its national industries and 
collapse of belief of the individual in national society. In another article called T\vo 
Kinds o f Nations dated 29/03/1995 we read that “a growing sense of anxiety about the 
way the national interest is defined under global economy, global security has 
affected the definitions of national interest and national identity”...“these definitions 




Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of 
national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)
A) Summary of the findings
The following table summarises the findings which have also been in the Appendix 2:
Table 2: The Summary of the findings- The Guardian 
Dependent variables
Al Bl/2 Cl/2 Dl/2/3 El Fl/2/3
1920s 0 0 0 0 0
1930s 0 0
1970s 5 1 (bl)
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1. The 1920s & 1930s
Like The Times, The Manchester Guardian was printed every day to publish the 
colonial and imperial news as well as the internal news. The paper was like a general 
board displaying wills, offering or seeking house-keepers, printers, partnerships, 
tailors, barbers, dyers, clerks, millenaries, drapers, governesses, tutors, servants and 
sport facilities.
The notions of ‘progress’, ‘industry’, ‘commerce’, ‘efficiency’ ‘free trade’ and 
‘competition’ were cherished and pursued. Strong emphasis was laid on the values of 
‘Christianity’, ‘duty’ , ‘the Nation’, ‘National Unity’, ‘family’ and the Arts.
Apart from one reference to the issue of Northern Ireland and two references to a 
‘feeling of insecurity’ in the face of a rising threat of war during 1930s, no other 
indications were found to suggest anything but a very strong sense o f national unity 
and sovereignty .The world was conceived as a space divided by nation-states and no 
real power beyond the boundaries of the nation-states was imagined to be able to 
exist. The only challenge to the sovereignty and unity of the nation-states was 
perceived to come from a counterpart and never from an ethnic, European or global 
force.
2. The 1970s
The first indications of a sense of declining of social unity appeared during 1970s 
when the data shows that ‘social homogeneity’ of the nation was questioned (5xAl).
Like The Times, The Guardian also conceptualises a ‘multicultural’ definition of the 
British society for the first time (lxBl).
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There is an unprecedented rise in ‘ethnic consciousness’ in the 1970s. The Guardian 
frequently reflects on ethnic fractures within the nation (20xCl/2).
Britain is caught in a state of panic and shock about its economic decline during the 
1970s (llxd3).
Europe is a new concept that is growing fast (3xE).
The notion of ‘global economy’ is also used for the first time. The Guardian suggests 
that the decline of the national industries should be understood in reference to 
globalisation (lxF3).
3 .1980s
The nation shows more or less the same degree of anxiety about the growth of ‘moral 
and social disunities’(4xAl).
As with in the previous decade , The Guardian continues to show an awareness of 
defining the society in a ‘multicultural’ manner, something that did not exist in pre­
war period (lxBl).
The persistence of ‘ethnic consciousness’ continues to characterise the British 
national society of the 1980s (llxCl/2).
Britain loses some of its panic about economic decline, as it realises that it is 
irreversible in the face of new technologies and global competitiveness. The 
Guardian also becomes aware of other dimensions of global interdependence such as 
the ‘environment’ and global ‘security’. Six references are made to the 
‘environment’, seven to the ‘decline of manufacturing industries’ and three to the 
issue of ‘defence and security’ (16xDl/2/3).
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Europe is a growing concept in the Guardian, a concept that is referred to and 
examined frequently. Different aspects of British sovereignty are also examined in 
the context of Europeanisation (6xE).
There is a noticeable rise in the ‘global5 conceptualisations during the 1980s as 
compared to the 1970s. Thirteen references were made to different dimensions of 
globalisation in relation to national sovereignty (13xFl/2/3).
4. The 1990s
All indicators of a ‘diminishing national homogeneity and sovereignty5 show a 
growing tendency during the 1990s.
The Guardian expresses a less sense of national unity than ever before by referring 
to a sharp decline of integrative and ‘unifying moral codes5 of togetherness. The data 
suggests that the validity of all moral wrongs and rights is felt to be increasingly 
subjective and a matter of individual opinion (14xAl).
There is a considerable increase in the Guardian’s conception of Britain as a 
‘multicultural and plural5 society during 1990s (5xBl/2).
The persistence of ‘ethnic consciousness5 characterises British national society of the 
90s more desperately than ever. The Guardian frequently reflects on ethnic dilemmas 
of the nation. (Devolution of Scotland materialised in 1997) (31xCl/2).
Britain loses all its panic about economic decline, as it realises that it is irreversible 
in the face of new technologies and global competitiveness. She accepts the loss of 
national industries and does not mention it any more. No editorials are written on 
‘decline of national economy5, The concept of ‘national economy5 is less frequently 
used than the concept of ‘the economy5. The number of editorials written on other
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dimensions of global interdependence such as the ‘environment’ and global security 
increases ten times (10xDl/2/3).
The notions of ‘Europe and Europeanism’ occupy the spaces of editorials and 
commentaries quite intensely. Twenty three articles have investigated the question 
of Europe and national sovereignty. The significant development of the 1990s is that 
there is a kind of resignation in respect of the concept of Europe and its 
materialisation as a single entity, which did not exist in the previous decades 
(23xE):.
The notions relating to the ‘globalisation’ of the economy and culture continue to 
grow in the 1990s. As with Europeanisation, there is also a sense of inevitability 
about its happening (14xFl/2/3).
The Guardian:
B) Analysis of the findings
The findings of The Guardian also suggest that there has been a steady decline in a 
sense of unity and homogeneity and sovereignty in Britain since 1920s. The analysis 
o f three sets of indicators (A, B & C) which measure the concept of ‘diminishing 
national homogeneity and unity ’ as well as the three sets of indicators (D, E & F) 
which are designed to measure the concept of ‘diminishing national sovereignty ’ is 
set out below.
A - Decline of social morality/integration
Figure 2.2 shows that tendencies towards sensing the nation as a ‘less unified and 
homogenous’ group grew from 0% in the 1920s and 1930s to 22% during the 1970s 
, 17% during the 1980s and 61% in the 1990s. (Also see section A in Figure 2.1 
which shows the above percentages in the form of graphs).
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These Figures show a constant growth in the nation’s self-perception as less unified 
with a sudden rise of such sentiments during the 1990s.
The data shows that British society has experienced a ‘decline of personal morality’, 
a higher degree of crime, violence, hooliganism, delinquency, and emotional 
disengagement. The reasons are suggested to be ‘the inability of the education 
system to cement the society’, ‘global economic forces’, ‘break-down of the family’, 
‘social atomism’ and ‘moral relativism’, and a growing ‘psychological insecurity and 
passivity’ caused by consumerism.
An editorial called The Withering Indictment o f our public spirit of 03/05/1995 
writes on the “demoralisation of the society, and that the refusal to believe in 
absolutes have undermined the society. (People) don’t know the difference between 
the right and the wrong and the education system no longer cements the society”. 
Another commentary titled Loner in our midst of 15/03/1996 questions: “What kind 
of society are we creating, crime against small children, too many lone parents, social 
atomism after the nuclear family, British towns are evidence of the elaborate 
communities of fantasy that men create as substitutes”. And an article titled The 
mirrors that matter of 19/10/1996 in reflecting on the Britain of the 1990s suggests 
that there is a link between ‘growing individualism’ and ‘social atomism’ on the one 
hand, and a ‘decline of social and personal morality’ on the other. “Our political 
institutions are more elitist and visibly less performed than other established 
democratic societies... a perceived national decline is the immanent descend to the 
history of 20th century UK”.
Bl/2- Multiculturalism and Pluralism
Figure 2.3 shows that there were no references (0%) to ‘multiculturalism or plurality’ 
of the society during the 1920s and 1930s indicating that there was no sense of 
hybridity then. However such an awareness grew in the post-war period by 14% 
during the 1970s, 14% during the 1980s and 72% during the 1990s. (See section B in
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Figure 2.1 which shows the same percentages in the form of graphs. The three 
coloured columns indicate the three decades of 70s, 80s & 90s).
It is interesting to note that, unlike The Times which only reflected on these concepts 
in the realm of religion, The Guardian uses ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘pluralism’ to 
describe the kind of society we live in the modem UK now. The paper describes the 
nature of metropolitan centres as ‘multicultural and plural’. Therefore it can be 
deduced that the Guardian perceives modem Britain to be increasingly a hybrid and 
heterogeneous country.
Cl/2-Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland
Figure 2.4 shows that the level of ‘ethnic consciousness’ during the 1920s and 1930s 
stood at a 0% level and grew profoundly after the Second World War. ‘Ethnic 
consciousness’ grew in the Editorials by 32% during the 1970s, 18% during the 1980s 
and 50% in the 1990s. (These percentages are indicated in the form of graphs in 
Figure 2.1).
It can be deduced that with the rise of ethnic consciousness in the last three decades, 
the nation perceives itself as less united and homogeneous compared to the 1920s and 
1930s.
Dl/2/3- Environment: Defence/Security: Decline of National Economy
The individualised findings are listed in Table 2 above and also in Appendix 2.
Figure 2.5 shows that there were no signs of ‘inability to solve own national 
problems’ in the fields of environment, defence or economy during the 1920s. A 
growth of 5% sense of inability to deal with own problems is indicated during the 
1930s due to the threat of Fascism, rising sharply to 28% in the 1970s, 41% in 1980s 
and 26% in the 1990s. (These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section 
D of Figure 2.1)
208
The 5% increase during the 1930s only refers to a sense of threat by Germany that 
caused the Guardian to reflect on the nation’s vulnerability on issues such as security 
and defence. The League of Nations was needed to protect the Nation-state s against 
the rising threat of war and Fascism.
The 1970s and 1980s were the decades when anxiety and concern about the decline 
of the national economy and prospects grows. A large number of editorials covered 
issues such as the unemployment, cuts in living standards, insecurity of food 
producers (farmers, fishermen, cattlemen) in the context of the EEC, insecurity of 
miners, economic deterioration of all manufacturing industries (such as the textiles, 
ship-building, motor & steel) and the economy in general.
The findings suggest that the British society underwent a fundamental transformation 
in its economic and social structures during 1970s and 1980s . As a result of these 
changes the British society was reflected upon as being less able to solve its 
economic problems. This trend together with the simultaneous rise of micro­
electronics, computerised and satellite networks suggest that the developments and 
imperatives of post-industrial society are responsible for the decline of the national 
economy and, to some extent, national sovereignty.
In the same period the nation shows a higher degree of awareness about global issues 
such as the environment, the risks of nuclear weapons, atomic energy and global 
warming.
E-Europe
Figure 2.6 shows a 72% rise in a sense of ‘Europeanism5 during the 1990s, which, 
compared to 19% during the 1980s , 9% during the 1970s and 0% during the 1920s & 
1930s constitutes a considerable shift. (These percentages are shown in section E of 
Figure 2.1).
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The indisputable growth of Europeanism can be better understood in relation to the 
decline of national society and in the context of globalisation. The data indicates that 
these three trends have risen in the last few decades, suggesting a link between the 
three. It is an indication of the enlargement of the unit of collective economic 
pursuits in the framework of global interdependence. The findings suggest that in the 
new global order, the boundaries of the nation-state are increasingly inadequate for 
an independent tackling of social and economic issues. Europe is the future that, 
whether liked or disliked, paves the ground for transcending the boundaries of the 
nation-state . With such transcendence, national sovereignty is perceived to diminish.
The Guardian takes a positive stance towards ‘Europeanisation’. It started exploring 
the ideas of a super-national Europe and a single currency as from Oct. 11, 1977. In 
an editorial called “America and the ritual, but" dated 7/2/1986 it writes “it is easy to 
be anti-American when it comes to be viewed as future eclipse and present danger. If 
European nation-states do not want to become de facto the 51st state, they should put 
their schizophrenia behind them and form one Europe”. In another editorial named 
“Taking the blinkers off John BulF of 1/3/1987 The Guardian asks the “Eurosceptics 
defenders of our nationhood... what makes you proud to be British?....(is it) hooligan 
nationalism that offers a blend of imperial nostalgia and implicit racism, in corrupt 
political institutions?”. On 17/11/1987 it reflects on Europe as “a central axis”. In 
July 5th 1987 the Guardian refers to “the realities o f Europeanism and Global 
power " . In October 19th 1995 there is another editorial called “put out more flags”. 
which describes the “ridiculous hooligan quality of right-wing nationalism and their 
Euroscepticism (as) extraordinary facets of inflated ego of reactionaries and 
romantics. These people are responsible for the actual loss of sovereignty by letting 
manufacturing industries go...”. Another commentary “The West V the rest” of 
16/11/1996 writes: ’’the people of the west (should) hang together or they will hang 
separately in a world multi-popular, multi-civilised of the global age where all power 
is local. The west should unite.” The Guardian generally has encouraged the 
politicians and voters of pro-European positions.
210
Fl/2/3 Global Village- Economy and Technology
The growth of a sense of ‘globalisation’ emerged and grew fast during the 1980s and 
1990s. Figure 2.7 shows a 46% rise of a sense of ‘globalisation’ during the 1980s and 
a 50% rise during the 1990s compared to 0% during the 1920s, 1930s and 4% during 
the 1970s. (These percentages are shown in section F of Figure 2.1).
The Guardian suggested that the rapid growth of multinationals would inhibit the 
peaceful advancement of Britain by manipulating the economy and damaging its 
sovereignty in a article of January 8th 1975 called multinational ghosts . A decade 
later in Making the Future Green on 30/01/1985, the trend was reflected upon again, 
but this time with admiration: The technologies of the post-industrial world work 
towards “decentralisation and localisation of the economy at grass root levels; the 
break-down of the economy into local and regional levels with their flexible and 
diversified economic base.... would liberate the enterprise at all levels”. In the same 
year in another article called The Tower Tumbles on May 22 , 1985, information 
technology is referred to as “having cut the umbilical cord of places....You can be 
part of the global market and in Hammersmith” linking the regions to the global 
space,” and all this is said to be beyond the control of national governments. In June 
19th 1985 a commentary called minimal self reflects on the “narcissistic retreat from 
the society; an emotional disengagement and the destruction of selfhood.... due to the
developments of giants of communication industries and wired technology in the
global culture of consumerism and under the state of oneness with the outer world”.
In an editorial dated 8/3/95 economic mobility and the labour flexibility of the post­
industrial global world are regarded as the causes of insecurity, loss of meaning, 
identity, sovereignty and the collapse of the family. In Oct. 20th 1987 in an article 
called the big bang and the real world speaks of the “crash of national markets,
shares, and instantaneous global markets (and) .governments with no power”, and
it continues in \Too late to escape with too little in November 24th 1987 by adding
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“The Wall Street crash (is) dragging down the rest of the world beyond the control of 
national governments”. It asks in Duckim the Future on 1/12/87 “Can national 




Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of 
national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)
A) Summary of the findings
Table 3; The summary of the findings- The Daily M irror
Dependent variables
A1 Bl/2 Cl/2 Dl/2/3 El Fl/2/3
1920s 2 0 0 0
1930s 2 1 (d2) 0 0
1980s 20 1 (bl) 2 (c2) 3(d2)
6(d3)
3 (dl)







1- The 1920s and 1930s:
Four references were found on the issue of ‘social unity5 during the 1920s and 1930s. 
They are all expressions of doubt about the nature and ability of the ‘modem society5 
to unite people (4xA).
A sense of hybridity was expressed through an adaptation of artistic ideas from other 
cultures in the age of ‘mobility5 (lxB l/2).
There were no signs of ‘inability to solve own problems5 during the 1930s. The only 
concern was over the growing sense of danger about rising Fascism and increasing 
need for the League of Nations to prevent the war. (lxD2).
2- The 1980s:
Twenty references were found to a decline of ‘social unity5 during 1980s (20xA).
One reference was made to the notion of ‘pluralism5 (lxBl/2).
The question of ‘ethnic nationalism5 of Northern Ireland is reflected upon (2xC2).
There is a very sharp rise in the paper’s coverage of the problems regarding the 
‘national economy5 , ‘the environment5, ‘security5 and the society’s ‘inability to 
solve them (15xDl/2/3).
The paper reflects on the growing significance of the notions of ‘Europe and 
“Europeanism55 (6xE).
No references were found to ‘globalisation5.
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3- The 1990s:
Fewer references are made to a ‘declining social morality’ compared to the 1980s but 
still a large increase compared to the pre-war period (8xA).
Two references were found to the questions of ‘multiculturalism and ‘pluralism’ 
(2xBl/2).
A significant increase o f ‘ethnic consciousness’ was registered (13xC).
A significant decrease of ‘inability to solve own problems’ has been found compared 
to the 1980s (3xDl/2/3). .
The concepts of ‘Europe and Europeanism” continue to be an important topic for 
editorial coverage (5xE).
No indications o f ‘globalisation’ was found.
The Daily Mirror:
B) Analysis of the findings
The Daily Mirror was one of the most radical papers of the decades of the 1920s and 
1930s. When the Guardian and The Times were busy covering the ‘colonial and 
imperial’ news, and never mentioned much about the General Strikes of the 1920s, 
The Daily Mirror covered these strikes on a day to day basis. It was a socialist paper 
that perceived the nation as divided on class lines and critically reflected on all issues 
concerning the nation.
Although the Daily Mirror is classed as a ‘tabloid’ paper (and it has gone heavily 
‘tabloidish’ and cheap over time) it used to have a much more serious and dedicated
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language and it also used to preserve a much higher quality in its daily reflections 
during the 1920s and 1930s. The Mirror went through serious changes during the 
1980s and 1990s by solely concentrating on trivial topics and gossip classed as 
‘internal affairs’ and by using more of a slang language. The editorial articles of the 
paper are normally only one third of a page and are published with very large and 
eye-catching print.
The Daily Mirror is therefore an unsuitable paper for investigating structural and 
cultural changes of the nation-state . However it has been chosen to have a more 
balanced reflection on the nation’s self perception.
A— Decline of social morality and integration
Figure 3.2 shows that the expressions of the level of decline of ‘national unity’ stood 
at 6% during the 1920s and 1930s, but they grew by 63% in the 1980s and 25% in the 
1990s. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section A Figure 3.1]
During the 1920s The Mirror expresses doubts on the nature of Modern Unrest that 
brings lack of unity at home (13/08/1925) suggesting that ‘our’ unity is strong when it 
comes to combating foreign powers but not enough to keep us united at home. The 
article says “we are at the edge of a volcano... foreign competition is too high... We 
have enough patriotism to unite us against the foreign force, but not enough to keep 
us united at home..”. The Mirror also questions the Age o f Experts on 29/11/1925 and 
whether science can have a binding power for the society that experiences an 
increasing level of agitation , restlessness and mental diseases. The paper was 
suspicious of the ‘modem’ developments in sciences and technology in terms of their 
binding power for the society. During the 1930s The Mirror reflects on the nature of 
mechanical advancements in British society by suggesting that science jeopardises 
the natural order of social unity by creating menace in A Menace to Society on 6/3/35.
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It is obvious that during the 1920s and 1930s the Daily Mirror was critical of the fast 
industrial and scientific developments that were happening in the British society by 
signalling that they would disrupt social unity. However under the overwhelming 
weight of multiple daily references to the nation as one proud entity, these criticisms 
were too occasional to characterise any real trait about the British society.
Five decades later there is a different picture. The Mirror rarely shows signs of pride 
about ‘us5. Instead it reflects on many disuniting themes that divide the nation. 
During the 1980s in an editorial called Private Grief dated 13/3/85, the Mirror 
describes the nation as divided along economic lines. It says that the nation is divided 
between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ by high unemployment, bad housing and 
widespread poverty. Other editorials such as Crossing the Line of 15/4/1985 refer to 
fractures in the ‘permissive society’ of the nation that allow too much drugs, sex, 
pornography, violence, hooliganism. In Suffering little children 12/9/85, the paper 
refers to children who are sexually abused and molested. The pictures painted in 
Bloody Brutal Britain on 14/3/86, and in Poverty on 1/6/87 describe the British 
society as follow: “The frightening truth about Britain’s sick society was revealed 
yesterday with the release of crime figures...one in 8 girls and one in 12 boys are 
molested under 14; rape has risen by 29%; doctor raping a 8 year old ; a vicars’ series 
of sexual assaults...vandalism happens one every minute...violent crime one every 4 
minutes...children are at risk”. In Bridge too far of 12/09/1995 the Mirror writes “The 
Tories’ creation of a divided Britain is now being extended to teeth”.
On the whole the data found from the Mirror shows a rising ‘social and moral 
disunity’, mostly along class and economic lines and also by too much social 
permissiveness during the 1980s and 1990s.
B- Multiculturalism and Pluralism
The origin of the idea of hybridity was found in the field of fashion and design during 
the 1930s, when the ‘adaptation’ of oriental ideas by western fashion designers was
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associated with the ‘age of mobility’. However during the 1980s and 1990s the idea 
of ‘intermarriage’ is encouraged as something very positive that would reduce racial 
prejudice and create a more plural society.
Figure 3.3 shows a 0% reflection of ‘multiculturalism and pluralism’ during the 
1920s. These reflections rose by 25% during the 1930s, 25% in the 1980s and 50% 
during the 1990s. [These percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section B of 
table 3.1]
C- Scotland/ Wales and Northern Ireland
The findings of the Mirror suggest that the ‘ethnic consciousness’ of Scotland/Wales 
and Ireland stood at 0% during the 1920s & 1930s, and it rose veiy sharply by 13% 
during the 1980s and 87% by 1990s. [See Figure 3.4 and also section C of Figure 3.1]
P- Environment, Security & defence and National economy 
Similar to the previous trends found in the Guardian and in the Times newspapers, no 
signs of ‘inability to solve own problems’ were reflected upon during the 1920s and 
1930s. The only exception to this rule was the sense of danger about the rise of 
Fascism and increasing need for The League of Nations to prevent a war.
This picture undergoes serious transformations during the 1980s. Declining 
manufacturing industries and the closure of the national pits indicate that “the nation 
has been beaten” and has lost some of its sovereignty in New Realities on 3/4/85. It 
says “we needed a budget for the nation, instead we got a budget for ‘the City’” In 
Nisei Nothing on 20/3/85, indicating that the ‘the City’ is linked to the global 
economy and that is where the national budget has been dedicated, instead of to the 
nation. An editorial called Sellins o ff Britain of 22/8/96 suggests that Britain is being 
sold off to foreign firms by the pound through privatisation policies.
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The ‘inability to solve own problems ‘ is also reflected in the question of the 
environment. There are frequent references to the crisis of nuclear power, symbolised 
in the disaster of Chernobyl, the toxic chemicals disposal into the North sea and that 
‘European’ ministers should do something about it.
Figure 3.5 shows that compared to 0% indication of ‘inability to solve own 
problems’ in respect to the environment, the National economy and defence during 
the 1920s & 1930s, the figure rose to 80% during the 1980s and 20% during the 
1990s. [These percentages are also shown in the form of graphs in section D of table 
3.1.]
E-Europe
Figure 3.6 shows a 0% indication of the notion of ‘Eurpeanism’ during the 1920s and 
1930s. The figure rose by 55% during the 1980s and 45% in the 1990s which is a 
remarkable growth of ideas surrounding ‘Europeanisation’. [These percentages are 
shown in the form of graphs in section E of table 3.1],
In an encouragement of Europeanism, in an editorial called Divide and Rule of 
24/4/96 the Mirror analyses that a “Britain outside a growing European Union does 
not have a future- at least not a prosperous one. If we are not in, we can not win our 
share of this huge market” . Or in Cashing an old Grudge of 12/6/96, The Mirror 
says “he (a minister, I suppose) and his anti-European allies are stuck in a time-warp 
when Germans were jack-booted Nazis and Britain ruled the waves and an empire. 
The reality of 1996 is that Britain could never prosper outside European Union”. Both 
these editorials suggest that the inevitable realities of 1996 dictate that one should 
accept the reality of Europe and join it rather than resist it in the nostalgic or phobic 
remembrances of the past.
F-Globalisation.




Summary of the findings and Analysis of changing consensus on the questions of 
national unity, homogeneity and sovereignty (1920s-1990s)
A) Summary of the findings
The following table summarises the findings of the Daily Express.
Table 4: The summary of the findings- The Daily Express 
Dependent variables





l ( c l )
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 3 (cl) 0 1 0
0 8(c2) 1 (d3) 11 1(13)
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1- The 1920s and 1930s:
No indication whatsoever was found to suggest any sense of doubt about the unity 
and sovereignty of the empire during the 1920s and 1930s, not even one single 
reference to the rising danger of war which was concerning everybody else.
2- The 1980s:
A relatively sharp rise of a sense of ‘decline of unity’ is registered (3xA).
No reference was found to have been made to social multiculturalism (OxBl).
‘Irish ethnic nationalism’ was acknowledged and that it has a disuniting effect on the 
nation (3xC2).
No references were found to a sense of decline of national economy or any other 
issue that may indicate a sense o f ‘inability to solve own problems’ (OxD).
Only one reference was found to have been made on Europeanism, and that is when 
all other papers are constantly writing on the issue (lxE).
(OxF) No indication o f ‘globalisation’ has been found.
3- The 1990s:
Only one indication of lack of ‘social unity’ was found (lxA).
No indication were found to suggest the multicultural nature of modem Britain.
A relatively sharp rise in Irish ethnic nationalism is registered and for the first time 
Scottish nationalism is also reflected upon (9xCl/2).
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Just when other papers have finished talking about the economic decline of Britain, 
The Daily Express begins to mention it for the first time! (lxD3).
A huge and unprecedented rise of a sense of ‘Europeanism’ has been recorded 
(llxE).
A first time admission of a global economy (lxF3).
The Daily Express:
B) Analysis of the findings
The Daily Express is the most right-wing paper of the four, if not of Britain. When 
everybody else was expressing fear about the rise of Fascism during 1930s, it praised 
Hitler and ‘his achievements’ in an editorial called I  talked to Hitler on 17/9/1936 
and disregarded the fear of war as unfounded. On July 23rd 1936 the Daily Express’s 
editorial page rejected the possibility of war and called it An Answer to Scaremongers 
. During all that time the paper opposed The League of Nations without any 
hesitation and informed Britain of its uselessness. The paper openly admired racism, 
sexism, and previously colonialism in its life time, and according to itself it was the 
biggest newspaper in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s. The paper has given its full 
and uncritical support to a ‘distinctive and superior British identity’ almost at all 
times and has shown adoration of ‘the’ superior race, monarchy, kingdom, 
Britishness, power and the empire.
The Policy o f The Daily Express published on 6/5/1936 has the following components 
in its objective:
“1- The strengthening of the empire and its free trade...
2- Withdrawal from the League of Nations; our imperial obligations separate us 
from the rest of the world and demand us to follow a path of isolation....
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3- To bind the empire we should provide our own people with wealth and 
abundance...
4- By full use of our resources and the resources of our colonies...”
The Daily Express is not the place to look for data that covers anything except ‘home 
news’ and that is mostly on sex scandals, gossip, pop stars and their sex lives, and 
football. Even though the pages of the Daily Express are the last place for a 
researcher to look for indications of a sense of ‘diminishing national unity and 
homogeneity’, these indications, at their minimal level, have been found during the 
1980s and 1990s!
A- Decline of social morality/integration
Figure 4.2 shows that indicators of a ‘declining social morality’ stood at 0% during 
the 1920s and 1930s and they rose by 75% in the 1980s and 25% in the 1990s. [These 
percentages are shown in the form of graphs in section A of Figure 4.1]. The main 
area of concern has been the rise o f ‘violence’ and ‘hooliganism’. No references have 
been made to other factors of social and moral significance that may or may not have 
an effect on the level of social unity.
B- Multiculturalism and pluralism
No signs of a perception of multiculturalism or pluralism were found in any decade. 
In fact the opposite has been encouraged by the paper throughout the sampled period. 
The Daily Express is heavily race and colour conscious and emphasises on a 
homogenous white Britishness.
C- Scotland/Wales and Northern Ireland
According to our findings the level of ethnic consciousness in the United Kingdom 
stood at 0% during the 1920s and 1930s. Figure 4.4 shows that there has been a sharp 
rise in the reflections of Scottish/Welsh and Irish nationalism during the 1980s and
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1990s. The figures have grown to 25% and 75% respectively. [These percentages are 
shown in the form of graphs in section C of Figure 4.1].
Although a sharp rise in ethnic nationalism in the United Kingdom is reflected upon, 
the Daily Express has a very negative attitude towards them. Three editorials were 
written, in the sampled period of the 1980s on Irish Nationalism and all three of 
them encouraged the British government to launch such a “war against Irish 
nationalists that can only win” in Let’s start fi2htin2 to win on 6/8/85 and Smash this 
IRA terror on 10/12/85; and the IRA is called Busy Thugs on 27/8/85. In the 
sampling frame of the 1990s eight references were found in respect to the existence 
of Irish nationalism and only one regarding Scottish nationalism and that was when 
the discussion over the devolution of Scotland became more urgent in the mid 1990s.
D- Environment- Defence and National Economy.
When all other papers have been writing on the issues and problems surrounding 
British manufacturing industries for almost twenty years, The Daily Express 
mentioned nothing on the subject and kept up with British images that had their roots 
in imperial times. It was only on 7/3/1996 in Is Britain on the road to the 3rd world? 
that the paper for the first time cried out and expressed doubts about the state of the 
British economy and acknowledged that something had fundamentally changed.
[See section D of Figure 4.1 for an expression of the change in graphs. In percentage 
terms a 100% rise in ‘inability to solve own economic problems’ would have to be 
indicated during 1990s compared to 0% during the 1920s, 1930s and 1980s, and for 
this reason no percentage figure has been enclosed].




Figure 4.5 shows that indications of ‘Europeanism’ stood at 0% during the 1920s and 
1930s and rose to 8% in the 1980s and 92% during the 1990s. [These percentages are 
shown in the graphic form in section E of Figure 4.1.]
The Daily Express supported Europeanism to the extent that it would abolish 
obstacles to free movement at a cheaper price in Scandal o f Europe on 1/10/1985. 
Although the paper generally opposes Europeanism, it uses terms such as Euro- 
Agriculture, Euro-food, Euro-Citizen and Euro-Budget in Cay does not fit on 6/2/95 
with ease and without much resistance. I must say that I found the paper’s position on 
Europe rather surprising. It seems that Europe, although not an adorable term for the 
Daily Express, is seen as a profitable source that should not be ignored and more 
importantly cannot be ignored any more. For the first time the Daily Express 
describes the nation as ‘divided and apart’ on the issue of Europe with 49% against 
and 51% for Europeanism in Why are we so proud to be a nation apart? on 5/6/95. 
The paper also encouraged Euro-doubters on 1/6/95 not to be blinkered by Euro fears 
on 12/12/95 and open the way for the Euro. All these editorials are written with a
sense of acceptance that “we must surrender more of our ‘sovereignty’ to prevent
the creation of a European super-state that will be German-led” in Raw Ambitions on 
3/4/1996.
Of course when the paper urges ‘surrendering more sovereignty to prevent a German- 
led Europe’, or when it refers to the painful facts on 15/8/1996 about ‘diminishing 
British independence and sovereignty’, it is evidently suggesting that expansion of 
Europeanism directly implies that national sovereignty would diminish.
F- Global Culture, Technology and Economy
Only one editorial was found on the issue of globalisation and its ‘iron law of global 
market’ in Put the Screws on Istate) Subsidies on 8/8/1995. In this editorial the paper 
shows a very open opposition to nationalised industries and the industries that require
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state subsidy for survival, and mentions only mockingly the home industries such as 
British shipyards, steel & Leyland who ‘gobble too much national wealth’. It adds 
that the ‘iron law of global market is imposed on our economy any way’.
This one editorial expresses the position of the Daily Express on the question of 
‘globalisation’ as opposed to a ‘sovereign’ economy. The paper shows no signs of 
pain or resistance to the requirements or implications of a global market because it 
finds it, as with Europe, more profitable than sticking to ‘national independence and 
sovereignty’. [Section F of Figure 4.1 shows the graphic growth o f ‘globalisation’.]
Conclusion
The objective of this chapter has been to find out whether there has been a historical 
trend towards a sense o f decline o f national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in 
Britain? The findings indicate that the answer is yes*. A British sense o f national 
sovereignty, homogeneity and unity has declined by 33% during the 1970s, 1980s 
and 1990s compared to the 1920s and 1930s. O f the total 1248 editorials that were 
looked at during the 1920s and 1930s, only 16 (just over 1%) of them were found 
to indicate a diminishing sense of ‘unity’ and/or ‘sovereignty9 of the British 
nation-state. However during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s of a total 1560 
editorials and commentaries that were carefully considered, 513 were counted 
(about 33%) that contained data indicating a diminishing sense of national 
‘sovereignty and unity9.
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On the question of validity and reliability of the data
The question of validity and reliability o f data has been carefully considered 
throughout the research. The data used in this chapter and their meanings are 
symbolic in nature. Messages and their symbolic communications can not be directly 
observed. Symbolic meanings, therefore, have to be un-wrapped and in that process 
there is always an element of subjectivity involved and embedded in selecting, 
prioritising and interpreting the data. This is not only the case with this thesis, but 
with all scientific inquiries. I have argued in the previous chapters that the 
‘Scientific’ perception that a strict separation can be made between ‘objectivity’ and 
‘subjectivity’ is a mechanistic view that fails to recognise that the researcher’s mind, 
and what s/he perceives to be significant are unavoidably involved in research. This 
thesis, therefore, makes no pretension or claim that all subjectivity has been kept out 
of the process of research. However it can be claimed that efforts have been made to 
minimise the impact of subjectivity in unwrapping symbolic meanings.
One way of unwrapping symbolic meanings is to look at them from different angles, 
and for this reason multiple indicators have been used in this chapter to produce a 
verifying effect on each other. For example if ‘a growing sense of inability to solve 
own problems’ is not regarded as sufficient to indicate a ‘lessening sense o f  National 
sovereignty \  then the other two indicators of ‘Europeanism’ and ‘globalism’ can 
help to establish a more valid inference in that direction. If one can show that 
simultaneous with a ‘growing sense of inability to solve own problems’, there has 
also been a growing sense of ‘Europeanism and Globalism’, then the concept of 
‘diminishing national sovereignty’ is supported better and the empirical results are 
more meaningful.
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Likewise on the question of a ‘lessening sense o f National homogeneity and unity ’, it 
may not be enough just to show a growth of multiculturalism and pluralism during 
the last few decades. However if it can be shown that parallel to a growth of 
multiculturalism and pluralism in Britain, there has been a growth of ‘ethnic 
consciousness’ and a diminishing sense of ‘moral and social unity’ , the findings and 
the interpretation of their meanings receive greater meaning.
It is for the reason of enhancing the reliability and validity of the data that three 
dimensions to each concept of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘homogeneity and unity’ were 
chosen, before establishing indicators to those dimensions. However to further 
enhance the reliability and validity of the data a cross-examination of the findings has 
been conducted as follows:
A cross-examination of the findings
According to the data obtained from the editorials and commentaries of four 
aforementioned British newspapers, it has been suggested and concluded in this 
chapter that during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s there has been a 33% decline in a 
sense of ‘sovereignty’, ‘homogeneity’, and ‘unity’ of the British nation-state 
compared to the decades of the 1920s and 1930s.
For some readers, especially those who still believe that the acquirement of ‘pure and 
objective’ data is a possible task, the data obtained from our sample may not be 
qualified as ‘objective and reliable ’ enough to substantiate the argument and 
conclusion derived from them. It may be argued that the data merely reflects on the 
opinions of the individuals who wrote the texts rather than the ‘Reality’. Against such 
a positivistic view of the social world, I believe that the processes of selecting and 
interpreting data always unavoidably entails the participation of the researcher’s 
mind and subjectivity, and no definite demarcation can ever be made between 
‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ in the processes of social research. However to
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safeguard my own research I decided to compare the results of my findings with those 
of MORI Polls that are conventionally understood to be more ‘objective’.
Ideally I would have liked to find similar kinds of research on two other European 
countries in order to compare them to the findings of this thesis in order to reach to a 
higher degree of ‘objectivity’ and accuracy of analysis. However I could not find 
such research in English in the UK, nor was there sufficient time and resources to 
allow me to travel abroad to search for them. Instead two empirical British Journals 
which conduct surveys on the British Public attitudes have been consulted. One is 
the Journal o f British Public Ovinion and the surveys published by the Journal are 
also well known as MORI Polls. The other one is the Journal o f  British Social 
Attitudes . Both are dedicated to measure and reflect on the public opinions and 
attitudes towards social issues through conducting social surveys and interviews.
The range of social issues they cover is vast. Having searched the journals 
thoroughly, it became obvious that only two sets of interviews published in the 
journals were useful for comparison and cross-examination of my findings. The first 
set was a whole range of MORI interviews that were carried out to measure the 
degree of the British (and in one occasion French and German) public inclination for 
‘European Integration’. Through the comparison of the results of these interviews, I 
have double-examined my Testable Proposition E on ‘Europeanisation’ and a 
‘diminishing sense of sovereignty’ of the British nation-state. The proposition 
suggested was: “ There is a growing sense o f  Europeanisation- critically or 
favourably- amongst the citizens o f Europe, which indicates a diminishing sense o f  
(national) sovereignty ”
The second set of interviews conducted by the journals that seemed relevant to this 
thesis, was comprised of a set of questions asked from the public to measure the 
decline of the ‘civil culture’, which is the social sphere in which the unity of the 
nation-state is expressed. Unlike the folk culture that unfolds on the grassroots levels
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of every day life, the strength of the ‘civil culture’ depends on a strong state whose 
legitimacy and accountability is largely trusted by its citizens. So if the level of public 
trust towards the state shows a historically diminishing trend it can be deduced that 
the civil unity will suffer a decline too. On this basis I decided to incorporate the 
findings of MORI Polls on the question of Civil Culture into my thesis to compare 
them with my findings. This would enable me to double-examine my Testable 
proposition A about a ‘diminishing sense of national unity’. The proposition 
suggested above was: “With the decline o f a binding and cohering social 
morality/integration there follows a diminishing sense o f social unity and 
b e l o n g i n g I am aware that social morality/integration does not immediately 
translate into civil culture, but ‘civil culture’ is surely a profound area where social 
morality/integration is expressed.
The comparisons are presented below. What is compared is firstly some of the 
findings of the MORI Polls in respect to the issue of Europeanisation to measure 
national sovereignty. And secondly Curtice and Roger’s article on the decline of the 
civil culture in Britain called ‘The Sceptical Electorate’ will be briefly looked at to 
examine the concept of national unity.
1) Europeanisation and National Sovereignty
MORI Interviews
“MORI interviewed a representative quota sample of 1068 British adults aged 18+ at 
19 constituency points throughout Great Britain. Interviews were conducted face-to- 
| face in street, on 27 April 1996. Data were weighted to match the profile of the 
population. (The survey was conducted on behalf of the Sun and published on 29 
April 1996). Interviews were to measure “Attitudes to the EU”. The followings are 
some of the questions and answers which were made” ( British Public Opinion. Vol. 
XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5).
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“Q : At the moment, a number of ideas are being considered for the future of the 
European Union. On balance would you support or oppose Britain participating in 
each of the following? ( British Public Opinion. Vol. XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5)
Table 5: Attitudes to the EU
support oppose don’t know 
% % %
A united States of Europe 27 57 16
A Single European Currency 32 58 10
A Central Bank of Europe 31 54 15
A single co-ordinated foreign policy 29 49 22
Fully integrated armed forces 36 48 17
A Supreme Court of Europe 35 48 17
Comment: The above question measures British public opinion on the issue of 
‘Europeanisation’ (which has a reverse relationship with national sovereignty). The 
question has three themes:
1) Economic and Political Integration (the first four questions),
2) Military and Defence Integration (question five)
3) Legal Integration (question six)
The results show that about one third of the British population is in favour of 
economic, political, military and legal integration with Europe, and is willing to 
prioritise it to retaining a distinct sense of national sovereignty.
“Q : At the moment the European Court of Justice has the power to overturn 
decisions made by courts in Britain. On balance do you think the European Court
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should or should not have this power?” (British Public Opinion. Vol. XX, No 8, 
May 1996 P.5)





Comment: Again about one third (31 %) of the British population is in favour of 
subordinating the sovereignty of the British legal judgements to the European Court.
“Q : In principle who do you think should have the power to regulate conditions of 
employment, for example on working hours and health and safety- The British 
Government or the European Union?” ( British Public Opinion. Vol. XX, No 8, May 
1996 P.5)






Comment: The figures above show that about one third of the population (30%) are 
in favour of the European Union taking over the sovereign power of the British 
government in respect to economic regulations.
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Cross-national trends
“ To supplement the Sun, MORI was commissioned by the European newspaper to 
research attitudes to three (following) questions in France and Germany, A 
representative sample of 508 German adults aged 18+ across all 16 Bundeslander 
were interviewed by telephone on 30 April 1996 by gdp Marktund 
Meinungsumfragen Gmbh (Hamburg), and a representative sample of 525 French 
adults were interviewed by telephone on 30 April- 1 May 1996 BVA. Data were 
weighted to match the profiles of the populations”. ( British Public Opinion, Vol. 
XX, No 8, May 1996 P.5)
Q. On balance, do you support or oppose the following?
Table 8: Attitudes to the EU
GB France Germany
1996 % 1996 % 1996%
A Central Bank of Europe
support 31 57 43
oppose 54 31 34
don’t know 15 12 23




A united states of Europe 











Comment: The figures above clearly show that an average of a third of the British 
population remains inclined to European integration on political and economic (and 
legal and military) grounds. Even though the majority of the British population 
opposes the issue of European integration, and the British show far less willingness 
for integration compared to the French and Germans, still one third of the British 
population supports a higher degree of European integration.
The fact that one third of the British population supports a higher degree of European 
integration, significantly illustrates a sense of a decline of national sovereignty 
because it represents a historical trend that did not exist in the Britain of 1920s and 
1930s. The average figure for the French case is over 50% and for the Germans over 
40% (see table 8). The fact that the trend for Europeanisation is stronger on the 
continent than here in Britain shows that the findings of this thesis about the British 
nation-state and national identity can be generalised to the rest of the Europe with 
ease.
Another piece of research that reinforces the above argument is made by Geoffrey 
Evans in his article called “The state of the Union: attitudes towards Europe” (British 
Social Attitudes. the 12th report, 1995/6 edition, Ch. 6). He examines the extent of 
support for European integration in Britain. He also measures the extent the public is 
willing to give the European Union the power to make cross-border policy decisions. 
He finds that 37% of British people interviewed wanted closer links with Europe and 
40% voted for “full unity with the EC” (ibid p. 122). A cross survey to find out the 
age composition of the interviewees reveals that a higher percentage of young people 
(27%) are interested in European integration compared to 11% amongst people over 
50. Table 8 also shows that 58% of British people oppose closer integration with the 
EC and regard it as a threat to national sovereignty. However the significance of these 
findings for my argument is a historical one. Data have shown that in the 1920s and 
1930s there was a 0% inclination for closer European integration in Britain while by
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the 1990s it has grown by over 30%. Likewise Britain’s opposition to European 
integration has declined from 100% to 57% in the same period).
2) Social Integration and National Unity
In an article called “The Sceptical Electorate” by John Curtice and Roger Jowell 
(British Social Attitudes , the 12th report, 1995/6 edition, Ch. 7), they investigate the 
decline of the ‘civil culture’ in Britain which, as explained above, can be interpreted 
as an indication of a decline o f6national unity \
The article suggests that the civil culture has declined in Britain: “Since the early 
1960s, when Almond and Verba were writing, many a commentator has argued that, 
even if Britain once had an ideal political culture, those days are past Particularly 
important was Marsh who suggested that political trust is at a much lower ebb than 
would seem healthy from Almond and Verba’s point of view (Marsh, 1977:232). He 
also drew a helpful distinction between two kinds of political efficacy. First there 
was personal efficacy, the confidence among citizens that they could participate in 
and influence politics by, say writing a letter to a newspaper, contacting an MP, and 
so on. Britain’s scores on this attribute were relatively high. Also important, however, 
was system efficacy, the confidence among citizens that the nation’s political 
institutions and those who operate them are able to listen and respond to the citizens’ 
demands and grievances. According to Marsh’s work, Britain scores on this attribute 
were relatively low” (British Social Attitudes, the 12th report, 1995/6 edition, Ch. 7 
p. 143).
The first question was to measure the trust and confidence of the citizens towards the 
efficacy of the system of government.
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Table 9; Trust and confidence of the citizens towards the system of governing
Britain
1973 1977 1991 1994
% % % %
Tfie system of governing Britain,
...‘could not be improved.... 
...’could be improved...
48 34 33 29
49 62 63 69
Source: 1973: Crowther-Hunt and Peacock, 1973; 1977: Opinion Research Centre 
Survey; 1991: MORI/Rowntree Trust State of the Nation Surveys (BSA, the 
12th report, 1995/6 edition Ch. 7, P. 146)
Comment: The results show that whereas 48% of people in 1973 thought that the 
governing system of Britain was almost perfect and needed no improvement, the 
figure dropped to 29% in 1994. Similarly whereas 49% of people believed that the 
system was not good enough and needed some improvements in 1973, in 1994 the 
figure rose to 69%.
The second question was on the nation’s trust in government:
Table 10: Citizens’ Trust in Government
1974 1986 1991 1994
% % % %
Governments put the needs of 
nation above the interests of
party-----
‘Just about always’... 
‘Only some of the time’...
39 38 33 24
57  5 7  63  73
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Comment: Only 24% of the population believed in 1994 that British government 
always or mostly placed the national interest above their party interests, compared 
with 38% who believed this only eight years ago. (BSA the 12th report, 1995/6 edition 
Ch. 7, p. 148)
The figures above suggest a decline in the confidence of the British nation both in 
the systems of government and in government itself since the 1970s. They are also 
more sceptical about the ability of the system to respond to the demands of the 
citizenry for the nation’s democracy which is also indicative of a decline of the 
strength of ‘civil culture’ and system efficacy.
I have suggested that the degree of the ‘system efficacy' or ‘efficacy o f the civil 
culture' measured by the article has a direct relationship with the degree of ‘civil 
unity' of the nation-state. The weaker the former, the weaker the latter. If the trends 
show a declining civic culture, then we can also deduce that civic nations and their 
unities will decline. If this is accepted, then the findings of the interviews on the 
decline of the ‘civil culture’ in Britain would support the findings of this thesis based 
on a historical decline o f a sense o f national unity and sovereignty in Britain.
A Complementary interpretation of the Findings
Although the results of my survey show a 33% decline in a sense of national unity 
and sovereignty in Britain since the 1920s, some may argue that the significance of 
the findings resides more heavily in the fact that about two thirds (67%) of the British 
population has retained a very strong sense of national identity. And it is, therefore, 
reasonable to describe today’s British society as a strong ‘national’ society based on 
the popular perceptions of distinct historical commonalities. This is of course true 
and my argument does not propose to refute this claim. The results of the findings do 
demonstrate that the majority of the British population has retained a very strong 
sense of national identity to date. The significance of my findings is merely in the
fact that this majority has historically diminished from 100% in the 1920s and 1930s 
to 67% in the 1980s and 1990s.
There are many reasons that explain why the nation-state is relatively resilient in the 
global era. One of the most important reasons is the fact that at a hermeneutic level, 
and as a species, humanity needs to belong to a community intimately and 
sensuously. The accumulated experience of belonging to a specific collectivity leads 
to distinct collective histories, and automatically creates a perception of the ‘other’. 
This basic transverse psychological function of human groups is embodied in the 
social forms of kinship and ‘ethnicity’ through which vernacular commonalties are 
shared and transmitted to the next generation. The nation-state as a time-bound 
institution of Modernity has incorporated and politicised ethnicity and represented 
collective identity only for the last two centuries. However in its language of 
nationalism the nation-state has successfully symbolised and embodied the transverse 
hermeneutic need for belonging to the extent that many of its ‘people’ equate 
ethnicity as a vernacular mode of collective existence with nationality as a 
conventional, modem and state-administered identity. The equation has led to the 
belief in the eternity of national identity itself.
In Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era Anthony Smith gives us several reasons 
as to why the nation-states are so resilient. They embody the (hermeneutic) needs for 
belonging and continuity which require:
“* the growth, cultivation and transmission of common memories, myths and 
symbols of the community;
* the growth, selection and transmission of historical traditions and rituals of 
community;
* the designation, cultivation and transmission of ‘authentic’ elements of shared 
culture (language, customs, religion, etc.) of the ‘people’;
* the inculcation of ‘authentic’ values, knowledge and attitudes in the designated
population through standardised methods and institutions;
* the demarcation, cultivation and transmission of symbols and myths of a historic 
territory, or homeland;
* the selecting and husbanding of skills and resources within the demarcated 
territory;
* and the definition of common rights and duties for all the members of the 
designated community” (Smith, 1995, PP 89-90).
The above are some of the reasons that explain the resilience of the sense of national 
identity. There are many historical events through which the British sense of national 
identity has been expressed lastingly and gloriously. It goes without saying that the 
modem British history contains ample examples of expressions of nationalistic unity 
of which The Second World War is the most profound example of the expression of 
this unity and memories of it to date..
It should be clear at this point that this thesis is not claiming that British national 
identity or the British nation-state is weak. What this thesis has substantiated is a 
decline in a sense of national homogeneity, unity and sovereignty since the 1920s 
when the British sense of national identity was 100% compared to the 1990s when it 
has dropped to about 67%. It is important to note that it is only within this historical /
comparative analysis that the findings gain significance. Had the research been 
conducted merely at the present time, the findings could have only suggested that the 
majority of the British people do not want to lose their national sovereignty and 
unity, and would have voted against it. Likewise if the research had been conducted 
around indicators supporting ‘national identity’, many indicators could have been 
chosen from the editorials and commentaries.
However to limit the scope of this research in order to make it managable, I chose 
six dimensions which were most recurrent in the editorials and commentaries in 
contradicting a sense of national unity and sovereignty. All the research has been
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conducted around these six dimensions in two different historical periods. The results 
of the two historical periods have been compared, and the comparison has shown a 
historical growth of the dimensions which contradict or undermine a sense of 
national unity, sovereignty and homogeneity.
Conclusion
Britain was a very strong colonial empire during the 1920s. British people reflected 
on themselves as a united and thriving nation whose ‘distinctiveness’ and 
‘superiority’ did not need to be emphasised. Questions regarding these issues simply 
just did not occur. The only way the British nation-state reflected upon itself was 
with enthusiasm and on new ‘developments’, ‘progress’, ‘scientific and 
technological discoveries’, ‘liberation of women and their clothing, ‘fashion’, ‘arts’, 
‘parliamentary Bills’ and ‘the colonies’.
Both the realities and the sentiments of a united and sovereign nation in the 1920s 
continued during the 1930s. The only factor that made the British, and indeed every 
western nation-state, feel vulnerable and in need of stronger support from The League 
of Nations was the threat of rising Fascism in Germany. In fact if there were any 
single factor indicating a diminishing sense of ‘sovereignty’ it could only be British 
foreign diplomacy and its insecurities in respect to its own defence.
By the 1970s, the picture is completely different. Britain no longer runs an empire; 
its sovereign economic viability came under severe questioning and challenge; its 
manufacturing industries and food production declined irreversibly with falling rates 
of profit in all of them; unemployment rose; poverty increased; housing slums, 
especially in inner cities, appeared; public contemplation and questions about 
‘progress and development’ for their own sake began; and public lack of satisfaction 
about the way the country was being managed slowly translated itself into forms of 
alienation, indifference, apathy and a diminishing sense of belonging, especially
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amongst the younger generation. Regional ethnicities grew. Even though British 
society at large does not perceive itself to be ‘multicultural’ and/or part of ‘Europe’, 
these notions are introduced for the first time in the 1970s. Britain began 
experiencing itself as a less ‘united and sovereign’ country compared to the 1920s 
and 1930s.
By the 1980s the British economy loses its ‘sovereignty’ in every sense of the word to 
global markets and with the globalisation of the City of London, it will be 
increasingly difficult to draw a meaningful distinction between global economic 
mechanisms and ‘the economy’ of any single nation-state . The data shows that in the 
same period there is a sense of diminishing ‘sovereignty’ under the influence of a 
sharp rise of ‘globalisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’. During the 1980s micro­
electronic technologies dominated the market giving rise to a plastic boom and this 
was accompanied with an increasingly selfish individualism of a “go and get it” 
attitude. The relatively alienated and declining society of the 1970s shifted into a 
right-wing and conservative society of the 1980s and expressed its (state) nationalism 
only when it came to the ‘others’ through the Falklands’ and the Gulf war. However 
the internal unities and memories derived from these nationalistic boosts have been 
relatively ephemeral and shortlived.
Ethnic consciousness increased further but no substantial growth of a sense of 
multicultualism has been found in the data. Although Britain feels less ‘sovereign’ 
and ‘homogeneous’ during the 1980s, it does not like and resists perceiving itself as 
a multicultural society by uniting itself under the right wing nationalism of Mrs 
Thatcher and by avoiding reflections on ‘multiculturalism’. However the realities of 
globalism, the growth of Europeanism, the rise of ethnic consciousness (to the point 
of the Scottish devolution) and a declining collective integration were too strong to 
be conquered by the sheer politics of Thatcherite state nationalism.
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It is not surprising that the decisive factors in the fall of the conservative government 
during the 1990s were ‘Europe’ and a sense of insensitivity and lack of 
accountability of the government to public opinions. The data shows that during the 
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, ‘ethnic consciousness’, ‘Europeanism’ and ‘globalism’ all 
increased considerably in Britain compared to the 1920s and 1930s. With the 
acceptance of these realities, Britain is slowly reducing its resistance against them 
which entails a reluctant recognition that the formative grounds for the constitution of 
collective identity and sovereignty are unavoidably changing.
This chapter was designed to find out whether there has been a historical trend 
towards a sense of decline of national sovereignty, homogeneity and unity in Britain. 
As substantiated above, the findings indicate a 33% decline compared to the 1920s 
and 1930s. The results of the cross-examination presented above further supported 
the findings. This remains true without refuting the fact that the majority o f the 
British population still has a strong and distinctive sense o f national identity; Britain 
still is one o f the strongest nation-states o f the world; The nationalistic memories o f 
the past, especially those o f the Second World War, unite the nation, in particular 
the older generation- around a distictive common past and identity, and about 67% 




At the beginning of the third millennium humanity is visibly shifting into a new 
‘paradigm’ or a new mode of being. The emergence of a postmodern social reality 
based on the dialectic of ‘globalisation and ‘localisation’ is increasingly
influencing and conditioning the dynamics of our thoughts, perceptions, values and 
the fabrics of our social relationships.
The beginning of this shift can be characterised in reference to a few fundamental 
developments. Firstly the subsumption of industrial capitalism by a micro-electronic 
and digital capitalism has led to ‘time-space compression’ to the extent of fusing a 
nation-state segmented world into a single global social reality. Secondly the 
repudiation of the Eurocentric epistemology of the Enlightenment based on the meta­
narratives of modernisation, scientism and a positivistic rationality has allowed the 
natural, the feminine, the organic, the subjective, the holistic, the ethnic and the 
local to play a greater role in the making of the narratives of social reality. Thirdly 
the latest scientific discoveries, especially those of quantum physics (which have 
quite clearly shown that the structure of the atom is not mechanical), have shaken the 
foundations of a Newtonian vision which was at ease with a mechanically bordered 
world and replaced them with a holistic picture of the universe and social life. The 
emergence of new spaces of global governance and interaction such as the integrated 
network o f global markets and cities, the internet, global telecommunications, and 
the network o f computerised systems and software packages have gone hand in hand 
with these developments to condition the integration of a single global space.
Some of the structural components of the shift from modernity to postmodemity can 
be characterised as below:
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Structures of Modern/ft? Structures of postmodern/fy
- Industrial capitalism - Digital and informational capitalism
National industry as economic 
infrastructure
Global telecommunications, computer 
network systems and software packages as 
economic infrastructure
-National economic concentration - Global Economic dispersion 
and centralisation and decentralisation
- National firms and companies - Transnational and multinational companies
- National Print industry - The digital media
- The transborder digital code
The above structural transformations have made the flow of capital across the globe 
via the transborder digital sign instantaneous, rendering borders obsolete. Some of 
the manifestations and implications of this ‘paradigmatic’ shift, especially in respect 
to the problematic of border-divided collective identity and representation, have been 
the subject of this thesis. These boundaries have been analysed as discourses of 
modem power in the colonial and imperial processes that historically contextualised 
the building of territorial and civil nation-states from above. There is no doubt that 
world affairs are still largely organised around modem boundaries both literally and 
symbolically. However this thesis has argued for the temporality of these boundaries.
The evolution of an organic and hybrid, rather than a mechanical perception of social 
and cultural collective identity is fundamentally different from the consecutive 
stacking of nationalistic building blocks or the manufacture of a state machine 
product in precise administrative and programmed steps. Organic systems are open 
and interactive, while mechanical systems are closed and self-referential. This is not
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to deny the importance of machine-like (state) operations, administration and 
segmentation of specialised tasks such as human collectivities, but it is dangerous 
only when it is taken to be the complete explanation. Reductionism will then follow. 
Reductionism and holism are complementary approaches that, used in proper 
balance, help us to obtain a deeper knowledge of life and who we really are. As in 
regard to the issue of collective identity the same perception can be used. The 
reduction of the human race to segmented ‘nationalities’ and nation-states could be 
better comprehended if complemented with the knowledge of their essential hybrid 
interconnectedness. This thesis has argued that the administration, standardisation 
and representation of national identity is a function of the modem state which by 
using the ideology of nationalism conceals the transborder human hybrid histories 
and the inborder human heterogeneities.
The systematic production of national identity in the modem era incorporates and is 
inseparable from the significant task of producing the spectacle of and exhibiting ‘the 
other' in ‘national’ spaces such as the museum, and anthropology intellectualised 
such an exhibition. The ‘other’ and its inferior position are made intelligible in a pole 
of binary apposites. One pole of the binary is usually the dominant one, the one 
which includes ‘the other’ within its field of operations1. There is always a 
relationship of power between the poles of a binary opposition such white/black, 
British/alien, us/them, the west/the rest, developed/underdeveloped, 
rational/emotional, etc. These binaries form the epistemic and linguistic force-fields 
in which the dominant discourse (here nationality) and strategic knowledge (here 
nationalism) are constituted as the Truth (here national identity), and are objectified 
in the normative institutional and structural forms (here the nation-state. These 
binaries together with the borders and structures they represent constitute and 
characterise different collective modes of being or paradigms. The shift from 
modernity to postmodemity has furnished the grounds for the weakening of
1 Edward Said provides a good example o f linguistic binaries such as the Oriental and the Occidental 
which constitute both the force-field o f inquiry and its normative hegemonic operations (Said, E. 
Orientalism (1978, Int.)
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modernist binaries and boundaries of representation. New postmodern force-fields of 
truth/knowledge/power (Foucault) are in the making and in ‘globalising’ and 
localising’ the hegemony o f capitalism, they fragment and undermine the nation­
state as its sovereign regulatory habitus (Bourdieu).
The globalisation and localisation of the hegemony of capitalism has another 
important consequence. For the first time in human history the capitalist mode of 
production appears to be divorcing itself from its historically specific origins in 
Europe. In other words its narratives are not solely written in the time and space of 
Europe any more. For the first time non-European countries of the Far East, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and Asia make their own claims on the history of 
capitalism, and in fragmenting capitalism’s Eurocentric force-field of operation, also 
fragment its Eurocentric cultural narratives and epistemic binaries. One of the effects 
of time-space compression is the possibility of simultaneous cultural transactions, 
interactions and creations which over time detefitorialise border-bound ‘national’ 
cultures.
Furthermore the fragmentation of space along national borders and the unification of 
global space together with decentralisation of production across the globe, mean that 
the discourse of capitalism is no longer located only in the west and it is possible to 
conceive of the future in ways other than those dominated by Euro-American political 
and social models. The simultaneous global integration and national fragmentation of 
space implies that economic activity becomes localised in regions below the nation­
state, while its management will increasingly require supranational and global 
supervision and co-ordination. In other words the sovereignty and homogeneity of the 
nation-state is constantly undermined from above and below.
Having proposed, examined and demostrated an emerging global/local social reality 
at a "structural* level, it is time to reflect on the "hermeneutic* mode of existence, 
whereby people feel, love, belong, interact and share familiarity and intimacy with
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their immediate environment (locality) and collectivity (ethnicity) in the framework 
of conditions that make them possible. Our conclusions on the structural changes in 
human societies should incorporate the hermeneutic expressions that are derived 
from deep human psychological and organic needs for bonding and belonging to an 
immediate locality and a concrete collectivity where life is ‘experienced’ and 
experience is ‘lived’ .
Anthony Smith articulates the (hermeneutic) need for collective belonging, a shared 
past, myths, memories, traditions, heroes and landscapes that are imagined and 
organised as a primordial quality in ‘the ethnie ' He reminds us of the importance of 
retaining a sense of ethnic belonging if we are not to sink into the secularising 
profanity of modernist accounts of collective belonging. Smith’s contribution in 
elaborating the meaning of collective identity around an ethnic core prevents this 
chapter from being concluded without reflecting on the primary need of humans for 
intimacy and belonging. The strong emotions that collectivities have expressed in 
their commemorative rituals and ceremonies can be understood as a sacred and 
intoxicating experience o f intimate belonging that both at a personal and collective 
level imply love, loyalty and sacrifice and which are ‘lived’ by ‘the (collective) 
body’ in its memories, reactions, reflections, attractions and chemistries. It is on this 
basis that the local can constitute the locus of ethnic resistance against (‘the national’ 
and) ‘the global’ ( Dirlik, 1996, PP 21-46).
The hermeneutic need of ‘belonging’ is *primary and transverse ’ and it permeates 
into the tissues of social relationships. Hermeneutic interactions flourish in their 
intertwining with the structural conditions of experience which are socio-economic 
and temporal. Their unique encounter unfolds in “the habitus- the embodied history, 
internalised as a second nature and forgotten as history” (Bourdieu, 1990, P. 56) 
where agents equipped with a shared past make structures work. Linked with the 
structural conditions of Modernity cited above, the hermeneutics of belonging are 
crystallised in the habitus of the nation-state, and faced with the more fluid
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structures of postmodemity, a different mode of collective being is crystallising 
which at its early stages has been theorised as global/local and global/ethnic.
No organic bonding of the two can be systematically conceptualised. The bonding 
between national identity as a ‘second nature’ and ethnic identity as a primary nature 
is largely ideological and a matter of the administration of culture industry from 
above. However this ideological linkage is not forcefully experienced. It is bio­
power. It is lived in the memories, beliefs and the performance of the (collective) 
body which lend themselves so ‘willingly’ to nationalism’s claim of what it is not: 
eternity. It is this masterful articulation of ethnicity and nationality that, as Bhabha 
argues, allows the ‘performative’ and ‘pedagogical’ narratives of nationhood to fuse 
together in the name of ‘people’. The nation-state is the habitus of modem collective 
identity where the transverse human need for belonging inhabits itself in the temporal 
structure of the nation-state. Subjectivities and objectivities merge together to 
constitute and objectify a ‘national’ mode of collective belief and identity. This thesis 
has substantiated the shift from modernity to postmodemity as a historical moment 
when the transcendence of the habitus of collective identity can be conceived.
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(of the concept of a diminishing consensus 
on National ‘sovereignty* and* homogeneity*)
A- Diminishing sense of National belonging
B- An increasing sense of national hybridity
C- Growing Regional Ethnicities
D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation 
F- Growing sense of Globalisation
Dependent Indicators
and their codes
Al- Decline of social morality/integration
Bl - Multiculturalism 
B2- Plurality
Cl- Scotland & Wales 
C2- N. Ireland
DI- Environment
D2- Defence and Security
D3- Decline of National Economy
El-Europe
FI- Global village of consumerism/global culture 
F2- Global Technology 
F3-Global Economy




A l Bl/2_______ Cl/2________Dl/2/3 El Fl/2/3
1925 - - - -
1926 - - - -
1927 - - - -
1935 - - - - -
1936
Apr. 24 d2. “Security in Europe” warning against the


























al. Decline of religious beliefs, and absence of Christian teaching, too many pagans, causing juvenile 
delinquency and an unstable society.
d.2. The League of the Nations must extent its 
authority for the security of Europe against war.
al. ”The Jewish Dilemma” : rise of Fascism in East London
al. ’The Marriage Bill” : the Bill lowers the sexual morality of the Nation; stability of marriage is part of 
national interest and is part of general conscience and reason.
al. the relationship of sexual morality, marriage and nationhood; against the marriage Bill
d2. “Failure of the League” (the closest the Nation 
thought of another concept of collective security).
1970s, 1980s, 1990s
c2. Northern Ireland and secession
d3. Insecurity of food producers such as farmers, 
fishermen & cattlemen in the context of EEC
d3. Insecurity of miners and the decline of mines
d3. national volatility and economic uncertainty in the 
context of EEC
c2. Northern Ireland
d3. economic decline, and rise of unemployment
d3. economic deterioration of manufacturing industries, 
jobs and the rise of inflation
d3. decline of the economy
d3. decline of morale/public steam and economic 
deterioration
cl. devolution of Scotland and break-up of Britain
d3. recession, economic decline, need for protectionism 
against the international economy
cl. Can the Scots be satisfied? the question of devolution
cl. Devolution of Wales/Scotland


























d3. decline of fishing industries and the EEC
cl. devolution of Scotland
d3. decline of Docklands
d3. economic decline and high unemployment
d3. lack of economic profitability, growth and certainty 
about future
<J3. Britain’s post-war decline in standards of education 
and numeracy
cl. the issue of Scotland’s devolution in “Tories and Scotland”
<J3. “y^encv in the shipyard”: decline of British ship­
building manufacturing industries
cl. “over the first hurdje” the issue of devolution
d3. “Boat-builders catch the tide”: decline of ship­
building industries
d3. “Process of urban decay” rise of unemployment & 
decline of housing
cl. Devolution Bill
cl. “Guillotine Bill and its failure” re Scottish devolution
bl. “positive discrimination” services should be provided for ethnic minorities to avoid racial 
hostility
d3. ’’the members of the club”: general economic 
decline of industry, productivity, management, 
investment
d3. “pax Americana” Britain entertain doubts about its 
ability to self-rule and its govemability. Too much 
economic problems, unemployment 25 years after the 
war.
c2. terrorism and the issue of Northern Ireland
d3. decline of provinces theatres.
d3. decline of British economy in the context of world 
economy.
cl. autonomy for Wales and Scotland
d3. coal mining in decline
d2. “the unworthy squabble” Europe should remember 



















a l. spread of violence likely to come from broken homes, marriages and weak education
el. “Heath’s European Survey7’: 
the notion of an enlarged 
community
b2. “cementing a plural society”.
c 1. the separation of Scotland and Wales.
al. “a message half-heard” referring to Schumpeter’s analysis that economic & technological 
developments have not overcome unemployment, poverty, exclusion; a need for spiritual home-coming 
and belonging
f2. The Times & global 
technology; a new world 
order; a new world order 
a post-industrial society.
f3. “vicious Market 
Circle” global economy 
and exchange rates
c2. “Personal Irish problem” about Irish national identity
£2. technological age for 
schools and the slowness 
of local governments to 
respond to it.
G. “City of Grim”: the 
city of London and its 
revolution and the 
abolition of British 
exchange control of 





consumers in the “global 
market” in which the sun 
never sets; maximum 
flexibility with minimum 
bureaucracy.
al. “Succer Hooliganism”
b2. ”Black Road to Canterbury” : Black Christian presence in Britain as a significant 
enrichment of the religious life of the nation; it is perhaps no pity that it preserved its special 
character on arrival and did not assimilate too readily into the style of church worship that was 
customary here.
cl. the issue of Scotland
£2. “the sun has risen”: 





opto-electronics is so 
reluctant to assist British 
Leyland and Midland’s 
economy?
May 22 al. Football hooliganism
Jun. 12 el. ’’now we are 12”: on the notion
of European community
Jul. 30 c2. “Screening the IRA”
Aug. 27 c2. “Mr Barry goes wooing” on Irish nationalism.
Nov. 5 c2. ”Banning ballots backs bullets”
Nov. 19 c2. “No referendum” in Ireland
Nov. 26 c2. “Hillsborough”
Dec. 31 al. & O. “1985” boundaries of
greater London 
extended to Nicaragua.... 
we become too blaze 
about privatisation... (we 








c2. “Breaking The Irish Wound” 
c2. Anglo-Irish agreements 
b2. Britain a pluralist society in “Death warrants”




May 5 c2. “screening reconciliation”
Jun. 2 al. ’’can doctrine develop?” ordination of women as demythologising Jesus; dispersed authority; threat to 
social consensus; break-down of the unity of the church.
Jun. 9 c2. “Question of Ulster’s police”
Jun. 30 al. ’’Priesthood and gender” Jesus can only be represented by men
Jun. 30 c2. Irish nationalism
Jul. 12 fl. “Birthday of a
concept” : the inception 



















d2. EEC and the question of developing a common 
security strategy against the international 
terrorism.
d3 decline of manufacturing industries
f3. decline of national 
economy due to global 
market forces beyond the 
controllability of policy 
makers.
al. “markets and morality"’: abandonment of moral codes of behaviour, loose legal interpretation on 
Guineas Affair meaning economic forces Vs political and moral judgement.
el. “Strategic Defence” a 
European issue Vs USA.
al “an unhappy compromise” on the ordination of women.
f3. “Debt Fatigue”; an 
analysis of the World 
Bank identifying a global 
‘debt fatigue’ affecting 
the public in Europe and 
USA.
d3. decline of British economic manufacturing sector 
beyond investment.
cl. “The Scottish Question”
al. on the question of sexual abuse of children within the family and at ‘home’ that is the place where a 
child should feel secure has been transformed into a closed world of secret suffering.
bl. “Islam in Britain” : in the interests of society as well as requirement of human 
rights, Muslims in Britain should be free to observe their religion and build a 
community life with institutions of their own; a multicultural religious and social 
fabric is for a healthy British way of life.
f3.” Lovaltv to the City”: 
accelerated development 
of London operations by 
financial housed abroad; 
learning to live with the 
presence of new market 
place; life different 
compare to the past.
c2. on the Question of N. Ireland
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a l. “case against Dr Runcie”: the church of England, a declining institution, liturgical modernisation; 
confusions over Christianity and decency.
c2. On the question of N. Ireland 
c2. On the question of N. Ireland 
c2. On the question of N. Ireland 
al. “The decline of the family” : a decline of organised religion.
£2. ’’High the bonds” : 
modem society too 
fragmented with the flow 
of capital; too hectic; 
economic insecurity too 
highfor the stability of 
society.
£2.3. ’Two kinds of 
Nations”: a growing 
sense of anxiety about 
the way the national 
interest is defined; 
global security has 
* affected the definitions
of national interest and 
national identity.
These definitions can not 
be reduced to a common 
past.
c2. The question of N. Ireland
c2. The question of N. Ireland
al. “Monster within” : has Britain become a more dangerous place for children? is child murder a 
symptom of a wider break-down in society?
c2. “Adams holds the key”
c2. “Molyneaux’s Legacy”
cl. “the pride of advice”
al. “A measure of faith”: 26 London churches are proposed to be converted into wine bars and galleries 
instead of closure.
c2. “Ulster’s Modernisers”
d3. economic decline/ job insecurity/ high 
unemployment/factory closures in all G7 countries 
























c2. “The American Dream” about peace in Ulster
al. “The decline of nuclear family”: of old-fashioned neighbourhood, of church’s parochial structures; 
there are heavy burdens on schools; lessons of right and wrong pushed to the margins of curriculum.
c2. “A IRA Offer 
c2. on IRA
d2. defence and Europeanism
d3. age of anxiety and uncertainty regarding 
economic lack of security
cl. “Scottish Scar”
dl. Pollution in the new global order: the 
issue of the environment, human rights, 
population, poverty in “towards a habitable 
habitat”
el. “Hour of Truth” Britain should 
fight for a sort of Europe
cl. Labour for the devolution of Scotland and decentralisation of 
power
el. “Major’s mavbe” on single 
currency as a very important 
political and economic decision 
since 1945.
el. “Europe’s History” : reluctance 
of westerners to include southern 
and central Europeans into their 
history. They should.
el. On Europe’s fishing policy.
el. “The peoples of Europe must 
speak”: we are committed to 
European identity.
b2. “decline of the past” an analysis of the reactions against western culture due to the growth 
of Islam, pluralism and global civilisation.
a l. “stand up for bastards”: the weakening of marriage is only part of a general weakening of a sense of 
responsibility towards the new generation
el. “our meat is his poison” on the 
influence of Europe on British beef 
and farmers.
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al. “morals are made in the classroom”: our society has become morally reticent, even inarticulate. 
Popular cultural assumptions are that re-definitions happen and things are only a matter of individual 
view.
el. “The Tories. Europe and the 
people”
el. ’’Defining issue”, expressing 
doubts on European identity
el. “How to vote sceptically”, 
expressing doubts on Europeanism
el. “Vote with Relish”: between 
this and next election the principle 
of single currency with all the loss 
of sovereignty that it entails should 
be decided.
cl. Devolution needs constructive opposition In ”The Scottish Vote”
d2. ”The end of one alliance” and the beginning of 
a new era of European security
el. “Is Euro-scepticism dead?” 
opposition with the issue of single 
currency.
cl. “pies in pokes” : we need to know more about the issue of 
devolution.
c 1. On the question of devolution.
el. “Europe on the defensive” we 
can become less competitive in one 
single space of Europe
c 1. “make them tell us why secrets sink without trace”
el. “Amsterdam soup” on the 
notion of European tax-payer
f3. The age of global 




c2. “our prime ministerial modernisers”
cl. “ a hard bargain” Scotland’s parliament should satisfy
£2. “Lap-top lovers” The 
pondering of an 
electronic age.
cl. “Does Blair know how to save the Unions” right to govern itself
is the UK’s loss.
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Aug. 29 c2. “talk or walk” referring to the Irish dilemma
Sep. 12 cl. Scots have given voice to their hearts in “Vote of Destiny”
Oct 10 e l . “off the mark” In European
Monetary Union and the interest 
rates.
Nov. 7 c2. “IRA irreconcilable” on peace in Ireland.
Dec 5 b2.” Blair’s militant tendency”: I am for pluralism and pluralism should not exclude
people from ordinary backgrounds.
Dec. 12 dl. “The climate of the Senate” a pause to
consider global warming.
Dec. 19 e l. “A tongue fa  Europe”
Table 1: Summery of the findings- The Times
Dependent variables 
Al Bl/2________C m ________Dl/2/3 E l Fl/2/3
1920s 0 0 0 0 0 0
1930s 4 0 0 3(d2) 0 0






























A-Diminishing sense of National Belonging 
B-lncreasing sense of National Hybridity 
C-Growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness 
D-Growing sense of inability to solve own problems 
E-Growing sense of Europeanisation 
F-Growing sense of Globalisation
The Times
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(of the concept of a diminishing consensus 
on National ‘sovereignty* and’ homogeneity*)
A- Diminishing sense of National belonging
B- An increasing sense of national hybridity
C- Growing Regional Ethnicities
D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation 
F- Growing sense of Globalisation
Dependent Indicators
and their codes
A1- Decline of social morality/integration
B1 - Multiculturalism 
B2- Plurality
Cl- Scotland & Wales 
C2-N. Ireland
Dl- Environment
D2- Defence and Security
D3- Decline of National Economy
El- Europe
FI- Global village of consumerism/global culture 
F2- Global Technology 
F3- Global Economy




Al Bl/2________Cl/2________Dl/2/3 E l Fl/2/3_________
1925 - - - -
1926 - - - -
1927 - - - -
1935
Nov. 21 cl. “Estates for Nations in Wales and Scotland
1936
Jun. 21 d2. The covenant of the League
Sept. 14 d2. “The League & the Industry”: the idea of collective
security should predominate (this is the closest they 
come to think of collective security i.e. in the body of 






















1970s, 1980s & 1990s
f3.”Multinational 
ghosts..” suggesting that 
multinationals inhibit 
peaceful advancement in 
Britain by manipulating 
economy.
c2. “a choice for the IRA”
al. + d3. ’’where are we going?” disturbing signs of Britain
failing to produce its vicious spiral. Economic failure, 
selfish society, decline of national mopale. we do not 
know how to reverse, do we?
el. ’’Sovereignty is not freedom”, 
pro EEC. Britain has not had an 
independent defensive foreign 
policy for the last 70 years.
a 1. “something wrong, but what?” Britain feels itself to be adrift; decline of the standards of personal 
morality, search for faitfi
d3. ”With a decent sense of scepticism” about ending 
the decline of national economy and industry.
c2. “Where is it going?”
d3. inevitability of cuts in living standards, economic 
decline in the UK
cl. Scots and Devolution
d3. “The melting snow of profitability” the decline of 
manufacturing industries.
c2. The Irish question
d3. uncontrollable decline of industries/ unemployment
c2. The Irish question
c2. The Irish question
d3. unemployment
c2. “last man through the loophole”. IRA
c2. The Irish question



























d3. The decline of shipbuilding industry; near collapse, 
against re-nationalisation
cl. The show in on the run/ Scotland and Wales
d3. Decline of industries, London in a decaying state of 
population, wealth, jobs etc.
a l. ’The school shake up starts here” the education can no longer manage our mobs and hooligans; 
schools escape-goats goats for society’s ills for decades.
c2. Ireland
cl. Devolution of Scotland 
al. “The dilemma of delinquency”: hooligans.
d3. Decline of living standards and the economy 
cl. The question of devolution 
cl. The question of devolution 
c2. The question of Ulster still looking for a solution 
2. IRA 
c2. Ireland
cl. Scotland and devolution 
c2. Ireland
d3. National decline of territorial rights of British 
fishermen
bl. “The message of steel drums” those who like the multinational, multi-cultural 
character of metropolitan centres; ideas for both the white and black souls
c2. What wants a united Ireland?
el. Exploring the idea of a super­
national Europe and single 
currency
d3. “When every option displeases” decline of industry, 
& economy
e 1. “one Europe vote when the 
case is more clear7’
a 1. commercialisation of Christmas and transformation of x-mass values in “face to faith”
f3. ’’making the future 






localisation of economy 
at gross root 
levels: Break down of 
economy into local and 
regional levels; flexible 
and diversified economic 
base; liberate enterprise 
at all levels.
Mar. 6 c2. On the question o Ireland
Mar 20 d3. + f2. “the seeds of hope
are thinly sown” decline of British, the effects of 
microchip take-over from the recession; high 
unemployment
Apr. 24 d3. “two motors taking over” rdecline of motor mfg.
dependency on foreign exchange market; huge deficit; 
British Leyland only 20% of the market in 1985 ,60% 
in 1975.
May 22 £2. “The tower Tumbles”
the advances of IT have 
cut the umbilical cord 
between places. You can 
be part of the global 
market and in 
Hammersmith.
Jun. 19 al. Minimal self; Narcissistic retreat from the society; emotional disengagement, the destruction of 
selfhood due to:
£2. Giants of 
communication 
industries & wired 
technology &
fl. global consumer 
culture and state of 
oneness with the 
outer world.
Jun. 26 c2. “The roots of terror long ago”
Jul. 4 el. Euromissiles.
Jul. 4 £2. Telecommunication
satellites form the fixture
Oct. 24 d3. ”The shop-keepers eve view of the world” now we
have much less to contribute to the global order, and we 
are paupers in decline due to de-colonisation.
Dec. 5 C2. N Ireland




















f2. “wprds count in the 




security, by opening up 
forbidden territories for 
inspection
el. “America and the ritual, but” it 
is easy to be anti-American when it 
copies to be viewed as future 
ecjipse and present danger. If 
Eprppean Nation-States do not 
want to become de facto the 51st 
state, they should put their 
schizophrenia and form one 
Europe.
d3. “wait there is plenty still to sell” :on manufacturing 
decline, massive re-organisation of factories under the 
impact of foreign take-over, where the multinationals 
slug it free from the indigenous competition
al. “the facts of crime” -.crime in Britain is serious due to high unemployment.
dl+ 2. Chernobyl: a simple need for help
dl+2. Chernobyl nuclear disaster and its conclusions 
for mankind.
d3. Decline of manufacturing industries; 17% decline 
since 1979.
c2. The question of Ireland
dl+2. “another major jolt for sellafield: on British 
nuclear fuels.
c2. Failure to provide real prospects
d2. Alliance doubt...
d2 + el. There is sense of Europeanism
in respect to a defence platform
d2 + el. Gorbachev and Europe’s
security
c2. N. Ireland
al. + d3. "hands in search of hearts and minds” : unemployment
over 3m, massive dislocation, shrugging indifference... without wide spread anger and sense of alarm; we 




















d3.” when colonial rules come to the inner cities” the 
supreme irony is that Britain’s new colonies will be the 
cities which were created on the surplus of the former 
ones.
f3.”Aristocrates rule in 
the urban global move 
towards hi-tech and 
service industries
f3. “how to dam the 
deficit” : IMF 
mechanisms
c2. The Irish question
f3. “the big bang & the 
real world”: crash of 
(national) markets, 
shares and instantaneous" 
global markets, 
governments with no 
power.
C. ”a real test for the 
politicians” : world stock 
market; London could 
not resist the global 
hurricane; a world wide 
solution needed.
el. Europeanism in “thinking 
beyond the channel”
bl. “The unknown quantity” : on multicultural society 
c2. “labouring under Sinn Fein”
el. Europe is a central axis
C. “too late to escape 
with too little’7 Wall 
street crash dragging 
down in the rest of the 
world beyond the control 
of national governments.
c2. “the real state under siege”
O. “Ducking the future” 
the height of 
technological folly of 
Britain’s most advanced 
micro-electronics sold 

















can long term national 
interests be reconciled 
with short term city 
profits?
el. “why this Europe won’t lie 
down” reflecting of Europeanism 
and Euro-sceptics’ resistance
£3. “some of our trains will go 
missing”: on world market 
economy and rail privatisation
al. “Shivering in the shadow of history’s fallen cities”: how bombs, wars, military destruction destroy 
memory, collective symbols, history, identity.
el. “borders go down...” referring to EU 
destruction of borders
el. “taking the blinkers off John Bull” : 
what makes you proud to be British? 
Eurosceptics defenders of our nationhood, 
but a redefining Britain; hooligan 
nationalism offers a blend of imperial 
nostalgia and implicit racism in 
corruptpolitical institutions.
2. On N. Ireland
al + £3. economic mobility,
labour flexibility, collapse of the family are effects of globalisation which have accelerated the pace of 
life. New technologies lead to insecurity, poverty communities can not survive; loss of meaning and 
identity.
al. + bl. ”Rock ages that rolls with the flow” : increasing secularisation lead to erosion of moral 
absolutes in modem world; society of multiculturalism.
G. “Taking and 
pondering”
al. hooliganism in English football
e l. “question for cash” : the issue 
of single currency, Europe’s 
monetary union.
f3. “World Bank. Global 
Vision”, golden age of 
economic growth in the global 
age.
al. “Withering indictment of our public spirit” the demoralisation of society, refusal to believe in 
absolutes have undermined the society. Don’t know the difference between wrong and right; Education 
does not cement society.
b2. Plurality of society + G. Global media and
how they have a 
control on society
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Blair’s emphasis on 
Europeanisation and the 
sovereignty of the Nation-State
el. “Crunch time looms in 
Europe’s state of flux” 
immutability of integration and 
flux; ERM and single currency
dl. ’’shelling out for pollution” :the question of multi­
nationals and the dumping of the toxic waste in the 
water.
el. ”A game of..” :realities of 
Europeanism and global power
fl.3. Globalisation 
supported by local 
language and culture; 
global village in “a 
cook’s...to no where”
c2. N. Ireland
d2. “Clouded judgement” :French nuclear testing is to 
Europe’s joined security
d2. “that nuclear clnh buzz” on European nuclear co­
operation
el. “put out more flags”: ridicule 
hooligan quality of right wing 
nationalism and their 
Euroscepticism are extraordinary 
facets of inflated egoof 
reactionaries and romantics. These 
people are responsible for the 
actualloss of sovereignty by letting 
manufacturing industries go.
d2. “disaster waiting to happen” decisive action needed 
to make nuclear reactors ‘safe’, and not commercial 
considerations. The international atomic energy in 
Vienna has begged for safety.
c2. The Gulf between Britain and Ireland.
cl. On the question of Scotland
al. “Views and Values” moral, religious and practical imperatives needed to make public commitment to 
marriage after cohabitation
dl. “last warning of Earth” prediction of global 
warming, nations procrastinate; intergovernmental 
























c2. Sinn Fein suggestion to remove the impasse.
c2. The sound silence of Sinn Fein
c2. The vicious cycle of the peace talks
c2. talks and peace process
c2. on the peace process
cl. Scots inquiry
el. Europeans and the far east in “ 
Tweaking the tail of the tigers”
al. “Loner in our midst..” what sort of society are we creating, rime against small children, too many lone 
parents, social atomism after the nuclear family, British towns are evidence of the elaborate communities 
of fantasy that men create as substitutes.
c2. “Ulster reverts to type”
c2. IRA barrier to talks
c2.” London falls into line”
c2.” In the shadow of IRA”
al. “when care is a dirty word” ordering a national inquiry into child sexual abuse, need for skill care and 
counselling
al. “too little too late”: combating child sex abuse.
cl. Devolution of Scotland
al “ pulling a moral vacuum”: condemning moral relativism, decline of morality, spread of adultery in the 
royal family. 75% of people have said in a survey that the society is less moral with 72 % believing that 
there is no longer a broadly agreed set of moral standards.
el. “stuck in a great cultural 
divide” rEuropeanism in the face of 
Eastern Europe.
c2. Talking through our bowler hats.
O. “creed out of control” 
the issue of privatisation 
of previously national 
industries and selling to 
the private sector.
al. “The mirrors that matter”: 1990s Britain: our political institutions more elitist and visibly less 
reformed than other established democratic societies; ...a perceived national decline is the immanent 
descant to the history of 20th century UK.
f2. “the temple of 
Desire” when British
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libraiy moves next year, 
it will offer greater 
electronic access than 
ever, from catalogue to 
digital text,its on-line 
resources will serve the 
world.
£2. the digital dictator
el. “The west V the rest” the 
people of the west hang together or 
they will hang separately in a world 
-multi-polar, multi-civilised of the 
global age where all power is local. 
The west should unite.
c2. “the necessity of cease-fire”. IRA 
cl. Scotland, Britain’s last colony
el. “time to go to the polls”: a 
modernised Britain must be part of 
Europe, not to stand apart from it.
bl, “Black looks and white lies”: anti-racist campaign have failed. We now need a 
radical new approach to multi-culturalism.
el. “enter the Europe” The 
European currency.
£2. ’’school’s out for 
ever” do our children 
exist only to shop or sit 
slavishly in front of a 
computer? the whole 
purpose of learning has 
become learning new 
technology. What has 
happened to the rationale 
of learning?
el. Blair government in future 
shock: pro Europeanism
fl. Global consumer 
culture: children’s 
demand for fashion 
food; 85% of children 
have asked their parents 
to buy food they saw on 
the TV; market economy 
for jingles.
Feb. 3 c2. “Unfinished business’
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Feb. 17 cl. ‘But what about Wales?"
Mar. 10 dl. “New Hope for forests” despite the slowing down
of the rate of deforestation, mankind is relentlessly 
swapping primary forests for a new utilitarian version 
due to demand for timber.
Mar 31 bl. ’’time to stop being scared of aliens” immigrants not a threat
Apr. 7 c2. “Dealing with seriously disturbed IRA”
Apr. c2.” Quite simply independent”
Apr. 14 f2. “The open road leads
only to internet”.
Apr. 21 d l. The space question
May 19 c2. Only the IRA benefits
May 26 al. “worse than the US” Britain is on the top 6f the table of crime now.
May 5 el. The idea of Europe did not
frighten the voters
Jun. 9 c2. the question of Ireland
Jun. 16 el. Re-thinking the route to Europe
Jun. 23 d l. ”how to protect ecology” the earth needs deeds not
words. Earth summit and the issue of global warming
July 8 c2. “history marches on” Ireland and peace issue.
Jul. 22 c2. “decommissioning does matter” but only as part of the eventual deal...
Jul. 22 h2 ’’tackling the ceiling” where are the blacks and Asians in governments... thanks to
the swelling number of black-Asian professionals in Britain...no tokenism abut 
equality, not positive discrimination but affirmative action in a plural society
Aug. 19 cl. Scotland and devolution
Sept. 9 cl. Scotland and devolution
Sept. 16 cl. questions for Wales
Sept. 16 el.” Ostrich time is over, its time
for EMU”
Sept. 16 f2. “cat’s out of the bag”
controlling the contents 
of the net is a task to 
daunt even the most 
zealous believers of 
national sovereignty; the 
material can be re­















el. “prising open the palaces” one 
of the more civilising initiatives of 
recent years has been the opening 
to the public of houses, offices, 
monuments and governmental 
buildings under the umbrella term 
of “European heritage”.
dl. “Good news on global warming” : an international 
consensus needed in TOKYO Earth summit about how 
to address surplus green house gases.
c2. Sleaze goes Irish
el. Brown wants to change EMU 
even before joining
el. EMU: in, out or maybe
el. EMU: the acceptance of Euros 
in the UK.
el. “the Euro is coming., like it or 
not” let’s get ready for it.
dl. “power for the Sahara” if we really wanted to 
reduce global warming we should stop travelling on the 
air. Aircrafts currently count for 3% of global warming.
el. “prison does wonder for the 
jobless figures”: Comparing 
European crime rates with those of 
the USA.
dl. “Trouble is on its way” four climate scientists warn 
that whatever happens at the Tokyo global summit, we 
must adapt to a future of bad weather with floods and 
draughts.
c2. N. Ireland.
al. + fl.” the new Briton”
under estimates the psychological damage inflicted on people in the attempt to turn us into independent 
economic animals, encourage to mistrust any form of community or collective endeavour, the 
psychological shift is one of insecurity and passivity in the sphere of life. This combination deeply in 
consumerism has made us different people
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Table 2: Summary of the findings- The Guardian
Dependent variables
A1 Bl/2________Cl/2_______ Dl/2/3 Ef Fl/2/3
1920s 0 0 0 0 0 0
1930s 0 0 l(c l) 2(d2) 0 0
1970s 5 1 (bl) 14 (c2) 
6 (cl)
11(d3) 3 l(f3)
















A-Diminishing sense of National Belonging 
B-lncreasing sense of National Hybridity 
C-Growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness 
D-Growing sense of inability to solve own problems 
E-Growing sense of Europeanisation 
F-Growing sense of Globalisation
The Guardian































Dependent Dimension (B): A growing sense of National Hybridity
The Guardian 
Fig. 2.4
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(of the concept of a diminishing consensus 
on National ‘sovereignty’ and’ homogeneity*)
A- Diminishing sense of National belonging
B- An increasing sense of National hybridity
C- Growing Regional Ethnicities
D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation 
F- Growing sense of Globalisation
Dependent Indicators
and their codes
Al- Decline of social morality/integration
Bl- Multiculturalism 
B2- Plurality
Cl- Scotland & Wales 
C2- N. Ireland
Dl - Environment
D2- Defence and Security
D3- Decline of National Economy
El-Europe
FI- Global village of consumerism/global culture 
F2- Global Technology 
F3- Global Economy
The Independent indicator is time ( the left hand column below).
The Daily Mirror 
1920s & 1930s
Dependent variables 
Al Bl/2________Cl/2________Dl/2/3 El Fl/2/3
1925
Aug. 13 al. “Modem unrest” gravity of industrial peril; we are at the edge of a volcano; foreign competition too 
high. We have enough patriotism to unite us against the foreign force, but not enough to keep us united at 
home.
Nov. 29 al. “Age of Experts” questioning the age of science, its superiority; its experts; the age of restlessness, 
speed, nervous diseases etc. Questioning the binding power of science for the society.
1926 - - - -





















al. “A menace to society” who does not believe in science and its beneficence in these days of mechanical 
advancement. The question is common amongst the men of science whether science is a standing menace 
to the orderly standards of society.
a 1. “patriotic Knowledge”: I wonder how many English people know the words of the national anthem of 
the “rule Britain” and how many recognise what regiment a soldier belongs to and what badges and stripes 
go to the respective ranks from officer to private, and why colours are dipped to the sovereign and why 
officers bring sword hilt to front of face when saluting with sword...flags. I was wondering if teachers 
know it.
bl. “Honourable Fashion”: the Chinese exhibition is already having an effect on women’s 
fashion and fashion designers have been quick to realise the possibilities for modem adaptation 
of the ideas of the old Oriental artists in this age of mobility.
d2. European Security is a matter of great concern due 
to rising danger of war and Germany.
1980s & 1990s
al. “1985”: division between have’s and have nots; no democracy, bad housing, high unemployment
al. “cuts and more cuts”: another 3 years misery with Magi Thatcher; high unemployment, divided society
d3. ’’Strike a light” declining manufacturing industries, 
mining
d3. “False economy” closure of skill-centres and skill- 
centre networks, declining economy
d3. The final curtain” coal miners and the closure of the 
pits; closure of national economy.
al. “private grief’ ; privatisation of national health service, private treatment, health dependent of wealth 
now
d3. “Nigel Nothing” we needed a budget for the nation, 
we got a budget for ‘the City’ instead
d3. “the new realities” miners strike, rail strikes, the 
unions have been beaten meaning that the national 
economy has been beaten, the nation has been beaten.
al. “Crossing the line” society too permissive, drugs, sexual experience in a world where women are used, 
abused, degraded; pornography etc. The permissive society has not liberated women, it has enslaved them 
even more as sex objects.
al. “Tough and right” : football hooliganism




















al. “Brutal truth” football hooliganism
al. “Home Truth”; Decisions to cuL benefits is ruthless to young people, thousands of youngsters turned 
into rootless wanderers and this is the modem civilised Britain in mid 80s; many turn to crime.
al. “None so blind” in an area where 95% of recent black school leavers are out of work, only an idiot 
could say unemployment had nothing to do with riot and violence; an area of disadvantaged overcrowded, 
poor schooling, inadequate welfare services. non existent prospects and widespread poverty only the 
wilfully blind can claim that deprivation and frustration had nothing to do with riot and violence.
al. “suffering little children” In Britain today many are suffering terrible misery, victims of cruelty and 
violence, alcohol and sexual abuse, homelessness, unemployment, crime and poverty.
al. ”Bloodv brutal Britain” the frightening truth about Britain es sick society was revealed yesterday with 
the release of crime figures... one in 8 girls, and one in 12 boys are molested under 14; rape has risen by 
29%; doctor raping a 8 year old; a vicars’ series of sexual assaults etc. vandalism happens one every 
minute; violent crime one every 4 minutes; children are at risk.
a 1. ”Backboard Jungle” the catalogue of crimes revealed at teachers union conference is appalling; too 
many parents do not care where their kids are or what they do, Classrooms hold the future of our society; 
if they continue to be breeding violence
dl+2. “ No need to over-react” Nuclear power may 
benefit mankind or destroy it. We can not abolish it; 
Chernobyl catastrophe; the nuclear industry has only 
itself to blame for much of the terror,
d3. Rise of unemployment and inflation
al. no jobs for the young people; very low morale.
al. “Forgotten Britain”; like the unemployed, the homeless and the ill housed ought to tear at the 
conscience of the nation; they are in a plight
al. “Where is the pity” cold kills in silence; the hypothermia death; Tories have no conscience about the 
people who freeze to death
al. “freedom behind the wire” Murdock’s newspaper 5000 print workers sacked by the Sun, Sunday 
Times, News of the World.
el. US Missiles the airbus” the 
American have dropped their threat 
towards the success of Europe’s 
new airbus jet (Europe Vs 
America)
dl+2 “Jov over Nuclear Peace Move” disaster of 
Chernobyl.
al. “Britain joins hands with giss job demo”: thousands of jobless linked hands across yesterday in protest 
against mass unemployment.























al. “Arrogant, blinkered, divisive, patronising” : Thatcher; 1250000 unemployed in 1979, now trebled, 
also deprived the youth from a future, the problem of homelessness,
al. “Poverty”: the truth behind the damning figures that Mrs Thatcher is trying to hide; unemployment.
al. “100.000 jobless kids lose dole money”
c2.. “A town in mourning” Enniskillen in tears after IRA cruelty and 
atrocity; a war within (the nation)
dl+2. “The dead sea” The North sea us a cesspool 
locked with ash, toxic chemicals and radio-active 
waste. The meeting of North European ministers on 
‘what to do?’
c2. “peace before politics”
c2. “ ... step closer to oblivion”
dl. ’’end this nuclear waste” the cold war is over, 
communism has collapsed, so what is France 
doing? referring to French nuclear tests and their 
damage to the environment.
£2. “All systems go” the 
launch of windows 95 
another leap into future 
which further 
separates generations.
el. “Visions at the heart of 
Europe” Europe with social 
justice, yes.
al. “Bridge too far” the Tories creation of divided Britain is now being extended to teeth.
al. “let the rich pav their wav” : of all tax increases by this government VAT on fuel has been the worst. It 
hills the poor, the elderly and the low paid.
al. ’’for god sake”, help her madam, break downs in the Royal family;
al. ’’don’t let lives go to waste” official figures of unemployed Rowntree Foundation reveals that 7 
million people of the working age are jobless.
c2. “Time to save lives not face.”
al. “a cruel lesson” rising violence in schools due to under-spending
el. “Divide and Rule” Britain 
outside a growing European Union 
does not have a future- at least,not 
a prosperous one. If we are not in 
we can’t win our share of this huge 
market.
c2. The question of N. Ireland
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Apr. 24 al. ’’Stop this football thug tape”: with this disgraceful timing a sick video glamorising soccer thugs is 
due to go on sale.
May 1 al. “Criminal...” the chances of being attacked has risen three times since the Tories came to power.
May 1 b 1. “our race shame”, we are a pluralist society; racism is a shame.
May 22 el. ’Tantrums can not hide
buntings” beef crisis and our 
European partners
Jun. 12 el. “cashing an old grudge” he and
his anti- European allies are stuck 
in a time-wrap when Germans were 
jack-booted Nazis and Britain 
ruled the waves and an empire. The 
reality of 1996 is that 
Britain could never prosper outside 
European union.
Jun. 19 el. “EU tell 'em Tony” on
Europeanism
Aug. 22 c3. “selling off Britain” by the Pound; on privatisation
and selling to foreign firms.
Sept. 26 al. ”Death Trips”: on drugs
1997
May 23 b2. “Winning race” racial prejudice is reducing with intermarriages increasing which is good. A
more plural society.
May 30 c2. ON the question of N. Ireland
Table 3: Summary of the findings- The Daily Mirror 
Dependent variables 
Al Bl/2________Cl/2________Pl/2/3 El Fl/2/3
1920s 2 0 0 0 0 0
1930s 2 1 0 d(d2) 0 0


















A-Diminishing sense of National Belonging 
B-lncreasing sense of National Hybridity 
C-Growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness 
D-Growing sense of inability to solve own problems 
E-Growing sense of Europeanisation 
F-Growing sense of Globalisation
The Daily Mirror







































































(of the concept of a diminishing consensus 
on National ‘sovereignty’ and* homogeneity*)
A- Diminishing sense of National belonging
B- An increasing sense of National hybridity
C- Growing Regional Ethnicities
D- Growing sense of inability to solve own problems
E- Increasing sense of Europeanisation 
F- Growing sense of Globalisation
Dependent Indicators
and their codes
Al- Decline of social morality/integration
Bl- Multiculturalism 
B2- Plurality
Cl- Scotland & Wales 
C2- N. Ireland
Dl- Environment
D2- Defence and Security
D3- Decline of National Economy
El-Europe
FI- Global village of consumerism/global culture 
F2- Global Technology 
F3- Global Economy
The Independent indicator is time ( the left hand column below).
The Daily Express 
1920s & 1930s
Dependent variables
A l  B l/2 _________ C l/2 _________ D 1/2/3 E l  F l/2 /3
19 25 - - - -
1926 - - - -











al. ’’Succer pays the price of neelect”: sense of revulsion and shame about football hooliganism and 
violence in front of our European partners.
c2.” Let’s start fighting to win’' 
c2. “The busy thugs”: on IRA
Opt. 8 al. “Enough is enough” reflecting on violence
Dec 10 c2. “Smash this IRA terror '
1986
el. “Scandal of Europe’s ski-high 
air force” the activities of the 
European community shall include 
the abolition of obstacles for free 
movement and the inauguration of 
a common transport policy and 
common market. It is cheaper to 
remove obstacles.
1987
Jan 9 a l. “Tenant Power” many council estates especially in the inner cities have been degenerated into breeding 









c 1. Devolution of Scotland 
c2.25 years of Ulster nightmare 
c2. “Blair must pass the peace test’
el. notions of Euro agriculture, 
Euro; Euro citizen; Euro budget in 
“cap does not fit”
el. “Why are we so proud to be a 
nation apart?”: on the question of 
Europe; 49% voted against Europe 
The rest agree with Europeanism.
el. “A new ally for Euro-doubters”
f3. “put the screws on 
(state ) subsidies”: the 
world will not fly 
apart if the state 
sector has to go on a 
diet. It is gobbling too 














in the shipyards, 
British Leyland, steel 
industry could tell 
them (the state 
subsidy lobbies) that 
the iron law of the 
global market is 
imposed on our 
economy any way.
el. “Blinkered by Euro fears”: 
reflecting on the doubt about 
Europeanism.
c2. On the question of IRA
c2. “Killing to keep the fear alive”
el. “Clerks opts for Euro 
Vote”
e l . “Raw ambitions” we must 
surrender more of our 
sovereignty at inter­
governmental conferences to 
prevent the creation of a 
European super-state that will 
be German led.
c2. On the question of IRA
el. “Urgent action must be 
taken”: expressing frustration 
and lack of Britain is not taken 
seriously enough on its position 
on beef. “Humiliatingfiasco, 
certainly illegal move by 
partners in the European union 
to ban our beef.
el. “Euro-folly takes its doll”: 
the emerging European super­
state is destroying our national 
industries. (The article 
expresses anger and 
disappointment but resigns to 
it).
c2. “This quiet silence”: on IRA
c2. “Don’t give up on peace”
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Aug 15 el. “The painful facts” : wake
up to the threats to British 
independence and sovereignty 
under the threat of 
Europeanism.
Aug. 15 e l . “Chance to halt a rash”
cattle call” : on European ban 
on British beef, referring to the 
power of Europe to influence 
British economy
Sept. 19 el. “Churchill’s Choice” the
question in front of us is 
whether we are willing to 
recover our greatness as an 
independent & sovereign 
nation, or we submerge our 
identity in a European 
super-state.
Sept. 26 el.” Leo’s Brussell..” on the
question of European super- 
tate or preservation of 
national sovereignty.
c2. “IRA killers must not be allowed to escape justice”
Mar. 7 d3. “Is Britain on the road to the 3rd world?”.
casting doubts on the issues of national 
progress/civilisation etc.
1997
Jun. 9 a l . “So why are our young women behaving badly?” a disturbing number of teenage girls are 
finding expressions in foul language, threatening behaviour and assault, using the worst aspects 
of male characteristics. Expressing uncertainty about changing gender roles.
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Table 4: Summary of the findings- The Daily Express
Dependent variables
A l B l/2 C l/2 D l/2 /3 E l F l/2
1920s 0 0 0 0 0 0
1930s 0 0 0 0 0 0
1980s 3 0 3 (c2) 0 1 0
1990s 1 0 8 (c2) l(d3) 11 1(D)
0 l ( c l )
'A-Diminishing sense of National Belonging 
B-lncreasing sense of National Hybridity 
C-Growing sense of Ethnic Consciousness 
D-Growing sense of inability to solve own problems 
E-Growing sense of Europeanisation 
F-Growing sense of Globalisation
The Daily Express
Fig 4.1: A graphic demonstration of the findings
a  b c D E F
□  1920s 





























The Daily Express 
Fig. 4.5
Dependent Dimension (E): A growing sense of Europeanisation
1920s
0%
1930s
0%
1980s
8%
1990s
92%
